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This thesis begins by examining the factors that have resulted in the dependent
nature of Canada’s political and economic structure, and proceeds to examine how this
has contributed to the cultural amorphousness of English Canadian identity.  The
hegemonic authority of American and trans-national interests, established and maintained
in the cultural sphere through the extensive monopoly of the distribution of cultural and
media products, perpetuates the amorphousness of English Canadian culture through the
appropriation of Canadian space by the international image industry.  Such categorization
of Canadian space reflects and perpetuates the imaginary representation of Canada within
the dominant ideology as an indistinct and amorphous entity, and comes to usurp the
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Some fifteen or twenty years ago, the Globe and Mail newspaper in Toronto held
a write-in contest.  The object of the contest was to gain some understanding of how
people conceived of themselves as Canadians, by asking them to complete the phrase "As
Canadian as..." in such a way that would parallel the phrase "As American as apple pie." 
Contestants were encouraged, then, to try and encapsulate what it meant to be Canadian.
What values did it evoke?  What kind of character or personality was immediately
brought to mind?  What kind of social situation did it reflect and represent?  The winning
entry, selected from well over a thousand responses, was "As Canadian as possible, under
the circumstances".
So accurate and effective was this phrase in concisely summarizing the reality of
Canadian culture and identity that it quickly worked its way into the national lexicon,
essentially fulfilling the objective of the newspaper contest by encapsulating, within the
minds of many Canadians, what it means to be Canadian.  The constant struggle to define
and conceptualize Canadian national identity would seem to have become in and of itself
a crucial, definitive aspect of who we are as a nation.  But what are the circumstances,
then, that we are forced to struggle against in the process of self-determination?  Why, for
that matter, is a continual process of self-determination even necessary?  Should a
v
national identity, character, and purpose not be something self-evident?
My analysis that follows is largely concerned with the relationship between issues
of space, place, and identity within English Canadian culture, and the manner in which
Canada's inherent dependency has facilitated and perpetuated American cultural
hegemony, which in turn has resulted in the categorization of Canada's inherent
amorphousness as a defining cultural characteristic. 
In Chapter I, I will provide an historical analysis of the circumstances and
conditions that have resulted in the absence and amorphousness that typify Canadian
culture and identity.  Canada's inherent dependency, a result of geographic and climatic
circumstance and a colonial predilection towards continentalist economic practices, will
be introduced as an important factor in the establishment of the hegemonic relationship in
which Canada is marginalized and made subordinant to the interests of a dominant power,
most notably and recently the United States.  The effects of Canada's dependent character
on the process of establishing its communications channels and its (in)ability to permit
the development of national forms of cultural expression will be the subject of an analysis
that will culminate in a case study of the Canadian Co-operation Project, which allowed
for the entrenchment of the American film industry in Canada's exhibition and
distribution sectors.
A prominent assertion running throughout my analysis is the argument that
Canada, which has always been a deficient example of the traditional model of the nation-
state and has also developed as a nation-state in direct relation to the cultural and
economic hegemony of a dominant power, serves as an early prototype for the evolution
of the new nation-state developing to meet the demands of the globalized world.  Chapter
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II will examine the manner in which the effects of American media imperialism in
Canada anticipate the impact of American cultural products and signifiers on other
national cultures around the world.  I will also provide a case study that illustrates in
concrete terms the hegemonic authority exercised by American interests in maintaining
the perpetual motion of information flows that both facilitate and perpetuate the system of
cultural distribution that maintains the hegemonic order.
 Chapter III will largely be devoted to substantiating and identifying the distinction
of 'English Canadian' culture and identity.  This analysis will expand on the relevance of
issues and concerns raised in Chapter I, such as the manner in which Canada's inherent
dependency, absence, and amorphousness can be interpreted as national characteristics
that can actually allow for the development of a national discourse and forms of cultural
expression.  Also in this chapter, I will examine the manner in which some forms of
English Canadian cultural expression can be seen as an example of a new kind of
nationalism, which expresses a keen awareness of its subordinant nature while still
identifying it as a source of empowerment.  The English Canadian rock band The
Tragically Hip will serve as the model for this particular study, which will also offer
insight into the relationship of English Canadian discourse to issues of technology and the
implications of this for the development of the new nation-state.
The purpose of Chapter IV is to elaborate on and complicate my arguments in
Chapter III, making it clear that, in spite of the forms of cultural expression employed by
many English Canadians, English Canadian culture remains marginalized, even within its
own nation and especially with respect to film and television, as a result of the dominance
of American cultural discourse in Canada.  Again, it will be explained that this is a
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phenomenon that has resulted not from external American oppression, but rather with the
complicity, both historical and contemporary, of the Canadian state.  Canada's inherent
dependency, it must be remembered, is a crucial component to fully understanding the
conception of space and place within English Canadian culture, and the representation of
amorphousness as a defining cultural trait.  I will conclude this chapter by examining the
current state of dependency that exists within the film industry in Canada, and discuss
how this further marginalizes an English Canadian filmic discourse.
In Chapter V, I will attempt to draw from my assertions and conclusions made in
the previous chapters to assist in my analysis of American films and television series that
appropriate the amorphousness of Canadian locations.  This amorphousness is
constructed and packaged as a commodity, a process that further entrenches the
hegemonic control of American and trans-national interests and the subordinance of
Canadian concerns.  I will draw from theories of cultural geography as well as media
industry studies to elaborate on how this conception of Canada is maintained and
perpetuated by the international image industry, due to the dominance of American
cultural discourse as a system of representation and the dependency of Canadian interests




THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTER OF CANADIAN  SOCIETY:
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
There's a dream he dreams where the high school is dead and stark
It's a museum and we're all locked up in it after dark
Where the walls are lined all yellow, grey and sinister
Hung with pictures of our parents' prime ministers
Wheat kings and pretty things,
wait and see what tomorrow brings.
-- The Tragically Hip, "Wheat Kings"
The sense of stifled desperation expressed in the excerpt above is typical of the
Canadian perspective, and indicative of the events and circumstances that have helped
form the Canadian consciousness.  Canada has, throughout its entire history, been a
peripheral nation, so marginal and ideologically diffuse, in fact, that it has been argued
whether Canada can even be said to constitute a nation in the traditional sense of the
word.  With two distinct founding national traditions, French and English, each
possessing a different historical legacy and claiming different national priorities, Canada's
national character, further complicated by an ethnically and religiously diverse
population, has been fragmentary and divisive at worst and ambivalently peaceable at
best.  Issues and conflicts that have arisen, both internally amongst various Canadian
groups and externally in relation to other nation-states, have paradoxically been
complicated by and ultimately resolved in typically ambivalent manner by Canada's lack
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of autonomy.   This inherent amorphousness and the inability of the Canadian
consciousness to define itself on its own terms, relying instead on conceptions held and
propagated by dominant interests, is indicative of the extent to which dominant outside
interests, be they French, British, American, or trans-national, have consistently and
continually exercised control over the economic, political, and cultural character of the
Canadian consciousness.  Because of these conditions, as well as others that will be
discussed and analysed throughout this thesis, Canada can be seen as a model of the new
nation-state emerging from the ashes of the Fordist period and forged by the effects of
globalization; a nation-state in which cultural distinctness and national priorities are
subordinate to economic imperatives determined by global trends.
Canada's Economic Background:  Staples Theory,
Branch Plant, Dependency
Studies of Canada's cultural situation have tended by and large to focus on
Canada's colonial history and its subsequent lack of autonomy and sovereignty in the
context of relationships with Britain and the United States, as well as Canada's status as a
dependent state, both economically and culturally, existing on the periphery of the
dominant American metropole.  The focus of much attention by scholars has been the
impact of this on Canada's (in)ability to express and even develop its own cultural
concerns through channels and modes of communication that have been marginalised by
or made subordinate to the priorities of the dominant ideology, be it British, American,
trans-national, or some combination thereof.  As Richard Collins has observed, the ever-
present motif in studies of Canadian culture and identity and the relationship between
these and the country's economy has been the manner in which they tend to integrate
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"dependency theory with a long-established Canadian conception of the nation being
synonymous with its communication systems."1  Collins also explains that, although
dependency theory originated as an avenue for analysing economic relations, and usually
from a Latin American or Third World perspective, it "has metamorphosed to embrace
cultural relations, and 'dependency' is now a pervasive metaphor used to characterize
Canada's relation to the United States.  It has become the dominant optic through which
scholars of Canadian communication...have analysed the Canadian audio-visual media."2
 The difficulty in determining a solid conception of Canadian identity, then, has been
attributed not only to Canada's colonial past and the difficulties of self-determination
associated with it, but even more so to the affect on the Canadian cultural consciousness
of the inability to communicate its own cultural discourse through the channels that have
supposedly been constructed for that very purpose.  Such a dilemma tends to promote the
sentiment that the expression of national priorities are irrelevant in comparison to those of
the dominant ideology.  Therefore, that which is considered 'national' becomes marginal
and fragmentary, even within the conceptions of that particular national consciousness.
A predicament such as this could very easily be attributed to Canada's colonial
history, and the manner in which this has resulted in an emphasis on the priorities of the
dominant discourse, but it must be remembered that Canada was never a colony in the
traditional sense of the word, and that the particularly unique set of circumstances that
influenced its evolution as a nation also influenced the way it primarily perceives its
national characteristics only through the externally imposed dominant discourse.  Stephen
Clarkson has argued that Canada's colonial status, and the manner in which it has affected
the formation of Canadian culture and identity, has often been misinterpreted, insisting
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that "it would be better to understand Canada historically as an outpost of empire, rather
than a conquered colony."3  As such, Clarkson suggests that the Canadian character has
been shaped not by generations of oppression from an outside source, which to a certain
extent might inspire a kind of collective revolt that binds people together in a cohesive
national sentiment, but rather by centuries of passive involvement, of situations in which
we have been told what to do, or have simply understood what was expected of us, and
have participated at the benefit of a semi-prosperous, largely peaceable existence.  This
particularly passive development and our continual reliance upon a dominant order has
also accounted for the lack of a cohesive national political culture and the nationally
unifying symbols and philosophies that it would produce.
In his seminal study The Fur Trade in Canada:  An Introduction to Canadian
Economic History, first published in 1926, the Canadian historian Harold A. Innis argues
that the Canadian economy was structured and organized around the production or
extraction of a number of staple goods, beginning with the beaver pelt during the fur trade
in the seventeenth-century and continuing with lumber, wheat, minerals, and paper and
agricultural products in the centuries to come.  Because of the manner in which Canada
was utilized as a resource hinterland for the benefit of more economically and
technologically advanced nations, Innis argues, Canada developed as an appendage
subordinate to the dominant metropoles of first France, then Britain, and eventually the
United States.  As a result, the very basis of the Canadian economic philosophy is one in
which Canada specializes in fulfilling the needs of more firmly established business
interests, relies upon foreign capital, and thus becomes nothing more than a peripheral
satellite economically dependent upon the dominant centre.  The ideological implications
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of this are also dramatic, as it is argued that the peripheral nation, dependent as it is upon
the economic welfare of the dominant nation, therefore aligns its own ideological values
and priorities with those of the centre.4  Thus, in the long run, staples theory holds
implications not only for Canada's economic structure but also its ideological and cultural
character.  The excerpt at the beginning of this chapter, from a song by the English
Canadian band The Tragically Hip (who will be the subject of further discussion in
Chapter III), illustrates the profound and deeply-ingrained impact of Canada's economic
dependency upon Canadian psychology and identity.  We are a nation of "wheat kings,"
the song proposes, a people defined by our role as 'hewers of wood and drawers of water'
undertaken for the benefit of interests to whom we remain subordinate, while we lament
the historical legacy that has brought us to where we are but remain unable to take charge
of our own destinies and take our future down a new path.
For many, however, staples theory has not provided adequate explanation for the
development and evolution of Canada's economic character.  Richard Collins, feeling that
other factors such as geography and climate played as much a part in the evolution of
Canada's economic behaviour as its reliance on the exportation of staple goods, has
argued that "History poses a problem to staples theorists in that the development of
manufacturing in Canada and Canada's transition to its current highly urbanized state are
not readily reconciled with the underdevelopment predictions of staples theory.  The
second stage of dependency theory has therefore argued that manufacturing in Canada has
been essentially of a 'branch plant' kind and that the metropolitan powers, pre-eminently
the United States, have retained R&D and high value-added stages of production at
home."5  The leading proponent of dependency theory in terms of understanding Canada's
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economic relationship with the United States has been Dallas Smythe, who, as Collins
notes, "cites both Canada's status as the country with the highest direct U.S. investment
(31 per cent of all foreign U.S. direct investment in 1964, 22 per cent in 1978 with the
United Kingdom in 1978 the next largest recipient of U.S. investment, with 12 percent)
and Canadian investment in the United States -- 1978 $6.2 billion -- as evidence of
Canada's dependency."6  Manjunath Pendakur has also explained how American
dominance of the means of distribution in Canada's film and media sectors is
symptomatic of the hegemonic structure within the Canadian economy as a whole:
 Canada has been the chief destination of U.S. direct invest-
ment since the turn of the century, accounting for a consistent
25 percent... The book value of U.S. direct investment in
Canada is estimated to be nearly $40 billion.  This amounts to
about 80 percent of all foreign investment in the country...
[I]n recent years retained earnings of foreign subsidiaries have
been the principal source of additions to foreign direct invest-
ment.  Foreign direct investment is generally in the most
lucrative and key sectors of the economy.  For example, 78
per cent of Canada's oil and gas, chemicals, automobile, and
electrical products industries are controlled by U.S. investors.7
The numbers that Smythe and Pendakur cite here are indicative of a time when there
arose in Canada an outcry against such a great degree of foreign ownership of Canadian
business.  The level of foreign control in Canada reached its peak at 37.6% in 1971.  In
response, the Trudeau government in 1973 enacted the Foreign Investment Review Act
(FIRA).  Though FIRA was successful in curtailing the extent of foreign ownership in
Canada, the Mulroney government, which was also responsible for negotiating the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Mexico in the late
1980's, abolished FIRA in 1985 and replaced it with Investment Canada, whose mandate
was not to discourage foreign investment but rather to promote and encourage it.  Recent
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studies indicate that foreign-owned companies constituted 31.5% of the $1.3 trillion
corporate revenue in Canada in 1996,8 a sharp increase that brings Canada near the same
level that it was so determined to turn away from twenty-five years ago.9
Dependency as a Condition of Canadian Political and Economic Culture
It seems clear, then, that a reliance on foreign capital is a very tangible and
unavoidable aspect of Canada's economic reality.  Canadian historian Mel Hurtig has
asserted that "There is no other major developed nation in the world that has the degree of
foreign ownership that we have in Canada, not by a long shot."10  As I have previously
mentioned, Canada's economic dependency can be seen as a product of its historical and
geographic circumstances, and arose as a necessary element of the building of the
Canadian nation-state.  Michael Bliss has asserted that "in an integrated continentalist
economy, a branch plant structure designed for anything but regional economies would
have been inefficient and superfluous."11  With its tariff protection policy -- the National
Policy -- dictating its economic and political agenda, the Macdonald government of the
late nineteenth-century sowed the seeds for a branch plant economy dependent on foreign
capital, but did so in the interests, and by the only manner feasible, of establishing in
Canada a strong and stable economy.  "The economic nationalism of the late nineteenth-
century," Bliss argues, "operated and was known to operate to induce Americans to enter
Canada and participate directly in the Canadian economy... [I]t now appears to have been
a peculiarly self-defeating kind of economic nationalism."12
If dependency was proffered by the federal government as a national requirement,
it was not over the objection of the Canadian people at the time.  In describing the
economic climate and the attitudes of the general populace towards branch plant
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industries and the welcoming of foreign capital into Canada around the turn of the
century, Bliss has further argued that
massive inputs of foreign capital were seen to be absolutely 
central for this concept of national economic development. 
Outside money was wooed without regard for nationality or
modern distinctions between direct and portfolio investment. 
Few people in the half-century after Confederation questioned
Canada's absolute reliance on foreign capital.  Aside from
worrying now and then about ever being able to pay off our
debts, no one was seriously upset about the ultimate conse-
quences of a high percentage of foreign ownership -- either
British or American -- of our resources.  Least of all were they
worried about the flow of interests and profits to foreign
countries.  As Industrial Canada commented in 1908, 'That a
portion of the profits made on the development of our latest
resources has to be paid out in interest is no hardship, since
without the capital there would have been no profits at all'.13
It would seem, then, that Canada has been the model nation-state for trans-national
investment opportunities, serving as an early prototype for the kind of free flowing,
barrier-less trade that has become an increasingly common aspect of the world market at
the end of the twentieth-century.  Though there have been numerous federal policies
attempting to prevent or curtail free trade with the United States throughout Canada's
history, the attempts have been consistently unsuccessful, something which Michael Bliss
attributes to the unwillingness or inability of the federal government to enforce such laws
when pressured by the United States (an example of which will be discussed in a case
study in the next chapter), predicated by a dependency on capital from south of the border
that essentially provides the structure and stability of the Canadian economy.  The
National Policy of tariff protection, Bliss argues, ironically "caused more American
manufacturing penetration than completely continentalist or free trade policies would
have encouraged... The funny thing about our tariff walls was that we always wanted the
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enemy to jump over them."14
Some parallels can be drawn, in fact, between the Canadian trade relationship
with the United States at the turn of the century and the current state of activity on the
world market.  As buzz words like 'Americanization', 'globalization', and 'free flow'
increasingly cause countries like Britain, Germany, and particularly France to dig in their
heels against the onslaught of American cultural products and economic imperialism,
while also inspiring them to pontificate on the nature of their societal and cultural
distinctness, the inevitable comparison of their current circumstance to the overall
character of Canada's cultural situation (which I will discuss further in Chapter III), must
come with an important distinction.  On the one hand, Canada is indeed the "clearest
early warning system to many countries who are still on the fringe of a universal process
that is proceeding with enormous impetus,"15 which is a result in part of our geographic
proximity, lack of cultural screens, and our dependent economic structure that allows
American business interests, including all forms of media, to cross relatively freely over
the border.  But it must also be remembered that Canada has never had the experience of
existing as a nation-state without having to negotiate with the presence and influence of
the United States.  Therefore, the sense of dependency ingrained in the Canadian
consciousness is not merely one of an economic nature; it is a result of the "political
dependency and absence of sovereignty"16 that has been the fate of a people handed from
the French to the British empires and that has grown into its own in the shadow of an
older, more prosperous and affluent nation, on whom it had to paradoxically rely for
capital in order to avoid being consumed by the threat of manifest destiny.  Or as Leo
Panitch has observed, "Canada had exchanged the 'shadowy and unreal independence
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offered within the British empire for the shadowy and unreal independence tolerated by
the Americans.'"17  
Abraham Rotstein has provided further explanation for the collective national
psychology that accepted, approved of, or at the very least was generally unconcerned
with the establishment of such a dependent economic structure in Canada:
What we [Canadians] understand least is the nature of power,
particularly as it applies to the economy.  Power has generally
been treated with deep suspicion and arm's length reservation in
English political philosophy... We have relied instead on a faith
in the built-in harmony of the market society growing out of
Adam Smith's maxims about the individual pursuit of self-interest. 
The effect has been to gloss over or to negate the importance
of the locus of economic power.  Thus when the power to make
decisions shifts out of the country by virtue of foreign ownership
of the economy, we are barely conscious that anything of
importance has happened.18
Of course, Rotstein is a little too extreme in his assertion that Canadians are "barely
conscious" of foreign economic control or the shift in power to outside interests that goes
along with it.  Indeed, part of our identity as Canadians is based on our passive/
aggressive relationship to such issues.  As Collins has argued, "Resistance to centrifugal
forces in Canada and the 'continentalist forces' in North America have been consistent
themes in Canadian history and public policy.  Both communications and the state have
been central to Canada's continuing process of nation-building and self-assertion."19  A
more accurate addendum to Rotstein's argument, then, would be that Canadians are
indeed aware of such issues as the locality of power and the sources that drive and benefit
from our economy, and often demand that steps be taken to remedy the situation.  But
when such an attempt is rebuked by the dominant interest, as it typically is, we turn away,
dejected and reticent, comfortable with the 'pretty things' that we do have, and resigned to
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'wait and see what tomorrow brings'.  "In other words," Tony Wilden argues, "this country
has never at any time since the Europeans named it been other than a colony controlled,
exploited, and garrisoned for the benefit of somebody else -- someone other than the
working people of many nationalities who built it, someone other than the working
people who still carry it on their backs."20
That government policies and industry agendas, both in the early years of the
economic development of the Canadian nation-state and throughout this century,
contributed to Canada's dependency on foreign capital is an important fact to consider,
but one that must also be analysed further.  As I have mentioned, the Canadian state had
little choice or opportunity available to it other than to continue its national development
along essentially the same lines that its colonial past dictated.  Partha Chatterjee reminds
us that the colonial state "was not just the agency that brought the modular forms of the
modern state to the colonies; it was also an agency that was destined never to fulfil the
normalizing mission of the modern state because the premise of its power was a rule of
colonial difference, namely, the preservation of the alienness of the ruling group."21 
Thus, Canada's dependency can be seen as a result of our historical evolution from a
colonial 'outpost of empire(s)' to a nation-state that, as a direct result of our consistent and
continual subordinance to dominant interests, lacks the necessary sovereignty and
autonomy of modern states.  In this regard, American hegemony within Canada must not
be seen as something imposed upon us from the outside -- a philosophy which implies
that the resistance against such hegemony could well result in its removal, as though one
were trying to struggle out of a straight-jacket -- but rather as something that constitutes a
very integral part of who we are as Canadians, something that makes up the fabric of our
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national consciousness.  To deny or refuse to acknowledge this fact is to be counter-
productive.  The notion of dependency, then, reaches far beyond the realm of the
economic or the political, beyond the boundaries of government and the nation-state, and
into the collective consciousness of the Canadian people.  Dependency, Collins argues,
"is secured and maintained more fundamentally in civil society itself -- in the integration
of all the dominant factions of capital under the hegemony of the American bourgeoisie,
in a continental labour market and international unions, and above all in our culture -- not
so much the 'haute culture' of the intellectuals but the popular culture which is produced
and reproduced in advertising, the mass media and the mass educational system."22
Dependency is propagated in Canadian society by working itself into a cycle of
resistance/conflict/denial/acceptance.  In other words, Canadians, believing themselves to
be citizens of a modern nation-state and not of a colonial entity, are drawn to resist their
roles as subordinates to others, resulting in a diplomatic conflict (see case study in
Chapter II) in which their demands and concerns are invariably denied, resulting in a
bitter acceptance that further, and paradoxically, fuels both their ultimate acceptance of
their fate and their desire to resist it further.23  Summing up the extent to which dependent
capitalist development has become ingrained in the socio-economic necessities of the
Canadian lifestyle, Bliss asserts that "On the whole Canadians continue to believe --
wisely, I think -- that a limited but prosperous national existence is preferable to a pure,
poor nationality."24  But even when such an act of acceptance is made, the contradiction
between a prosperous existence and a poor nationality remains.  It is never resolved, and
the psychic scars run deep in the Canadian consciousness.  Wilden, in discussing the
structure of power in Canada, describes the effects of this contradiction on the
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conceptions of Canadian identity:
But many Imaginary Canadians in positions of power insist
that Canada is an independent, industrialized, democratic
state.  Others, a little less ignorant perhaps, but no less cynical,
declare that if Canada is a colony, then that is what Canadians
want.  Others yet more extremist will say that this is the best
Canadians can hope for or deserve.  But we are not by birth or
nature 'colonials'.  We were not born with a 'colonial mentality'. 
We were brought up and trained to be this way, in our collective
history as in our personal lives.25
Though Canada may not be a colony, and its people therefore not colonials, in the
traditional sense of the word derived from nineteenth-century imperialism, it still cannot
deny the lack of autonomy that characterizes its state and affects the consciousness of its
people.  Northrop Frye has echoed Wilden's concession that Canadians are indeed
conditioned into thinking of themselves as a powerless, subordinate, dominated people. 
Drawing from his experience teaching in both American and Canadian universities, Frye
has observed that "'American students have been conditioned from infancy to think of
themselves as citizens of one of the world's great powers.  Canadians are conditioned
from infancy to think of themselves as citizens of a country of uncertain identity, a
confusing past, and a hazardous future.'"26
 The extent to which dependency as a characteristic of the Canadian
consciousness is maintained and propagated as much by Canadian interests -- not just at
the level of business and industry but also in the realm of the social and cultural -- as it is
by American hegemony must not be underestimated.  It pervades all aspects of Canadian
society from within and is utilized by outside interests to their own advantage.  The
tendency in Canadian political culture, however, is to believe that dependency is forced
upon us from the outside, and that the state, be it the federal or provincial governments,
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represents the means by which such dependency must be averted.  As I have already
illustrated, though, the Canadian state has done more to entrench the notion of
dependency in Canadian thought than any American corporation could ever achieve. 
Thus, as Abraham Rotstein has argued, "the current mix of cultural practices in Canada
does not exist because of some collusion on the part of American capital and the
Canadian state, but because current cultural practices have been largely accepted and
internalized by Canadians themselves.  The state does not stand above society, either as
the bete noir of cultural dependency or as the potential saviour of national cultural
development."27  In order for a strong, distinct Canadian identity and culture to be
determined and flourish in its own right, then, we must first acknowledge the nature of
dependency in Canada and its relationship to American hegemony, rather than continually
attempting to struggle against the hegemonic order on its own terms.  Canadian cultural
dependency, a result of the inherent historical legacy ingrained in our economic character
and political culture, for better or worse, represents an indelible and undeniable part of
who we are today, and we cannot successfully forge a strong and healthy national cultural
identity without first recognizing and coming to terms with this.
Dependency and the Lament for Cultural Expression
A great deal of attention will be paid in this thesis towards media industries in
Canada and the impact of their administration on English Canadian cultural identity,
particularly with regards to the regulation, or lack thereof, of the access of American
media products to Canadian modes of communication and to the complicity of the
Canadian state in this process.  In many respects, the dependent nature of Canada's
economic structure clouded the minds of many government leaders and officials in the
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first half of this century who were unable to conceive of the impact of this dependency on
Canada's cultural spheres.  The tendency of Canadians to view their country's dependency
as an external oppressive force, and to struggle in Sisyphean fashion against the dominant
order when the only real possible outcome is the reassertion of our own subordinance,
only began to take shape in the postwar period and finally coalesced in government
initiatives in the 1960's.  Prior to this time, as I have already discussed, there was little
organized concern about foreign control of certain sectors of the economy or of various
industries, or of the effects that such dependency may have on Canadian culture or
national identity.  The Massey Commission, filed by federal committee in 1951, was the
first time a cohesive argument was presented which outlined in material fashion the
impact of Canada's economic dependency on the United States on cultural activities and
forms of expression in Canada.  Though many of the Commission's recommendations
pertaining to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) were taken into
consideration by the federal government, action was not taken in the Canadian film
industry or music industry (better described as communities rather than industries,
actually) until the late 1960's.
As I will discuss in further detail in Chapter III, Ian Angus has identified the
rhetoric of left-nationalism as the primary impetus behind the movement towards
somehow rectifying the effects of Canada's economic dependency on its modes and
channels of cultural expression.  Angus argues that "the main rhetorical form of left-
nationalism is a lament for the failure adequately to preserve the past and an argument
that such preservation requires a radical reorientation in the future."28  The sentiment
within Canada that there occurred in the past a series of failures to preserve our national
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culture is legitimate and justifiable, but the state has continually erred in its attempts to
forge a different future, primarily by relying on policy implementation and other actions
that treat dependency as externally imposed rather than inherently Canadian, and thus
attempt to struggle against the hegemonic order on its own terms.  Examples of such
cases will be presented throughout this paper, but I would like here to briefly summarize
some of the events within Canadian cinema in the first half of this century that would
later serve as an inspirational albatross in the context of left-nationalism.
Ted Magder has explained that, in spite of Canada's consistent refusal to institute
regulatory policies of any kind against the exhibition of American films or to set up a
quota system of some kind that would benefit the indigenous film industry -- something
undertaken by virtually every other Western industrial nation at some time during the
inter-war period -- Canada was actually the first Western industrialized country to found a
state-run film production institute.  Despite the enthusiasm and moderate success of some
of the early filmmakers and their efforts (Nell Shipman serving as the best example), the
production of feature films facilitated by the institute, founded in 1918, quickly proved
incompatible with the small domestic market, vast geography, and poor communications
infrastructure that Canada offered.  By the mid-1920's, the federal government had
abandoned the institute and the overall project of establishing a film production industry,
apparently following the advice of many American industry insiders who quipped that it
made as much sense to set up a film industry in Canada as it did to build a pulp mill in
Hollywood.
With the establishment of an indigenous film industry in Canada clearly no longer
on the federal government's agenda, Ray Peck, the director of the Canadian Government
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Motion Picture Bureau, began to view the prosperous American film industry as yet
another source of capital from the dominant centre that could perhaps be persuaded to
'invest' some of its capital in Canada.  In 1927, Peck explained that, "We are attempting at
all times, as Canadians, to induce American capital and manufacturing interests to come
into Canada and establish branch factories.  I look on the American film industry much as
a branch factory idea insofar as it affects Canada.  American motion picture producers
should be encouraged to establish production branches in Canada to make films designed
for British empire consumption."29  The nature of Canada's dependency is perhaps best
illustrated in Peck's last sentence here.  Not only was he promoting an American branch
plant film industry in Canada, but his intention was that it be for the benefit of the other
dominant centre to whom Canada was subordinate.  It would seem as though an
independent Canadian film industry was of no concern to those who had the power to
establish one.  The American industry had repeatedly declined Peck's invitation since
1925, but meanwhile in Britain in 1927, as Pendakur explains further, "the British
government intervened to preserve British film production by passing the Film Act of
1927 which imposed a distributor's quota thereby making the production of British films
inevitable."30  With this regulation of the distribution of films in Britain restricting the
access of American films to British theatres, the American majors finally accepted Ray
Peck's invitation to produce films in Canada.  These 'quota quickies' allowed the
American industry to circumvent the distribution quota in Britain by qualifying under the
banner of 'British empire consumption', and also, as I will discuss further in Chapter III,
served as a significant milestone in the shift in dependency from Britain to the United
States.
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What is most evident from the examples above, though, is the extent to which
Canada has seemed incapable of diverging from its inherent dependent nature.  In
attempting to encapsulate the political, economic, historical and sociological reasons for
Canada's particular political cultural identity, Rotstein has explained that:
 The greatest weakness in the set of requirements for preserving
Canadian independence is the peculiar intellectual and political
tradition that forms the basis of the Canadian political culture. 
While we have gained the legal trappings of sovereignty and 
independence, we are unable to muster the symbols and the
political vocabulary necessary to understand the vital interests of
this country and to act for its preservation.  The essential weak-
ness of a Canadian political culture lies in its derivative liberalism. 
This is the heritage of an intellectual colonialism whose concepts
and symbols are inadequate to our dilemma and bypass the major 
problems surrounding Canadian independence.31 
This lack, or absence, of such national symbols and concepts is also a reason why the
Canadian filmic discourse has been so weak in its evolution (a discussion continued in
greater length in Chapter IV).  The paradox exists in the fact that government officials
and policy makers have emphasized the importance of developing a film culture that
expresses national interests and both reflects and promotes national culture, when it
seems clear that:  a) officials and policy makers have little autonomy in the face of
Canada's legacy of dependency and the hegemonic control exercised by American and
trans-national interests; and b) largely because of this dependency, Canada's particular
national culture, with its lack of unifying symbols and concepts and an aversion to heroic
myths -- indeed, it is better defined by what it is not than by what it is -- lends itself very
poorly to the medium of film, especially when that medium, and its distribution
throughout Canada, is dominated by the glorified, seductive mythologies created by the
American cinema.   
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Case Study:  the Canadian Co-operation Project
In short, then, attempts to free Canadian cinema from Canada's historical
dependency collided head-on with the results of a half-century of neglect of the
distribution, exhibition, and production sectors of the Canadian film industry.  The final
nail in this coffin would be driven by the Canadian Co-operation Project, which laid the
groundwork for ensuring that the distribution and exhibition of films within Canada
would be controlled by the American industry.  Indeed, Magder explains that, as a direct
result of the Project, instituted in 1948, "Canada had come to represent the one last
bastion of Hollywood's halcyon days.  The MPAA's annual report of 1952 noted that
Canada's percentage of Hollywood's domestic market had gone from 4 per cent in 1948 to
10 per cent in 1951.  With $18.5 million in remittances, Eric Johnston [president of the
MPEAA] was able to report that 'outside the U.S. itself, Canada ranks as the second
largest market in the world for Hollywood films.'"32
 Since the rise of Hollywood's international presence in the years following the
First World War, countries around the world have been wary of both the ability of
American films to infiltrate and dominate their nation's movie screens (this will be
analysed further in the next chapter) and the implications of this on their respective
national cultures.  As a result of the advantageous position held by American industry
after both World Wars, virtually every Western industrialized nation in the world took
steps in both instances to regulate the flow of American films, often simultaneously in an
effort to support their own national cinema, however small.  Hamelink has described in
greater detail how other countries responded to the threat of American cultural
imperialism manifested by the film industry: 
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the massive invasion of American films in the early 1920's
caused restrictive measures, first by Germany, later by France
and the U.K.  After the Second World War, with massive
imports of U.S.-made films, worries rose in European countries
about the protection of national film production and about their
balance of payments.  These worries motivated measures of
import control that largely worked along two lines.  The number
of imported films was limited (so-called number quotas) and
screen time was shared between foreign and domestic films
(so-called screen quotas).33 
Hamelink asserts that these policies had by the 1960's resulted in a more balanced
environment in which "the European film industry became stronger, a strong trend
towards trade liberalism emerged in Europe, and several co-production and co-investment
schemes for film production developed between European markets and the U.S. film
industry."34
Canadian officials, however, as I have described above, took no such steps. 
Instead, as Magder explains, "In 1948, they negotiated their own special deal with the
Hollywood majors... The Canadian Co-operation Project, as it came to be known, was yet
another attempt at branch plant production; it could be termed a success only if its
primary goal was to leave the commercial film sector unfettered and unchanged."35  The
branch plant production which Canadian officials were attempting to establish by way of
the Project was not American film production, though this would develop into a viable
economic opportunity some forty years later.  Rather, the aim of the Project was to
increase direct American investment in Canada in as many sectors of the economy as
possible, an objective that hardly needed the encouragement of a government-endorsed
policy.  Instead, the American film industry, through the administration of exhibition
exercised by the MPAA and the MPEAA, established Canada as a branch plant market to
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serve as an additional, and in many cases surplus source of revenue for the American
domestic market.  In this regard, the role of the Canadian market for American films in
the postwar period anticipates that of the overseas and particularly the Asian market in
the period following the end of the cold war, providing the American industry with
surplus revenue to be gained at little cost in addition to the revenue received from the
domestic American market.  The manner in which the American film industry achieved
the means of accomplishing this will be discussed in the next chapter.  The Co-operation
Project, then, positioned Canada as a branch plant not in terms of production, but rather
in terms of consumption.  Distribution and exhibition of films in Canada remained firmly
under the control of the Hollywood majors, by way of the MPAA and MPEAA, and the
Canadian public was constructed as nothing more than what Dallas Smythe has termed an
'audience commodity'.  In Chapter IV I will discuss the recent development of the
utilization of Canadian locations for the actual production of American films for
international consumption, and postulate the effects and implications of this on Canadian
culture and identity.
The Co-operation Project was essentially an opportunity for the American
industry to suppress the growing desire among some circles in Canada to ensure that steps
were taken to loosen the grip which American interests had over the distribution and
exhibition sectors of the Canadian industry, and to even pass legislation requiring that a
portion of the profits made by the American majors from the exhibition of films in
Canada be invested in the production of Canadian films.  Magder explains how
Government Film Commissioner Ross McLean tried to spearhead such an initiative in the
years following the Second World War:
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On 1 December 1947, McLean sent a memo to the minister
of National Revenue, J.J. McCann, that endorsed the
government's stated intention of encouraging 'the investment
of funds by United States owned companies in the production
of films in Canada for international distribution'... McLean
felt that friendly persuasion would not suffice to ensure 
compliance...[and] recommended that the American companies
be 'induced or required to invest a portion of the yearly
Canadian revenues -- say $4,000,000 to $5,000,000 -- primarily
in producing films in Canada'.36 
The MPAA, which already faced such restrictive measures against the exhibition of
American films in European nations, was not about to allow the Canadian market to start
building walls against the flow of American cultural products, especially considering the
ease of export which American products had traditionally enjoyed into Canada, not to
mention the lackadaisical attitude taken by the Canadian government in relation to the
activities of the American film industry in Canada prior to the Second World War. 
Indeed, the dependent nature of the Canadian economy on American interests allowed the
American film industry to side-step any restrictive measures against the distribution and
exhibition of their films in Canada by offering the federal government a set of industrial
objectives that, on the one hand, would appeal to the Canadian tendency to rely on
American capital, and on the other, would facilitate the entrenchment of the American
film industry in the distribution and exhibition sectors of the Canadian industry.  The
following excerpt from a memo drafted by Eric Johnston, president of the MPEAA, lays
out the criteria for what would become the Canadian Co-operation Project:
'a) to make a short film explaining Canada's trade-dollar shortage
to American and Canadian audiences; b) to increase coverage of
Canadian subjects in American newsreels; c) to have short films
made about Canada by U.S. film companies; d) to obtain
distribution of some NFB films in America; e) to insert some
Canadian sequences in U.S. feature films; f) to make a series of
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radio recordings by U.S. stars extolling the virtues of Canada as a
vacation land; g) to distribute fewer 'low-toned' gangster films in
Canada; and h) to appoint a staff man for liaison of the project.'37 
Evident in the above passage is the very clear sense of Canada as a subordinate, marginal,
weaker nation whose concerns and priorities are not only seen to be insignificant, but so
too is its very character.  Aside from the immediate material effects of the Co-operation
Project -- the banal, stereotypical, and geographically inaccurate representation of Canada
in American films, the failure of the Canadian state to regulate the distribution and
exhibition of American films in Canada -- its real significance lies in the way it both
revealed and perpetuated the cycle in which Canadian dependency on American capital
leaves the powers of Canadian cultural definition and characterization in American hands,
resulting in the conception of Canada within the dominant ideology as one of absence and
amorphousness.  The effect of this on the manner in which Canadians conceive of their
own identity and culture will be touched on throughout this thesis, and examined in
greater detail in Chapters IV and V.
The positive reception of the Co-operation Project by the majority of Canadian
government officials reflected, as Magder puts it, "the complex, much broader relations
of dependency that deeply penetrated Canadian society...  What is crucial to understand is
that the Canadian state had not simply caved in to American pressure with respect to film
policy.  Nor did the problem lie in Hollywood itself, as though it stood alone as an
ideological and commercial structure."38  Rather, the federal government, as in its earlier
actions of economic dependency discussed above, possessed full complicity in events that
resulted in circumstances perceived to be detrimental to Canadian culture, which the
federal governments of later generations would dedicate hundreds of millions of dollars
24
trying in vain to overcome.  However, feeling that the "popular culture" of the American
cinema was an inconsequential threat to the cultural lives of Canadians, many Canadian
business interests and ruling elite at the time of the Project treated the American film
industry much in the same way that the industrial activities of the dominant centre had
always been viewed in Canada; as a means by which our own economic initiatives could
be strengthened.  Magder, in a rich analysis that deserves full attention, explains the
economic and political environment at the time of the Project's approval:
As David Wolfe has cogently argued, the Liberal government
(and Howe in particular) was eager to encourage direct
American investment in Canadian manufacturing.  Indeed,
Wolfe suggests that the Exchange Conservation Act made
the building of branch plants the 'government's explicit goal.'
Seen from a broader perspective, the Canadian Co-operation
Project can be quite conveniently situated within the overall
effort to attract direct American investment to Canada in the
immediate postwar period.  Moreover, the Canadian govern-
ment strongly supported the principle of tariff reduction at
the first round of the GATT negotiations.  Thus, coercive or
discriminatory measures, such as quotas or subsidies for
private Canadian film production, would have been anathema
to the overall macro-economic strategy of the Canadian
state.  Hollywood, had, in a sense, made an offer that
Canadian officials, given their own economic policy preferences,
could not refuse.  What was perhaps even more important is
that no one within the private Canadian film industry had
proposed a better scheme to increase production activities.39
From the Canadian perspective, it was felt that the Project would ultimately increase
American investment in Canada in more indirect than direct ways, such as through
tourism and the overall impact of having Canada's image and reputation advertised, as it
were, in Hollywood films and American media (the advertising potential of these
channels will be examined in the next chapter).  However, this strategy proved incredibly
naive and misguided.  In fact, the manner in which Canada was represented in the films
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that filled the requirement of "including some Canadian sequences in American films"
only served to perpetuate the conception of Canada held by the dominant ideology and
thus further established the subordinance of Canadian culture within the periphery of the
United States.  Magder explains that, "As Pierre Berton chronicles, the films and the
references remained as inane as ever -- it was a very unreal Canada that found its way
onto the theatrical screen.  Tourism figures do show an increase of American visitors to
Canada, but the figures are far lower than the increase in Canadian tourists to the United
States.  American films were still doing what they did best -- selling the United States to
the world.  The MPAA continued the Project until 1957, when it was quietly put to
rest."40
Canada's economic dependency, then, has profound implications not only on the
economic character of the Canadian state but also on the social, political, and cultural
realms of the Canadian consciousness, both because of the internal ramifications of
dependency as well as the external conception of Canada disseminated by the dominant
ideology.  Canada's dependent nature, then, has continually resulted in a lack of autonomy
in areas where outside interests are dominant, particularly in the distribution of cultural
products in Canada, thereby weakening the ability to both define and defend a notion of
Canadian culture, further relegating Canada to a position of subordinance on the
periphery of the United States.  Furthermore, Hannerz has explained that "peripheral
states are often what Gunnar Myrdal some twenty years ago described as 'soft states', with
very little capacity for policy implementation.  This tends to be obvious enough in the
area of cultural policy.  Clearly the performance of the state in managing cultural flow
depends in some significant part on material conditions.  The soft state is often an
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impoverished state which may ill afford to maintain a powerful cultural apparatus."41 
Though the Canadian state, in spite of its lack of autonomy and its intrinsically
subordinate character, cannot be accurately described as "impoverished," its cultural
apparatus can, especially in comparison to other western industrialised states.  Indeed,
many observers have noted how Canada serves as a prescient example of the effects of
American control over a nation's cultural distribution channels, something that will be
discussed further in the next chapter.
If it can be argued, as it will be in Chapter III, that the nation-state as we know it
has reached a stage of obsolescence and must now evolve into an entity more suited to the
trends and demands of the new millennium, and that the 'culture of the market'
necessitated by the mandate of the trans-national corporation will likely be the force
determining what these trends and demands will be, then perhaps it is not difficult to
argue that Canada, having developed as a nation-state in direct response to the trends and
demands of the American nation-state -- which has served as the forerunner to the model
of the trans-national corporation -- can be looked at as a prototype of the nation-state to
be.  In Chapter III I will examine the extent to which the English Canadian discourse
exists 'in between' the ideologies of America and Europe, allowing it to have a unique
perspective on issues of technology that are pertinent to the evolution of the nation-state. 
Chapter IV will be dedicated to an analysis of the extent to which English Canadian
culture and identity have been marginalised in Canada by the preponderance of the
dominant American discourse.  My discussion in Chapter V will focus on the depiction
and utilization of Canadian-ness in the trans-national image industry as an example of the
manner in which Canada facilitates the material realization of what Michael Rustin has
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called "'abstract universalism,' with its 'denial of the particular location of human lives in
place and time', its placeless and nonreferential sense of identity."42  In Chapter II, I will
expand on my discussion in Chapter I by analysing the manner in which American
cultural hegemony is maintained and perpetuated in Canada, and extrapolate on the
implications of this for other nation-states.
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CHAPTER II
FILM AND MEDIA DISTRIBUTION AND CULTURAL HEGEMONY:
A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE
It is important to remember that Canadian dependency has largely determined
American hegemony in Canada, and not the other way around.  However, American
cultural hegemony and media imperialism have a tremendous impact in perpetuating this
dependency.  In many ways the American and trans-national media industries have
positioned themselves to increasingly assume the role of the dominant power to which the
Canadian nation-state is subordinate.  As the dominant power that maintains the
hegemonic order in Canada has increasingly become more invested in cultural industries
and the production and distribution of cultural products (by the end of the 1980's, the U.S.
entertainment industry was second only to aerospace as a "foreign-trade earner for the
U.S. national economy"1), so has Canada's dependency shifted from the realm of the
economic to affect that of the cultural.  Accordingly, Canadian reaction to this shift has
intensified in equal measure; the apathetic approach of the first half of the century
towards curtailing American investment in Canada quickly gave way to panicked
awareness with the rise of television and escalated in the late 1960's and 1970's into a
vigilant but fruitless attempt to turn the tide.  My goal in this chapter is to trace the
evolution and advancement, as well as examine the current legitimacy, of American
media imperialism, keeping in mind the argument that Canada, having been subjected to
31
hegemonic control for nearly a century, serves as a model for the manner in which nation-
states will likely evolve under the global hegemony of trans-national interests.
Media Imperialism:  A Review
The primary undercurrent running through most of my analysis concerns the
impact and effect of American media and cultural products on the evolution of English
Canadian consciousness, and how American hegemony has both capitalized upon and
perpetuated English Canada's inherent dependency and amorphousness.  In order to
provide an appropriate sense of context and prevent my analysis from slipping into
generalizations and oversimplification, an overview of the structure, function, and effects
of media imperialism, as well as an examination of its legitimacy, is needed.
Media imperialism, or cultural imperialism, has been subjected to a fair amount of
revision since its development as a discourse in the 1970's, and in some cases has even
been refuted on the basis of its supposed inaccuracy and illegitimacy in properly
determining the causes and effects of the flow of information from the centre on the
culture and economic structure of the periphery.  Herbert I. Schiller, the leading
proponent of the media imperialism thesis, views the 'imperialist' source as a monolithic
and oppressive entity, and the relationship between centre and periphery as one which is
completely determined, monitored, and controlled by dominant interests in the centre who
act in the name of capitalist development and under the guise of the free flow of
information, which itself is a construction created and utilized by the dominant interests
in their attempts to penetrate foreign markets while safe-guarding their own.  In
discussing the circumstances that facilitate the actions of the imperialist centre, Schiller
explains the overall result of the economic and cultural influence of the centre on the
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periphery:
The result of these diverse yet interconnected activities and
relationships is a cultural take-over of the penetrated society. 
The impulse that produces cultural domination originates with
commercial imperatives, but this in no way diminishes the
impact on the cultural landscape of the penetrated society...
From the time a region/nation is absorbed into the system, it is 
compelled -- given some latitude in the national circumstances
of developmental level and degree of political independence --
to adapt its production, its working force, its rewards, its
concepts of efficiency, its degree of specialization, its invest-
ments, and its resource priorities to the world capitalist
economy.2
What stands out most in Schiller's analysis is the conception of the dominant centre as an
aggressive 'penetrating' force, and the marginal periphery as a passive recipient who is
both unable to resist the commercial imperatives of the dominant interests and is largely
uninvolved in the process of adopting the economic and cultural signifiers of the centre. 
Though there is still a fair amount of validity in Schiller's assertions regarding the
hypocrisy of the 'free' flow of information, and his analysis of the overall structure upon
which dominant interests rely is also sound, he tends to treat the 'imperial' centre as
monolithic, and ultimately his analysis, in its inability to consider the autonomy and the
potential reactions of the peripheral interests and its insistence that the centre serves as
the ultimate determinant of economic and cultural behaviour, reflects in many ways the
same kind of thinking that it purportedly condemns.
The media imperialism thesis proposed by Schiller has come under criticism, and
in some respects has been considered outdated, largely because of the manner in which
the analysis is based largely on the impact of the imperial tendencies of one nation-state
on a less sovereign, more subordinate nation-state.  In a globalized world where the role
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and influence of individual nation-states is seen to be receding, theories of cultural
imperialism are increasingly considered incompatible with the more fluid structure of the
New World Order.  As Ien Ang has argued, "most theories of cultural imperialism remain
firmly couched within transmission models of communication... Such a vision is not only
theoretically but also historically inadequate:  in a world system where capitalism is no
longer sustained through the coercive submission of colonized peoples (as in nineteenth
century high imperialism) but through the liberal institutions of democracy and the
sovereign nation-state, equation of power with imposition simply will not do."3  Though
Ang's assertion here that the contemporary influence of a dominant power is foiled by the
"liberal institutions of democracy and the sovereign nation-state" seems naive (as I will
illustrate in the next case study), the media imperialism argument has been further
complicated by theories of audience reception, which argue that peripheral consumers
seldom ingest cultural codes and signifiers from the centre in the same manner as those
who reside in the centre, and that therefore peripheral groups are empowered by their
sovereignty as consumers which may reinforce their own cultural values just as much as
transplanting those of the dominant power.
  Having been subjected to scrutiny and analysis and several rounds of revision, the
media imperialism thesis has managed to evolve in accordance with many of the
criticisms and characteristics brought about by the increasing globalization of the world
market.  Magder has explained how a more revisionist approach to media imperialism
succeeds in considering the role and function of nation-states, the fluidity of capital and
cultural flows between centre and periphery, and the complicity of national
representatives within peripheral nations:
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  Over time a more accurate and subtle, if also more complicated,
version of media imperialism has been developed.  It recognizes
at least four characteristics of media imperialism that the earlier
versions overlooked or undervalued:  first, that the imperialist
centre (the United States or others) is rarely omnipotent; second,
that the dependent periphery is rarely powerless to offset the
dynamics and effects of media imperialism; third, that specific
actors within the periphery (including on occasion state officials)
may indeed benefit from and facilitate the process of media
imperialism; and fourth, that the effects of media imperialism are
often unintended and unpredictable.4 
It is important that theories of media imperialism be revised and adapted to reflect the
reality of contemporary trends in the international flow of capital and cultural products,
rather than being dismissed as outdated or incompatible within current conceptions of the
operations of nation-states.  The power and influence of dominant interests, be they
American or trans-national, are too firmly entrenched within the structure and operation
of international business and politics for the ramifications of their actions and policies not
to be considered to have a vital impact on those who are subordinate within their sphere
of influence.  The model of media imperialism Magder provides above, for example,
clearly offers many direct parallels to the situation of American cultural hegemony in
Canada, and serves as a kind of template with which to examine the relationship between
dominant and subordinate interests.
It would be in our best interests, then, to avoid any overly revisionist approach to
the causes and effects of media imperialism on a micro level and focus instead on the
effects and ramifications of media imperialism on a macro level; on the manner in which
the cultural consciousness of an entire people is seen to be affected by the economic and
cultural activities of one nation impacting upon another.  Magder, in an attempt to
condense the concept of media imperialism to an understanding of its most basic
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operation and results, has noted how, in the eyes of many scholars, Canada serves as an
ideal example of the long-term effects of one nation's media and culture on another:
As J.O. Boyd-Barrett explains, media imperialism may be defined
as 'the process whereby the ownership, structure, distribution, or
content of the media in any one country are singly or together
subject to substantial pressure from the media interests of any
other country or countries, without proportionate reciprocation of
the country so affected.'  The definition fits the Canadian case to a
tee; not surprisingly, the literature on media imperialism tends to
make special mention of the Canadian case.  In his discussion of
media imperialism Anthony Smith reflects a wide consensus:  'The 
culturally and politically debilitating effects of media dependence
are perhaps most eloquently illustrated by taking an example not
from the non-aligned or developing countries but from the
developed world itself.  Canada has always been obliged to struggle
to maintain a thriving indigenous culture because of the proximity
of the United States with its enormous output of information and 
entertainment... It has conceded the right of free flow and has
suffered the consequences.'5
It must be reiterated here that the temptation to interpret American media imperialism as
a purely oppressive and external force, something to which Smith succumbs towards the
end of his statement above, is an inaccurate oversimplification of the matter which
ignores the broad system of relations (which I described in the last chapter) that determine
both the origin and development of the hegemonic relationship between the dominant
power and the subordinate interests.  The system of operations that facilitate media
imperialism must therefore be viewed within the context of the particular relationship
between the dominant and the subordinate, and to that end I offer this following case
study.
Case Study:  Split-Run Magazines and Canada's Cultural Autonomy
Me debunk an american myth?  And take my life in my hands?
-- The Tragically Hip
The imperialistic notion of a dominant nation exerting its cultural values onto a
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weaker, less developed nation by way of cultural products and signifiers that flow from
the dominant core to the oppressed periphery, though still a general occurrence, has
become greatly complicated by the question of what constitutes a nation, and also by the
parameters within which nations exist and are related to on a daily basis.  Ian Angus
argues that globalization has brought about "a genuinely transnational economic
environment dominated by large corporations that are increasingly gaining leverage over
nation-states and whose influence cannot therefore be theorized as the influence of one
nation-state over another."6  However, while Angus' assertion that the influence exerted in
the globalized world economy is that of corporations and not nation-states may be correct,
the effects and ramifications that arise from this influence can still be seen as reflecting
national and/or nationalist concerns, and therefore can still be regarded as the influence of
one national culture on another.  That the main players in this drama have shifted from
political entities to business conglomerates illustrates the fluidity between politics and
commerce in the global community, but in no way assuages the impact of such influence
on cultural issues.
Consider, for example, the recent trade dispute waged between Canada and the
United States.  This very heated debate, which concerned the issue of advertising in split-
run magazines (whereby copies of an issue sold in Canada contain Canadian advertising,
the fee for which is paid to American publishers) centred around Canada's Bill C-55,
whose aim was to "keep the $350-million advertising pie in Canadian hands, thereby
ensuring the financial viability of the home-grown magazine industry."7  The Canadian
side was being fought by Canadian Heritage Minister Sheila Copps, while the American
trade officials were backed by Time Warner Inc., Microsoft Corp., and Walt Disney Co.,
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(who, in a twist of post-modern fate beyond ironic and almost too cruel for words, holds
the legal publishing rights to the image of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police).  A senior
U.S. trade official has viewed the dispute as "purely a commercial issue...a difference of
opinion over competition, not over culture... It's somewhat demeaning to phrase it as
such."  Bill Merkin, a former U.S. deputy trade representative currently working as a
trade consultant in Washington, has echoed the observation that American trade officials
"see this as a money grab for two Canadian companies, pure and simple.  The United
States just doesn't buy the Canadian concern about culture."8
The two Canadian companies in question are Telemedia Inc. of Montreal and
Rogers Communications Inc. of Toronto, who virtually dominate the Canadian magazine
industry and stood to gain more than anyone else (in financial terms) if Bill C-55 had
become law.  From the American point of view, then, it was a situation of American
corporate interest versus Canadian corporate interest, and as such, would warrant an
appropriate retaliation if not resolved in favour of the American side.  Deputy U.S. trade
representative Richard Fisher "warned that up to $4-billion of Canadian steel, wood,
plastics, textiles and apparel could soon face sanctions at the border, most likely punitive
duties," if the Canadian government refused to back down on Bill C-55 and the magazine
issue.9
If a $4-billion retaliation on a $350-million issue seems somewhat extreme, it is
best to keep in mind what is at stake from the perspective of American corporate
interests.  Dennis Browne, director of the Centre for Trade Policy and Law at Carleton
University, has claimed that "the entire Canadian magazine advertising market is worth
about a morning's worth of two-way Canada-U.S. trade, which flows at a rate of $1-
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billion a day. 'It's peanuts [Browne argues].  It's silly that this thing is getting the kind of
attention that it is in the United States.  But it underscores the importance of
entertainment industries to the United States and culture to Canada.'"10  Browne has
further warned that "if Ottawa thinks it's getting a rough ride on magazines, it's only a
prelude to what it will likely get over looming disputes over satellite television, movie
distribution and the Internet."11  What the magazine issue illustrates, then, is an example
of the domino effect; the manner in which dominant corporate interests approach the
global economic environment in an attempt to preserve their hegemonic authority. 
Simply put, the thinking goes that if the first domino cannot be pushed over, none of the
others in the line will fall either.  Christopher Sands, director of the Canada Project at the
Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, has observed that
"'Canada is the vanguard... Canada is where we deal with issues first.  If we don't resolve
them here, we will see barriers cropping up globally.'"12  An individual domino itself may
be worth peanuts in the grand scheme of things, but the game operates as a system, and
the loss of revenue from one domino theoretically makes the revenue from others
inaccessible.  In this manner, systems upon which dominant interests rely for the
maintenance and continuation of their hegemonic authority, such as the international
image industry, tend to operate like perpetual motion machines; if they are made to slow
down in any way then they are rendered inoperable and are not properly fulfilling their
function (this will be discussed further later in the chapter).  As Morley and Robins
explain, "Capital has always sought to overcome spatial barriers and to improve the
'continuity of flow'... 'The ability of both capital and labour power to move...from place to
place depends upon the creation of fixed, secure, and largely immobile social and
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physical infrastructures.  The ability to overcome space is predicated on the production of
space.'"13  Or, for that matter, on the maintenance of space that has already been produced
and has therefore become integral in managing other spaces that have been incorporated
into the system.
Bill C-55 will be before the Canadian Senate in May 1999, and if it is passed it
will become law.  Canadian and U.S. officials, however, have been negotiating a
resolution that would effectively take the place of Bill C-55.  Canadian officials have
been motivated to resolve the issue due to the pressure placed upon them by the sectors of
Canadian industry targeted by the American trade threat.  The manner in which the
resolution has been negotiated, however, reflects the cycle of Canadian dependency I
described in Chapter I, and illustrates Canada's lack of autonomy and the dominant
position that the American nation-state still holds in affecting Canadian policy, be it
economic or cultural.  The trade war against the various sectors of Canadian industry
threatened by the United States proved so imposing and was so effectively handled by the
U.S. negotiators, that not only is Bill C-55 essentially being superseded, but in order for
the Canadian representatives to persuade the U.S. officials not to enforce trade embargoes
of any kind, further concessions had to be made which in effect have given the United
States a better deal on split-run magazines and more access to the Canadian publishing
industry than they had before Bill C-55 ever became an issue.  The Globe and Mail has
reported that, "In return for postponing the threat [!], the U.S. administration has won a
pledge that Ottawa is willing to change some aspects of its 35 year-old magazine policy --
including postal subsidies for publishers, foreign ownership restrictions, tax breaks for
advertising placed in Canadian magazines and Bill C-55 itself, Canadian and U.S.
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officials have confirmed."14 
As well as illustrating the process by which American corporate and political
interests maintain their hegemonic authority within the entertainment and
communications industries, corporate conflicts and international trade disputes such as
the one provoked by Bill C-55 also shed light on the mentality utilized in following such
practices.  The refusal of American officials to acknowledge the Canadian concerns over
culture is largely due to the fact that the American side is also, in its own way, attempting
to preserve its own cultural standards.  One of the difficulties in negotiating issues of
trade in which the Canadian argument is based on cultural protection while the American
side is focussed on matters of "fair" competition in a free market economy, is not so much
that Americans fail to realize the Canadian perspective in relation to culture, but rather
that Canadians fail to realize that the American side is equally interested in its own
culture, which is based extremely heavily on consumerism.  Allan Smith, on the one
hand, has argued that "Americans did not even see Sony's purchase of Columbia Pictures
as an event to be reacted to in cultural rather than economic terms... [T]he chief
significance of the sale was nonetheless held to relate to what it meant for America's
waning economic power.  There was simply no sense that what had happened would have
an impact -- negative or positive -- on American culture as such."15  However, Smith's
assertion that the purchase of an American entertainment company by Japanese interests
was perceived to have no impact "on American culture as such" is a half-truth, and fails
to consider the impact that the web of economic dominance has on stabilizing and
nurturing the American conception of self that provides the basis for American culture. 
Perhaps more appropriate is Graham Murdock's assertion that "the ideology of
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consumerism encourages people to seek private solutions to public problems by
purchasing a commodity... It also redefines the nature of citizenship itself so that it
becomes less a collective political activity than an individual, economic activity -- the
right to pursue one's interests, without hindrance, in the market place."16  The principle
ideals of American society -- independence, autonomy, liberty, the pursuit of happiness --
have become embedded in a culture that is based not so much on characteristics of
expression (i.e., art, literature, film, theatre, music) as it is upon the sheer presence of
these and other cultural products in as many aspects of life as possible.17  The "empire of
the market," as J.G.A. Pocock has called it, has created a culture of the market as well.    
In this sense, it can be argued that one of the ways in which American and trans-
national business interests have been able to ensure that trade barriers remain flexible 
and information flows remain free for the transmission of cultural products, thereby
allowing them to maintain their dominant position in foreign markets around the world, is
by tipping the playing field in their favour and imposing the ideals of market imperative
over those of cultural expression.  Ien Ang has argued that "It is not just a question of
'cultural imperialism', that older term that suggests the unambiguous domination of one
dependent culture by a clearly demarcated other.  The homogenizing tendencies brought
about by the transnational era may be better characterized by the term 'cultural
synchronization' and it poses quite a different problem as to the politics of cultural
identity."18  In other words, the infiltration of foreign markets relies on the attempt to
synchronize the cultures of other nations with the economic culture, the culture of the
market, of the United States, so that cultural priorities and nationalist sentiment become
secondary to a nation's economic well-being and stability.  In this manner, issues of
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national culture and sovereignty are eclipsed by the importance of maintaining a sense of
equilibrium in the economic sphere.  For example, Morley and Robins have noted J.G.A.
Pocock's assertion that what is being created is
an economic community based on 'a set of arrangements for 
ensuring the surrender by states of their power to control the 
movement of economic forces which exercise the ultimate
authority in human affairs.  The institutions jointly operated
and/or obeyed by member states would then not be political 
institutions bringing about a redistribution of sovereignty, but 
administrative or entrepreneurial institutions designed to
ensure that no sovereign authority can interfere with the 
omnipotence of a market exercising sovereignty in a
metaphorical because non-political sense.'19
However, this is not to say that the effects of cultural imperialism have faded, only that
the means by which they are implemented have had to adapt to changes in the climate of
global economic and cultural affairs.  The machinery put in place by the purveyors of
cultural imperialism has not been dismantled by the anxiety over the role and position of
the nation-state in the New World Order, and dominant interests have in many ways been
safeguarded by the extent to which the infrastructure upon which their position relies has
retained its influence. 
American Monopolization of Distribution Channels
Perhaps one reason why theories of media imperialism seem so difficult to
dismiss from a Canadian perspective is because of the long and well documented history
which dominant interests have exercised in the cultural sphere in Canada.  Another factor
that legitimates the tenets of media imperialism would appear to be the effectiveness of
the rhetoric upon which the dominant order relies to both maintain and further its
hegemonic authority.  The concept of the free flow of information has of course played a
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tremendous role in maintaining the stability of the hegemonic order, and also in ensuring
the constant progression of the dominant discourse which perpetuates the legitimacy of
the dominant ideology.  Sandra Gathercole, drawing from the cultural imperialism thesis,
has plainly identified America as "a media imperialist," asserting that the United States
"'invented the concept of the free flow of information to justify its own unilateral
penetration of foreign markets.'"20  An important note here is that the free flow of
information, more than merely justifying the "unilateral penetration of foreign markets,"
is actually the main factor that has made such penetration possible.  Schiller has argued
that "it is now evident that the historical coincidence of these two phenomena -- the
policy of free flow of information and the imperial ascendancy of the United States -- was
not fortuitous.  The first element was one of a very few indispensable prerequisites for the
latter."21  Furthermore, the manner in which information flows have been utilized by
American interests to establish and maintain the economic dominance of American
cultural products illustrates the contradiction inherent within the structure of "free" flows
of information.  Magder, for example, has described how the free flow argument was
crucial in establishing the foothold of the American film industry in Canada's exhibition
and distribution sectors:
Though it operated as a cartel, the MPEA understood well the
ideological value of free trade and freedom of expression.  'The
free exchange of ideas,' MPEA president Eric Johnston said in
his first address to the Motion Picture Association of America,
'is more important than the free exchange of goods.  There must
be no obstacles to the transit of the media of communications'...
Like all infringements on the 'free' market, protectionism
promoted mediocrity, and state subsidies distorted the 'democratic' 
structure of demand and supply.  Of course, Johnston's rhetoric
was based upon the assumption that an equal exchange of motion
pictures actually existed in the market and that the monopolistic
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practices of the major distributors in no way distorted the
dynamics of free competition.22
Gathercole, continuing her discussion of American imperialism, has provided other
examples of the manner in which the control, both physical and ideological, exercised by
the dominant order over the manner in which information flows are both defined and
accessed, has resulted in a highly regulated system that favours and promotes dominant
interests.  She has stated that "'The country which controls the world's film markets has
not neglected to control its own.  In fact, America is the most xenophobic and
protectionist media market.  It shares with Red China the distinction of having less hours
(2%) of its television time devoted to foreign programming than any other nation.'"23  Part
of the process of maintaining cultural hegemony, then, is to ensure that peripheral
concerns remain in the periphery and are thus perceived from the centre to be marginal,
both in form, content, and most importantly, ideological value.  To quote an old sports
adage, the best (cultural) defence is a good offence; keep all the play in the other team's
zone and they have no chance of scoring on you.
One of the other ways this is achieved is through the process Immanuel
Wallerstein has described as that in which "the powerful of the world seek to commodify
and thereby denature the practices of cultural resistance.  They create high market demand
for the forms of avant garde (and/or exotic) artistic production.  They create high-tech
market networks for the distribution of previously artisanal or illicit production of the
means of every day life; that is, they transform a private domain into a semipublic one."24
 By doing so, the dominant power reassures its hegemonic authority and effectively stifles
any possibility of a cultural resistance within the subordinate nation.  As we have seen
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with the example of Bill C-55, American interests still enjoy an extremely advantageous
position when it comes to negotiating the conditions regarding their access to message
transmission channels in Canada.  Though the example of the magazine industry in
Canada serves to illustrate the manner in which a country's very economic welfare can be
threatened in order to protect, maintain, and enhance the dominant position of American
interests, the dominance of American cultural hegemony is normally maintained through
the international monopoly enjoyed by American interests in the fields of broadcasting,
communications, and entertainment.  Schiller reminds us that "External domination in
cultural communications is achieved in many ways, but the prerequisite is the control of
both the message (image, information) production and the message transmission
channels,"25 for it is through these channels that not only material products are
disseminated but also ideological values and priorities, which serve to extend the function
of distributing cultural products to include that of actually distributing cultural values and
ideals.  Film industry analyst Harold Vogel has explained in further detail how the control
of distribution channels in the cultural and communications spheres both maintains and
perpetuates the hegemonic authority of the dominant order:  "'Ownership of entertainment
distribution capability is like ownership of a toll road or bridge.  No matter how good or
bad the software product (i.e., movie, record, book, magazine, TV show, or whatever) is,
it must pass over or cross through a distribution pipeline in order to reach the consumer. 
And like at any toll road or bridge that cannot be circumvented, the distributor is a local
monopolist who can extract a relatively high fee for use of his facility.'"26 
To put it simply then, as Nicholas Garnham has argued, "'It is cultural distribution,
not cultural production, that is the key locus of power and profit.  It is access to
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distributions which is the key to cultural plurality.'"27  The international monopolization
of distribution channels for film, media, and other forms of communication by American
interests has been the integral aspect in the development, maintenance, and evolution of
American cultural hegemony.  Guback and Varis have described some of the results that
have been wrought by this development:  "The economic power of films distributed
abroad by American multinational companies is particularly impressive, because less than
10 per cent of the features produced in the world in any given year are made in the United
States, yet for years they have occupied about half the screen time in world theatres
(excluding those in socialist countries).  According to a representative of the MPEAA,
much of this success is attributable to the worldwide distribution networks of the major
American film companies."28  Continued access to foreign markets has been achieved and
maintained through several developments throughout the course of this century.  Three
main interrelated factors have combined to solidify the control of international
distribution channels by American interests. The first of these is the actual material access
to the means of distributing products throughout the world.  Guback and Varis have
explained in great detail the process by which American businesses were able to
consolidate their interests in foreign markets, thus allowing for the formation of cartels to
oversee and ensure the success of American business abroad, such as the one which the
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) created in the interest of supporting the
economic health and expansion of the major American movie studios:
Although United States law prohibits agreements restraining
commerce among competitors in the domestic market, it makes
an exception where overseas trade is concerned.  The Webb-
Pomerene Export Trade Act of 1918 allows domestic competitors
to cooperate in foreign trade by forming export associations that
47
might otherwise be held illegal under anti-trust laws.  Companies 
supposedly competitive in the American market are allowed to
combine, to fix prices, and to allocate among themselves their
foreign customers.  This legislation was one of the United States' 
Government's earliest efforts to stimulate exporting by small
medium-size firms at a time when few companies were concerned
with foreign markets.  But a 1967 study by the Federal Trade
Commission found that in reality, just the opposite actually took
place; 'companies that have gained advantages from the Act (have)
not been the smaller firms in our economy, but rather those that are
large in an absolute sense and which simultaneously have major
positions in the markets they serve.  A number of associations in the 
motion picture and television field have been organized under terms
of the Webb-Pomerene Act... The most important of these groups is
the Motion Picture Export Association of America (incorporated in
1945), which is the international arm of the MPAA.  By bringing
together the 'nine largest producers-distributors of film in the world
and allowing them to act in concert through a single organization',
the MPEAA presents a kind of unified front to other nations of the 
world."29
Understanding the structure and function of the MPEAA and the access it allows
American cultural products into foreign markets further illustrates the importance of 'free'
flows of information in ensuring the continued success of American cultural products
abroad.  So long as the channels for distribution remain open will they be flooded with
products produced by those who administer and regulate the channels themselves.
The second main factor in the monopolization of the distribution channels for
cultural products by American interests has been the mass appeal of American films and
cultural products abroad.  Morley has referred to Richard Collins' "National Culture: A
Contradiction in Terms," in which Collins quotes a World News Survey from the 1930's,
which reported that "film exhibitors in working class areas were 'on the whole satisfied
with the more vigorous American films...(but) practically unanimous in regarding the
majority of British films as unsuitable for their audiences.  British films, one Scottish
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exhibitor writes, should rather be called English films, in a particularly parochial sense;
they are more 'foreign' to his audience than the products of Hollywood from over 6,000
miles away.'"30  It must be noted, however, that this level of acceptance is only
accomplished as a result of the ability of the American film industry to distribute their
products en masse to other nations, and also due to the size of the American domestic
market, which is the third factor in facilitating American cultural hegemony.  As
Straubhaar has explained, the size of the American domestic market
enabled both films and television programs from U.S. producers
to enjoy early and continued export success.  The variety of 
immigrant ethnic groups in the U.S. market encouraged
production for a broad popular culture.  This production was 
successful in building on the large North American Market; the 
industry structures grew rapidly.  The result was a vast scale for 
U.S. cultural industries compared to the rest of the world,
industrial rationalization in the film studio system, and the 
accumulation of financial and personal resources.  U.S. cultural 
industries also showed innovation in genre and content. 
Considerable development of film genres in the 1920's, 1930's,
and 1940's was accompanied by export success.31
This export success Straubhaar refers to was certainly aided by the standardization and
commodification of film into genres, but was primarily facilitated and sustained by the
American distribution  monopoly, administered by the MPEAA, which granted American
films greater access to movie screens around the world than any other national cinema.  In
fact, it is important to remember that Canada, fully incorporated as part of "the large
North American market" Straubhaar refers to, is a country whose national cinema has
virtually no access (less than 2% in 1998, as I explained in the last chapter) to its own
screens as result of its position of subordinance within the structure of American
hegemony.  The success and popularity of American films in countries such as England
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and Scotland also exemplifies the complicity of the more peripheral or subordinate
nations in the establishment and maintenance of American cultural hegemony, and serves
as an example of the complexity of media imperialism, illustrating how it is not just a
matter of external oppression on the part of the dominant interests.  Furthermore, the
continued success of American films and cultural products abroad, though tremendously
aided by the distribution monopoly, has served to legitimate the ideological philosophies
and motivations of the dominant order, as well as justify the means by which this
dissemination has been accomplished, namely control of distribution channels.
It should be noted here that the major American film distributors also exercise a
monopoly in their own country, and are currently engaged in the very kinds of vertically
integrated operations that were outlawed by the Paramount decree enacted by Congress in
1948.  The Independent Film and Video Monthly has alluded to this, explaining that "the
exhibition climate underwent a sea change in the Eighties, thanks to the nullification of a
major anti-trust decision passed in 1948 that banned studios from owning and controlling
blocks of theatres.  Today, studios are again free to monopolize chains and control most
of the screens across the country."32  Balio confirms the allowance of monopoly practices
in the American market, which were permitted for decades in international distribution
and exhibition, stating that "Columbia started the trend in 1986 by purchasing a small
chain of theatres in New York City.  Within a year, MCA, Paramount Communications
and Warner Communications bought or acquired stakes in important theatre chains
around the country."33  That these changes in business policies should come in the late
1980's was more than fortuitous or coincidental.  With the blocs and boundaries of the
Fordist period rapidly crumbling, American multi-national corporations were quick to see
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the benefits of fewer international barriers to their media products. At the same time that
they were insisting that information travel through free flows without the obstructions of
quotas, levies or trade sanctions of any kind, they were equally adept at ensuring that their
own economic structure remained resistant to outside influence.  The following
statement, issued by Time Warner in 1989 explaining its reasons for merging, helps put
into perspective the manner in which businesses reacted to the changes in the market
climate brought about by the trends of globalization:  "'In the Eighties we witnessed the
most profound political and economic changes since the end of the Second World War. 
As these changes unfolded globalization was rapidly evolving from a prophecy to a way
of life.  No serious competitor could hope for any long-term success unless, building on a
secure home base, it achieved a major presence in all of the world's important markets.'"34
 The secure home based referred to here is, of course, the largest domestic market in the
world.  With a monopoly on the distribution and exhibition of films in both the domestic
American market (including Canada) and abroad, American and trans-national
corporations have capitalized heavily on the 'free' flow of information.
The Perpetual Motion Machine, The MPAA, and The Billboard Argument
As I mentioned in my discussion of Bill C-55, the necessity of information flows
to remain free and uninhibited illustrates the manner in which American cultural
hegemony exists as a kind of perpetual motion machine.  As I have just discussed,
American cultural hegemony is maintained and perpetuated by the monopoly enjoyed by
American interests in the international distribution of cultural products, the mass appeal
of American cultural products, and the size of the American domestic market.  It must be
remembered, however, that these three factors do not exist independently of each other,
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but in fact are interrelated components that both rely on and facilitate the success of the
others.  The monopoly of international distribution channels could not have been
developed were it not for the size of the domestic market which allowed for the growth of
companies and business interests that were large enough in scope to expand into the
international arena.  As Guback and Varis explain, the domestic American market "has
allowed productions to be on a financial level often dwarfing competitors.  While this in
itself does not ensure superior products, it has permitted the amassing of capital that
supports worldwide systems for distributing products."35  The domestic market has also
facilitated the development of technological resources that have been obtained as a result
of the continued financial success of American interests at home and abroad. 
The international distribution system, then, is simultaneously a product of the
large resource base of the domestic market, and is also the entity that facilitates the
continued growth and success of that market by enabling the access of domestic interests
to international markets, thus increasing the potential profit margin of domestic interests
which in turn contributes to the amount of capital and technological resources available
for the production of goods.  There is therefore a tremendous amount at stake for
dominant interests who rely on the perpetual motion of this distribution machinery, which
can be seen as the justification for the role and function of the MPAA and the MPEAA,
as well as the manner in which they view the world market as a kind of domino game,
where the failure to access one market will prevent the access of others.  The continued
access to international markets, then, supports the dominant order not just in financial
terms, but even more so in terms of maintaining the ideological dominance that facilitates
access to the distribution channels that, in turn, make possible the access to foreign
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markets that provide the surplus revenue that keeps the whole cycle in motion.  There is
so much more at stake than just the revenues generated by films and cultural products
themselves, or even by the symbolic presence of such American media products all over
the world:  in the eyes of the MPAA and the business and congressional interests they
represent and protect, these products are billboards, not just for the consumer items
present in and therefore advertised by them, but most importantly for American ideology.
 As Guback and Varis explain:
The deep penetration of world markets by American motion
pictures, an MPEAA executive once observed, has been
accomplished in spite of trade restrictions directed at them. 
The exportation of American media materials, moreover, is
said to contribute positively to the United States balance of 
payments, quite apart from revenues gained directly by them. 
'We know,' an MPEAA official has asserted, 'that motion
picture and television programs are one of the most effective
means of creating demand for American goods in foreign
markets.  When attractive U.S. products are seen on the screen,
it generates an immediate demand for them which benefits
other American export industries'.36
In other words, then, even though the distribution monopoly provides for the health and
security of large sectors of the dominant economy by furthering the ubiquity of American
cultural products, the most important item these products advertise and sell is the set of
values and beliefs that encourage people to 'buy into' everything else associated with it.
In addition, the monopoly of distribution channels and the large American
resource pool -- facilitated both by the large domestic market and the ability of products
to add considerably to their profit margins in the international market place -- ensures
continued access to foreign markets while also providing those markets with goods of a
standard unmatched by other producers due to the inability of other interests to access the
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channels that enable and perpetuate the cycle of capitalist expansion.  With the logic of
the entire system I have just described justified by its own inevitable success, the
producers and distributers who maintain and utilize this structure become increasingly
invested in maintaining their hegemonic authority, which in many ways relies on
convincing the subordinate interests of the ideological motivations that justify the
dominance of the hegemonic order.  As Schiller has explained, "Cultural-informational
outputs are largely, though not entirely, determined by the same market imperatives that
govern the overall system's production of goods and services.  Yet, as we are all aware,
cultural-informational outputs represent much more than conventional units of personal-
consumption goods:  they are also embodiments of the ideological features of the world
capitalist economy.  They serve, extremely effectively, to promote and develop popular
support for the values, or at least the artifacts, of the system."37
The manner in which global information flows combine to operate as an
interrelated and ever-evolving system, with the end result ultimately being the
maintenance of the dominant order's hegemonic authority, helps to explain, then, the
importance of maintaining the perpetual flow of communication, media, and cultural
products in the eyes of those who administer and manage the international distribution
channels.  This distribution framework, through its ability to disseminate not only
products but also their attendant ideological implications and motivations, ultimately
buttresses the hegemony enjoyed by dominant interests.  More subordinate interests are
therefore relegated to the periphery, unable to access the ideological channels that
disseminate forms of cultural expression.  In Chapter IV, I will discuss in greater detail
the marginalization of English Canadian culture and identity, facilitated by the dominance
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of the American discourse in Canada and the inability of English Canadian cultural
expression to connect with the nation.  I will begin by examining in Chapter III the
substance and character, or lack thereof, of English Canadian culture.
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CHAPTER III
THE RHETORIC OF CULTURAL IDENTITY AND THE EXPRESSION
OF ENGLISH CANADIAN CULTURE
In this chapter, I would like to turn my attention towards the specific matter of 
Canadian identity, and the question of what constitutes English Canadian culture.  No
small task indeed, these issues have been the subjects of scholarly and intellectual debates
that have filled dozens of books in the last three decades alone.  My objective here,
however, is to gain as clear an understanding as possible of English Canadian culture, as
well as the dynamics of Canadian national identity, in order to realize what is at stake and
what is being threatened by the prevalent dissemination of American cultural and
ideological discourses.  I will attempt to achieve this by focussing not on the
contributions and accomplishments of various individuals and organizations (i.e., John
Grierson, the NFB, CFDC/Telefilm, etc.), but rather on the rhetoric employed by those
whose analyses and interpretations of the plight of Canadian culture resulted, over the
years, in the implementation of various policies and the founding of certain organizations
within the film and broadcasting fields.  I feel that an understanding of Canadian culture
and society can be garnered from the study of:  the manners in which people have reacted
to American hegemony; the policies that have been implemented in attempts to foster
Canadian expression and industry; and the rhetoric utilized to tie it all together.  Later in
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the chapter, I will focus a great deal of attention on Canadian discursive strategies and the
manner in which these help contribute to cultural expression.  Furthermore, I will also
shed light on the extent to which American ideology and discourse have been so
prominent in Canada that they have not only threatened Canadian identity and culture, but
are themselves indirectly responsible for shaping certain distinctly Canadian cultural
characteristics, since national expression is inevitably defined in relation to American
ideology, thus further illustrating the impact of American media on Canadians and the
reactive nature of Canadian culture and identity.
Locating English Canadian Identity
As I have previously discussed, Canadian national identity has long been difficult
to determine.  From its origins as a colonial outpost of the French and then British
empires, to a country whose foundation was based more on the fear of manifest destiny
than on any binding nationalist sentiments, through the transition from loyal British
dominion to a branch plant of the American economy, Canada has continually possessed
a national character consisting of reaction rather than proaction, spectatorship rather than
instigation, pragmatism rather than jingoism.  These, of course, must not be regarded as
the sole defining characteristics of Canadian identity, but rather as the most pertinent to
my discussion.  The question of Canada as a national entity has been the subject of
innumerable debates, and my aim here is not to offer definitive evaluations but rather
probe in greater detail how aspects of Canada's national character have found expression
within contemporary English Canadian culture.  To achieve this, an understanding of the
manner in which Canadian identity has been constructed is necessary.  Focussing on the
origins of the Canadian condition, Ian Angus has concisely summarized that, "In obvious
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contrast to the United States of America, Canada has no heroic founding myth.  For the
French population, their historical memory is one of conquest by force of British arms. 
For Canadians of British extraction there is little more than the negative tradition of
Confederation precipitated by fear of American expansion.  A lowest common
denominator of rejection is not a powerful cement to hold ethnically distinct groupings
together."1  Furthermore, an important consideration alluded to here by Angus is that the
question of what constitutes Canadian identity is further complicated by the question of
what constitutes Canada.  Rather than attempting to determine the unifying cultural
characteristics between the 'ethnically distinct groupings' that comprise the nation, I will
instead focus my discussion on questions pertaining to the culture and identity of English
Canada, which, due to its lack of cultural screens such as language, its close proximity to
the United States (90% of English Canadians live within 150 miles of the U.S. border),
and the continentalist strategies of many Canadian business leaders and government
officials, has long been extremely susceptible to the influence of American media freely
crossing the border.
In singling out English Canada as the focus of my attention, I do so for these
reasons above.  I am not proposing that English Canada be considered a monolithic
example for issues of culture and identity regarding the country as a whole.  There are 
issues and concerns that are unique to other groups within Canada, such as the Quebecois
and First Nations, that cannot be properly addressed within a discussion of English
Canada.  However, the recognition of Canada's many distinct groups requires the
acknowledgement that only together do they all constitute Canada as a nation.  In order
for this to be achieved, English Canada must be regarded as only one aspect of the
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Canadian nation-state, rather than representative of the nation in its entirety.  As Ian
Angus has asserted:
it is necessary to accept that what the country will be in
the future is open to discussion and negotiation between
the relevant groups.  There are at least three such groups: 
First Nations, Quebec, and English Canada.  The last, how-
ever, has not referred to itself as a nation.  In calling itself
as Canada, it has elided the key question of its relation to
the others and especially the history of violence whereby
the Canadian state, as all other states, was constructed.  A
genuine debate about the future of the Canadian nation-state
cannot occur if one group claims to monopolize the term
'Canada' without discussion.  For this reason, we must
recognize our distinctiveness as English Canadians -- that is,
those Canadians who inhabit the part of the country where
English is the ordinary language of public interaction.2
The equating of English Canada with 'Canada', or as Angus describes it, "the current
practice of calling English Canada the 'Rest of Canada' or 'Canada outside Quebec',"3 has
therefore been a contributing factor to the elusiveness of determining a solid conception
of Canadian identity.  If one proceeds from the assumption that English Canada is in fact
'Canada', then an attempt to define Canada as a whole is confounded by the fact that the
traits and characteristics of the other groups -- such as Quebecois, First Nations, and, a
populace omitted by Angus but deserving of mention particularly in the context of 1990's
globalization, the New Immigrants -- do not coalesce under the banner of 'English
Canada'.  Therefore, English Canada itself must be located individually in terms of
culture and identity so that its own contributions to the collective Canadian culture and
identity may be distinguished from those of the other groups.
In spite of the historical, social, and cultural divisions that exist between English
Canada, Quebec, and the other groups that constitute the Canadian nation-state, there are
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of course elements of a common history, society, and culture that they all share as
'Canadians', regardless of their hyphenated nationalism.  The degree to which one takes
precedence over the other will depend on one's own history, social and cultural
background, and most importantly political beliefs.  For Richard Collins, the amount of
flux between nationalisms within Canada is not a sign of weakness within the structure of
the nation-state, but rather just the opposite:  
Canada holds together as a political institution, a state,
very well.  The absent fit between nation(s) and political
institutions in Canada clearly has tensions and insecurities
(the slumbering giant of Quebec nationalism, the unsatisfied
hunger in English Canada for identity in a nation-state of the
good old-fashioned kind), but what is most striking about
Canada is not how imperilled a state it is, albeit it ill merits
the stipulations of nationalism, but rather how unimportant
these stipulations are.  Canada is a remarkably stable and
successful state.  It is best understood in terms of Ramsay
Cook's brilliant aphorism that Canada is a nationalist state,
not a nation-state.4
The nationalist character of this state, however, has grown increasingly fragmented in the
ten years since Collins' observation, during which we have seen the rejection of two
national referendums on national unity (or so they were called), the virtual expulsion of
one of the country's founding political parties from official party status as a protest
against former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, a sovereignty referendum in Quebec
come within a whisker of being in favour of secession, and the number of official national
political parties grow to five, all of which have their constituencies concentrated in
different regions of the country, and two of which gained office on the platform of
nationalist issues pertaining to their respective regions.  Through all this, commonalities
between the different nationalist groups are still very evident, especially with regards to
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one theme in particular.  As Angus states, "Both English Canada and Quebec have
articulated their goals through an emphasis on preserving themselves (though, of course,
against different perceived threats)... Such an emphasis on preservation implies a
background context in which sociological nationhood is perceived as existing but
disappearing or endangered."5 
In terms of locating and expressing English Canadian identity, then, Angus argues
that even though preservation has been the key concern, the primary theme or mode
through which the realization of preservation has been sought has been "a contemporary
evaluation of the validity of the nation."6  As I have already pointed out, the only nation
that English Canada has associated itself with is Canada as a whole, and therefore the
federal government was seen as the body best suited for the operation of preserving 'the
nation'.  Angus identifies the discourse of left-nationalism as "the key component of the
self-expression of English Canada in the period of permeable Fordism from the end of the
Second World War to the beginning of the Free Trade Agreement in 1989."7  It was
during this time that the process of preserving Canadian identity was at its peak, and it
was through the discourse of left-nationalism that this process was put into practice.  By
'permeable Fordism', Angus refers to the hegemonic discourse that came into being in the
capitalist world in the post-war period, also referred to as 'Keynesianism' or the 'welfare
state'.8  Left-nationalism, which Angus describes in further detail here, would come to
influence most if not all of Canada's cultural policies that were implemented during this
period:
There were two main components of this left-nationalist
discourse:  an analysis of the historical reasons for the
continued dependency that characterized the Canadian
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economy and an argument for the necessity of cultural autonomy,
both intrinsically (as the key aspect of the expression of national
identity) and strategically (as a condition for gaining control of
the economy)... [I]ts impact on Canadian society was such as to
propose the assertion of cultural autonomy without fundamentally
altering the condition of economic dependence.9
The philosophical driving force behind the rhetoric of left-nationalism and the policy
implementation it inspired, was the belief that the federal government could validate the
nation by implementing policies that, on the one hand sought to build and strengthen
forms of cultural expression, while at the same time neglecting the infrastructure upon
which these modes of expression relied for their very survival.  In other words, policy
makers attempted to open up avenues for national cultural expression while ignoring the
fact that part of the national character of the time was one of economic subordinance to
the United States.  Hence, the Canadian Film Development Corporation Act of 1968
established a process by which Canadian filmmakers were able to obtain funding for their
films, but made no mention of avenues being made available for distribution or
exhibition, aspects of the industry completely dominated by American interests and
therefore almost totally unavailable to Canadian films.
Essentially then, left-nationalism assumed, correctly, that culture is a construction,
and national cultures are thus constructed by a nation's governing body by implementing
policies whose results and ramifications affect the collective consciousness of the mass
population.  As Immanuel Wallerstein argues, "Clearly, in any given state, after 100 years
of making such decisions, it is very clear that a 'national' culture will exist even if it didn't
exist at the outset.  A particular past, a heritage is institutionalized."10  However, the
problem encountered in implementing policies to foster Canadian film in the post-war
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years was that many of the government initiatives that had already been taken throughout
the first half of the century had not necessarily been in the interest of fostering a Canadian
cinema independent from the influence of the American industry and its policies.  Rather,
the film industry was viewed with tremendous neglect for its economic and cultural
potential by the federal governments of the time.  For example, I mentioned in Chapter I
how Ray Peck, the director of the Canadian Government Motion Picture Bureau in the
late 1920's, encouraged American film companies to utilize Canada as a branch plant for
their productions:  "'We invite Americans to come over to Canada to make automobiles
and a thousand and one other things, and why not invite them to come over and make
pictures..?'"11  Furthermore, when the British Film Act of 1927 limited the distribution of
American films in Britain, American film companies, now under the formal invitation of
Ray Peck and the Canadian government, brought their operations across the border for the
production of 'quota quickies'.  Manjunath Pendakur observes that, "Remarkably enough,
the Canadian government allowed the country to be used by the American film industry
in its attempt to subvert the quota law in Britain.  One wonders where the Canadian
government placed its allegiance -- with imperial Britain or the imperial United States?"12
 And, for a final insult to injury, Seth Feldman notes how, following the end of the
Second World War, "the federal government agreed to Hollywood's demands for the
Canadian Co-operation Project, a deal that quashed the possibility of a feature film
industry in exchange for a token recognition of Canada's existence in their real movies."13
Thus, when the Canadian government founded the CFDC in 1968 and attempted,
at least in the hopeful eyes of many Canadian filmmakers longing for a national cinema
that would actually reach the nation, to implement policies that would somehow construct
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avenues for expression of a national culture through film, it did not seem to realize that
the film culture which had been constructed up to that point was one of subordinance to
American interests.  With this in mind, it is easy to understand the origins and importance
of  the concept of preservation in English Canadian culture, and Canadian culture in
general.  It is also clear why those subscribing to left-nationalism, the dominant cultural
discourse in Canada in the post-war period, would so stringently adopt the strategy of
cultural preservation.  However, Angus asserts that this sentiment manifested itself in a
very specific manner:  "The emphasis on the 'preservation' of our historical cultures has
been a significant rhetorical form within which left-nationalism has articulated its
prospective world-view in relation to the past.  One might say that the main rhetorical
form of left-nationalism is a lament for the failure adequately to preserve the past and an
argument that such preservation requires a radical reorientation in the future."14 
This sense of the past being lost and of history being non-heroic, un-mythic and
uneventful is an important aspect of Canadian identity.  Ultimately, it results in a
philosophy that sees the present as a kind of last stand, a time in which decisions must be
made and solutions implemented in order to prevent the situation of dependency and
deficiency from continuing in the future.  This mode of thought also encourages a
continual examination of the identity crisis at hand, proceeding from the belief that "the
key to identity is simple awareness of identity, conscious or otherwise."15  However, due
to all the different cultural and national concerns that combine to form the multi-faceted
dimensions of Canadian identity, simple awareness of one's identity may very well result
in an awareness of the divisions in national concerns rather than the similarities; an
awareness that the shops in your neighbourhood do not advertise in your language, or that
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a particular province has three times as many Senators as another of equal size, or that a
particular metropolitan area hundreds or thousands of miles away controls the majority of
businesses that operate in your community.  As Richard Collins argues, "What weakened
the Canadian state yet further was the fatal trap that every attempt to grasp such a
collective definition only drove the internal divisions yet deeper."16
English Canadian Culture:  Anticipating the Effects of Globalization
I would like to, for a moment, complicate my argument thus far by evaluating the
relevance of the study of national identity in the midst of the globalized New World
Order of the 1990's.  Or to phrase this in the form of a question, has the singular
discussion of Canadian or English Canadian identity become something of a moot point?
 Ien Ang has asserted that "in the increasingly integrated world system there is no such
thing as an independent cultural identity; every identity must define and position itself in
relation to the cultural frames affirmed by the world system."17  This is, of course, a trend
that has been recognized and monitored for a number of years now, and has been felt
perhaps most dramatically in Europe, as I will discuss in a moment.  Ultimately,
globalization and modernity have greatly affected the ways in which people conceive of
their national identities, due to the manners in which the New World Order has shifted
the emphasis from the boundaries and blocs of the Fordist era to a more fluid, though still
decidedly hegemonic, global model in which information, capital, cultural signifiers and
products infiltrate the nations of the world with greater ease.  Ian Angus echoes this
sentiment, stating that "We are now situated in a period of transition from the prior
consensus of permeable Fordism towards a new hegemonic formation that will come
about in a world of globalization and new social movements.  In this period the politics of
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national identity may well go the route of the declining influence of the nation-state."18
Canada, however, has long experienced these characteristics of globalization that
have only recently begun to affect other cultures around the world.  The history of 
Canada's economic dependency on the United States in this century -- precipitated by
geographical circumstance, lack of political autonomy as a colonial outpost, and
ultimately manifested in the form of a branch plant economy reliant upon and subject to
the whim of the imperial elephant to the south19 -- has resulted in the tremendous
difficulty of the Canadian body-politic to regulate the flow of American cultural products
and signifiers within Canada.  In the opinion of some, the situation of the last one
hundred years or so has had the effect of Americanizing Canadian society, or erasing in
Canada any significant marks of distinction between it and the United States.  Prominent
media scholars have in fact discussed Canada as though it were nothing more than a
"miniature replica" of the United States.20  Thus, the infiltration of media and other
information flows has been perceived as a kind of cultural scourge, wiping out whatever
was there before and replacing it with the values and products of the source of the media
dissemination, leaving the governing body of the dominated nation subservient to the
wishes of the foreign corporations who run a good majority of the country's key
industries.  As Richard Collins argues:  "New electronic distribution technologies make
possible large transnational publics for information and culture and an international
market-place that can only be weakly controlled by nation-states.  Technological change
is, at least potentially, globalizing the Canadian condition."21
In a sense, then, Canada can be seen as a kind of early prototype for the situation
faced by many industrialized nations who are experiencing a crisis of cultural identity in
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the face of the penetrating presence of American and trans-national cultural products.  Ien
Ang has further asserted that in Europe it has already reached the point where "American
cultural symbols have become an integral part of the way in which millions of Europeans
construct their cultural identities."22  This situation has existed for so long in Canada that,
as I will further argue later in this chapter, Canadian-ness is frequently defined in relation
to American qualities and characteristics, though notably often only in terms of
opposition (i.e., we may not know who we are, but we do know we are not them). 
Another parallel between the current cultural climate in Europe and the Canadian
condition is evidenced in David Morley and Kevin Robins' article, "No Place Like
Heimat:  Images of Home(land) in European Culture".  In it, Morley and Robins
extensively discuss the cultural identity crisis being experienced by many Europeans in a
section they entitle "Where is Europe Anyway?".23  The similarity of this query to
Northrop Frye's indelible summation that the essential question within Canadian identity
is "Where is Here?" is very telling.  This question seems to arise out of the sense that
one's location -- not just in a physical sense but rather in a frame of mind; one's place of
existing if you will -- is in fact not one's own, and is instead subject to a constant flux
imposed upon it from an outside source or sources. 
The fact that Europe, which arguably has faced an identity crisis of its own kind
for a long time, seems to have come, primarily as a result of the effects of
Americanization, to the same kind of cultural identity crisis as Canada is very telling.  It
is as if the New World Order of globalization -- the collapsing of boundaries and free
movement of information flows -- has created in Europe a situation similar to that which
Canada has continually encountered, in which people experience a vagueness in their
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cultural identities, due, in no small part, to ubiquitous American cultural products and
signifiers.  There are, of course, some key differences between the European crisis of
identity and the Canadian.  In fact, the aggressive sense of desperation and assertive
approach to facing and remedying the problem(s) generally evinced by European
scholars, as well as the factors by which they gauge European identity (such as ethnic,
religious, and territorial issues) suggests that their experience relates to more of a loss of a
lived identity than an inability to actually determine one.24  Indeed, the very notion of
attempting to determine an all-encompassing European identity, as opposed to locating
Hungarian or Dutch or Irish or French identity, illustrates two important concepts:  first,
that the effects of globalization have produced in Europe a sense of fear and anxiety
towards Americanism so strong that the idea of Europe as a whole has become a kind of
safe haven or rallying point against the onslaught of American culture; and second, that
this phenomenon again parallels Canada's process of identity determination, in that it
involves a collection of various groups, be they ethnic, linguistic, religious or regional,
who may not be able to express a definitive understanding of their collective identity, but
are instead bound together by the idea that 'We may not know who we are, but we do
know we are not them, and we want to keep it that way'.
This tension and conflict within and between national identities can be attributed
to the fact that the sense of nationalism practised and experienced within European
cultures and even in Canada is no longer compatible with the economic, political, social
and cultural environment of the modern world.  The effects of globalization and
modernity have not necessarily rendered nations obsolete, but they have dramatically
altered the ways in which people are able to relate to nations.  What is taking place in
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Europe, then, can be seen as a type of growing pain, part of the process of transition
between what Richard Collins often refers to as "old style nationalism" and the new
nationalism required within the free-flowing structures of globalization.  But in spite of
talk of the declining role of the nation state in the globalized world, the role of
nationalism will continue to be a prominent one, albeit in a modified form.  As Morley
and Robins elaborate, "whilst it is increasingly clear that technological and economic
transformations are surpassing the regulatory capacities of the nation-state, there is, at the
ideological level, still an obsessive and regressive 'desire to reproduce the nation that has
died and the moral and social certainties which have vanished with it...to fudge and forge
a false unity based on faded images of the nation'.  National ambitions and endeavours
will not simply disappear'."25 
Expressions of national identity will eventually, in one manner or another, adapt
or change in some way to accommodate the shifting needs and priorities of the globalized
world.  Richard Collins has argued that Canada in fact has been on the forefront of this
transition for some time, and that the progress towards a new relationship with
nationalism has been slowed by the lingering mentality of a past era:
Canada, though deficient as a national home of the old-
fashioned kind, has successfully created a tolerant,
prosperous, and decent community, which Trudeau
customarily named 'the peaceable kingdom'... But Trudeau's 
recognition of Canada's achievement and Canada's potential
to act as a role model for an internationalizing world has not
been incorporated into the Canadian self-image.  Rather the 
phenomena that, from a Trudeauesque optic, are achieve-
ments and advantages still appear as problems.  Canada is a
new kind of community misrecognized by old-style nation-
alism.  The irony is that the old style nationalism is dominant
in Canada."26
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However, recent events within Canada's political culture seem to indicate the beginning
of a decline in this old style nationalism and a move instead towards a more fluid,
decentralized political structure that emphasizes the expression of regional concerns over
the imposition of federal mandates.  This 'social union,' as it has been called, is an
interesting animal indeed and seems to have arisen as a kind of antidote against the
constitutional crises and failed attempts at 'national' unity that have plagued the country
for nearly a quarter-century.  What the social union represents more than anything is the
recognition that the approaches associated with 'old style nationalism' have done nothing
to address the concerns of the nation-state as a whole, and that a new approach to national
concerns is required. The proposed social union further indicates that Canada is beginning
to incorporate aspects of an internationalized world into its self image, forging a new kind
of relationship to its national identity.  My goal in the discussion that follows is to
illustrate the manner in which English Canadian culture has had a kind of head-start in
adjusting to and adopting this newer nationalism more suited to the globalized New
World Order.
English Canadian Culture:  Substantiating Absence
I would like to move here towards a discussion of specific elements of English
Canadian identity, with the hope that my efforts are not seen as reductive and simplistic,
but rather as a concise framework that is in no way meant to be definitive.  Other attempts
to classify the cultural components of English Canada have either led to the conclusion
that English Canada does not constitute a nation and therefore cannot possess a national
culture, or have tended to focus instead on the manner in which issues of industry and
economy can be seen to create a definitive outline for the construction of a distinctive
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English Canadian consciousness.  In fact, this notion of constructing an identity has been
viewed as a key element of English Canadian discourse.  Richard Collins has argued that
"English-Canadian nationalists have had to invent the nation to which they feel they
belong.  These inventions have a precarious character and are often distinguished by an
overwhelming sense of the fragility of English-Canadian identity."27  Furthermore, he
states that "it is often argued that such a conception of identity is simply whistling in the
wind and that the English Canadian experience is one of absence; English Canada simply
does not have an integrating history or culture in the way that Quebec or other nations
do."28  On the other hand, Hardin suggests that the source of an English Canadian
consciousness can be found within the social-industrial structure of English Canadian
society, singling out "'a public enterprise culture,' a redistribution culture,' and 'a public
broadcasting culture'" as the legs upon which the table of English Canadian identity
stands.29  Though I feel there is much validity in the notion of English Canada as a culture
of absence, as I will illustrate further in the next two chapters, I also believe that specific
elements of English Canadian culture, which in some ways can be seen as expressions of
an inherent absence, can be identified and deserve attention.
For the purposes of this paper, then, I have decided to focus on three aspects of
English Canadian identity, which can be seen not as founding elements of the societal
infrastructure identified by Hardin, but rather as expressive characteristics voiced through
artistic works:  a relation to wilderness; a relation to technology; and a relation to the
United States.  I do not propose that these are the only criteria by which English Canadian
culture can be judged, nor do I suggest that every cultural product produced by an English
Canadian contains one or several or all of these traits.  Rather, these are characteristics
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that seem to best personify the ways in which English Canada has positioned itself in
relation to its own history as well as the world within which it exists.  It is  important to
note that these traits are best understood in relation to that which provides their substance
and definition.  This is an indicator of the extent to which English Canadian culture is
based upon reacting to outside influences or perceived threats, a result no doubt of its
colonial history and the ever-present threat of manifest destiny posited by the United
States.
Ian Angus has asserted that there are "two main abiding themes throughout the
history of definitions of English Canada:  political continuity articulated through the
intervention of the federal state and a sense of break, of difference, elucidated through
relationship to the land, nature, environment.  These two themes are the temporal and
spatial dimensions of English Canadian identity."30  Angus suggests that the role of
wilderness, and by this I mean a relationship to the land, nature, and the surrounding
environment, takes the place of a founding national mythology in the English Canadian
context.  Since English Canada, unlike the United States, has never had a revolution, it
therefore lacks a determined beginning, a sense of establishing one's own identity and
forging it into a national character.  The importance of the wilderness then lies in its role
as an historical and social reference point for a culture which has not provided any
definitive reference points of its own making.  "In revolutionary traditions," Angus
continues, "time suggests discontinuity and thus difference from Europe... In the English
Canadian sense, by contrast, geography becomes important for identity where history has
failed to provide it."31  Angus elaborates further on the role of the wilderness in English
Canadian identity with reference to insights provided by other scholars and intellectuals:
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Cole Harris has documented the continuing appeal of the
demanding northern environment as a source of identification,
in opposition to the American myth of nature as a garden...
Margaret Atwood has suggested the theme of survival against
'menace, not from an enemy set over against you but from
everything surrounding you' as the unifying national symbol. 
Northrop Frye has claimed that the abiding theme in English
Canadian literature is not the establishment of identity but the
question 'Where is here?' which Robert Kroetsch sees as
leading to a predominance of characters who have no name.32
Furthermore, the assertion by Atwood that the English Canadian condition is typified by
"'menace, not from an enemy set over against you but from everything surrounding you,'"
serves as another example of English Canadian culture that has pre-dated the effects of
globalization.  So prevalent is the relation to wilderness within Canada that even
spontaneous sociological events have been interpreted in terms of the manner in which
they reflect the mixture of fascination, affinity, and fear of nature held by Canadians. 
Recently, the death of former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's son Michel in an avalanche
while skiing in British Columbia was met with a tremendous show of sympathy and
remorse around the country.  Though Trudeau has long been a public figure of
considerable mystique, the public response to his son's death was seen by many as related
as much to the nature of his death as to the celebrityhood of his family.  Michael Bliss, in
attempting to explain the swell of national interest in the incident, observed that "Trudeau
had a relationship with Canada's natural environment and with the Canadian outdoors that
no other prime minister has had.  Clearly his son was replicating his father's love of
Canada's wilderness, and that resonates with Canadians."33
The relevance of nature and wilderness within English Canadian identity, though,
is most directly expressed in Angus' assertion above that the environment provides for
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Canadians the sense of space and place that has otherwise been unavailable to them,
either due to their own inaction or to the imposition of British or American will upon
them.  The relationship with wilderness, then, reflects "not so much a geographical
determinism as a continuing mediation on place, experienced often as a dangerous,
identity-undermining threat that requires the winning of an always tentative security
through the imposition of human will in technology."34  Traditionally then, the English
Canadian relation to technology is also concerned with the attempt to establish a sense of
place within a placeless world; of utilizing the tools of a modern industrial society as the
means to establish modern and industrial characteristics within the vast landscape and
historical vacuum that English Canada is faced with.
However, the relation to technology has also manifested itself in ways concerned
less with the imposition of technology on the environment and more with the effects of
the imposition of technology upon us from outside sources.  After more than a half-
century of living with the reality of the omnipresence of the American media, English
Canada began to express a distinct sense of anxiety, fear, and at the very least a keen
sense of awareness of the effects that American media either were having or, perhaps
more ominously, were intended to have on the Canadian consciousness.35  It is through
the relation to technology, then, that English Canada expresses not only its apprehensions
towards the outside world, but also its insight on the manners in which technology, as a
tool of cultural imperialism, affects the course of human social development.  Arthur
Kroker, in fact, has identified the "highly original, comprehensive, and eloquent discourse
on technology" as "Canada's principal contribution to North American thought,"36 and has
furthermore asserted that "the Canadian mind may be one of the main sites in modern
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times for working-out the meaning of technological experience."37
This practice of reflecting on the impact of technology on society and everyday
life can be seen in many respects as a result of Canada's colonial history, both in terms of
British rule and American hegemony, which has resulted in a mentality of passive
awareness and a tendency towards analysis rather than action.  To paraphrase Donald
Creighton, Canada can be seen as a society which has bred a race of passionate observers,
a people who are situated within the world community in ways that allow them to look
but not touch, or to participate but not administrate.  Kroker has elaborated on this theme,
asserting that Canadian thought and discourse exist "midway between the future of the
New World and the past of European culture, between the rapid unfolding of the
'technological imperative' in American empire and the classical origins of the
technological dynamo in European history.  The Canadian discourse is neither the
American way nor the European way, but an oppositional culture trapped midway
between economy and history."38  This position, coupled with the intense and consistent
barrage of cultural products from the American media and image industry for the better
part of the past century, has afforded Canadians a particularly keen insight into the
technological workings of modern society.
In his discussion of the various manifestations of the Canadian discourse on
technology, Kroker raises examples of how English Canadian artists in various fields
have expressed this theme through their work.  He mentions, for example, how the rock
trio Rush "has been embraced by a wider North American audience because in songs like
New World Man ('He's a rebel and a runner; a stoplight turning green') it has captured the
dynamic willing which is at the centre of technological society."39  Kroker also discusses
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the music of Bruce Cockburn, "who in songs like The Trouble with Normal and
Civilisation and its Discontents, provides a haunting reminder of that which has been lost
by our absorption into the fully modern technical empire of the United States."40  With
regard to cinema, Kroker draws attention to the manner in which "the celebrated and
pioneering animation productions of the National Film Board of Canada as well disclose
the meeting of the creative imagination and technology in the Canadian mind."41
The films of David Cronenberg and Atom Egoyan are also indicative texts within
this discourse.  Egoyan's second film, Family Viewing (1987), features a family whose
members each use video technology as a means of relating to something dear to them, be
it their sex life, their lost childhood, or each other.  Though the movie is shot primarily
with film stock, Egoyan accentuates the impact of technology on the family's
interpersonal relationships by presenting the scenes which occur in the home as grainy
video images in which the shot composition and blocking is similar to that in a TV sitcom
or soap opera.  In an early scene, a conversation between Van, a principled but morally
confused young man, and his step mother is punctuated by a laugh track and the sounds
of applause from a television show Van is watching, amplified to seem as though it
naturally accompanies their own conversation.  Egoyan's third feature, Speaking Parts
(1989), also concerns characters who are morally adrift, with no conception of their
individual identities, who cling to technology (again, video) in an attempt to fill the void
in their lives.  Cronenberg's films have consistently featured commentaries on the effects
of technology on society and on the individual's role in society.  The movie most relevant
to my discussion here, though, is Videodrome (1982), a horror film in which "an
enthusiastic global corporate system which makes inexpensive glasses for the third world
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and missile guidance systems for NATO" has developed a program which causes the
formation of brain tumours in its viewers, which in turn induce the viewers to hallucinate
to the point where their hallucinations will "change human reality".  Most famously,
Videodrome features a scene in which Max (James Woods) is seduced by his television
set, with which he then proceeds to engage in a kind of techno-erotic asphyxiation by
inserting his head through the screen and into the pulsating set itself.  Some scholars have
recently noted the manner in which this and other Cronenberg films have curiously
prophesied the effects of technology in the modern world, with Videodrome keenly
pointing towards "today's quest for psychosexual fulfilment on the Web."42 
And surely the pinnacle example of English Canada's insight into the effects of
modernity and globalization is Marshall McLuhan, who, picking up from Harold A. Innis,
in many ways pioneered the study of the 'global village' within which we live today. 
Kroker also notes that perhaps McLuhan's most important contribution to the Canadian
discourse on technology was that he "wished to escape the 'flat earth approach' to
technology, to invent a 'new metaphor' by which we might 'restructure our thoughts and
feelings' about the subliminal, imperceptible environments of media effects."43  English
Canadian identity, then, can be seen as having been shaped by the impact of technology
from an outside source, and has attempted to substantiate its idea of self by expressing
and analysing the void created by technological imposition.
One can see within English Canadian identity, then, a desire to see beyond the
reference points of media itself, and the various other tools of cultural and economic
hegemony, and examine the inner workings of the ways in which hegemony is achieved
and maintained.  Richard Collins has suggested that because of this tendency within
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English Canada, "a distinctively Canadian emphasis has pre-echoed global
preoccupations and exemplified a general contradiction -- that between the political and
ideological forces of nationalism and the forces exerted by modern mass
communications."44  It is through this process that English Canada has found a voice for
national expression, and why it can be seen as an example of the new form of nationalism
required within the framework of globalization and modernity.  As Arthur Kroker argues,
"the Canadian discourse is, then, a way of seeking to recover a voice by which to
articulate a different historical possibility against the present closure of the technological
order."45
For the reasons I have just discussed, the practice of viewing Canadian national
culture and expression as an entity oppressed and dominated by American interests, as I
discussed in Chapter II, has become very much outdated.  If we accept the validity of the
assertion that nation-states as we know them have become somewhat obsolete within the
framework of modernity and globalization, then we must also realize that conceptions of
national identity and expression are also adapting in relation to the newer forces at hand
in global communications.  Though dominant interests are still prominent and in no way
seem to be receding in either power or position -- as plainly evidenced by the recent
plethora of corporate mergers, the persistent advancements of trans-national corporations
within communications and cultural industries around the world, and the sustained
influence of watchdog organizations such as the MPAA -- the old paradigm of cultural
dominance/imperialism as the elephant that stamps across the border and crushes our will
and ability to express national concerns and sovereign interests no longer seems to apply.
 Rather, English Canada serves as an example of a culture that has both adapted to and
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drawn strength for cultural expression from the turbulence brought about by the decline in
influence of the nation-state and the related difficulties this has imposed on the
expression of national identities.  To reiterate this point, Morley and Robins have noted
how Eric Hobsbawm
argues that the nation state is in retreat, and that any future
history of the world 'will inevitably have to be written as a
history of a world which can no longer be contained within
the limits of nations and nation-states as these used to be
defined, either politically, or economically, or culturally, or
even linguistically.  It will see nation-states or nations or 
ethnic/linguistic groups primarily as retreating before,
resisting, adapting to, being absorbed or dislocated by, the
new supranational restructuring of the globe'.46
English Canada, then, with its historical inability to determine a national identity within
the framework of old style nationalism related to the nation-states of a bygone era, has
found that the shift in emphasis from nation-states to a more fluid relationship with
nationality has opened up a new realm of possibilities for the expression of national
identity.  The presence of conflict between the nation-state and national expression, trans-
national communications companies and state regulating committees, the free flow of
information and nationalist protection policies, has helped fill the inherent absence within
English Canadian culture.
Looking for a Place to Happen:  The Tragically Hip and
an Expression of New Nationalism
In this regard, I would like to briefly turn attention towards a group of artists
whom I feel serve as a prime example of the manner in which English Canadian artists
are on the cusp of forging a new conception of nationalism, and one which can be directly
attributed to the tensions created by the trends of globalization and modernity which I
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have discussed above.  The musical group The Tragically Hip, who hail from Kingston,
Ontario, have been for the duration of the 1990's arguably the most popular English
Canadian band in the country.  Their songs, with lyrics written by lead vocalist Gordon
Downie, often probe issues of historical, political, and sociological significance within
English Canadian culture, which perhaps explains their enormous (and in many ways
unprecedented) popularity in Canada, as well as their complete anonymity in other
countries, such as the United States.47   However, the actual content and subject matter of
their music is only a part of their appeal within English Canada.  Perhaps most
importantly, their songs, which tend to favour the more expansive and expressive
parameters of poetry over the narrative restrictions of pop song formula, employ a very
idiosyncratic discourse that positions their work outside of, and in many instances in
opposition to, the dominant American discourse.48  In analysing the songs of The Hip I
am proceeding from McLuhan's assertion that "'The mind of the artist is always the point
of maximal sensitivity and resourcefulness in exposing altered realities in common
culture.'"49  Quite honestly, their work warrants the attention of an entire paper this size.  I
will focus here however on two particular songs that pertain to my discussion thus far.
"Save the Planet" and "Fireworks", from The Hip's seventh and most recent
album, Phantom Power (1998), are both explicitly aware of  the possibilities for
expression presented by the shift in priority of nation-states in the post-modern world,
and are also concerned with the process of locating  English Canadian national identity
within this context.  The two songs work to complement each other, raising issues and
concerns that the other in turn addresses.  "Save the Planet", which precedes "Fireworks"
on the album, introduces the situation by directly drawing attention to the failure of the
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Canadian nation-state to provide a solid conception of Canadian identity.  The song's first
verse ("The man 'cross the street he don't move a muscle / though he's all covered in dust
/ when constitutions of granite can't save the planet / what's to become of us"), expresses
a sense of anxiety over the lack of a definitive national self-image within the English
Canadian consciousness.  "Covered in dust" suggests that any remnants of the old
conception of nation-states are obsolete, while "constitutions of granite" that "can't save
the planet" is a sarcastic, and deeply cynical reference to the numerous failed attempts
(i.e., the repatriation of the Constitution in 1982, the Meech Lake Accord in 1990, the
Charlottetown Accord in 1992) to preserve the Canadian nation-state within the
framework of old style nationalism, and also to the desire of many Canadians to believe
that such constitutional patch-work would solve the country's identity crisis.  "What's to
become of us" implies that we are in a period of transition, of trying to figure out a better
way of relating to our national identity. 
The fourth verse ("That's when the powers of observation / come to the periphery
town / and we carry their water / we don't make a sound") references the manner in which
the hegemony of the dominant discourse, exemplified by the American and trans-national
image industries ("the powers of observation"), perpetuates Canada's role as a branch
plant of multinational industry, as a hewer of wood and drawer of water ("we carry their
water / we don't make a sound").  This stanza, through its choice of words and imagery,
references the process of cultural exportation practised by American and trans-national
interests, an assertion supported by the line that follows ("and after gaining our
resignation / they come through the chainlink fence"), which serves as a metaphor for the
collapsing of barriers and the free flow of information that is so vital to sustaining the
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hegemonic systems upon which dominant interests rely.  Downie, the band's lyricist,
manages to take this metaphor even further by utilizing language that alludes to key
aspects of Canada's relationship with the United States, and in so doing implies that
Canada's lack of self-determination can be attributed at least in part to its historical
economic dependency on the United States.  Prior to referencing the arrival of dominant
interests in "the periphery town," Downie introduces this movement as "a tolerant hum
from the core".  The usage of the terms "core" and "periphery" in this context are a very
clear allusion to the principles of dependency theory, which according to Dudley Seers
was based on the idea "that the world consisted of a 'core' of dominant nations and a
'periphery' of dependent ones," and that it is the dominant core's "external influences that
distort the process of development."50  The song's finale, with Downie chanting "what's
left to captivate us" and then reiterating "what's to become of us," hammers home the
sense that nationalism as we know it has led English Canadian culture astray, and that
new methods of defining and determining national identity must be turned to as
alternatives.  This kind of cultural questioning, manifested as a result of the tension
inherent in international trends brought about in part by changes in the global
communications industry, can be seen as an example of Arthur Kroker's assertion that
"Canadian thought forces the question of what is the most appropriate response to the
technological dynamo."51  While "Save the Planet" expresses frustration over the failure
of English Canadian culture to establish a clear understanding of its own identity, and
laments the fact that a large portion of that identity may indeed be one of subordinance to
American interests, "Fireworks" essentially picks up where "Save the Planet" leaves off
and answers the question of "what's to become of us" with a decidedly optimistic
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response.  If "Save the Planet" looks back on Canada's political and social situation
during the Fordist period, then "Fireworks" proceeds by celebrating the end of this period
and looks forward to an international environment in which Canada's traits and
characteristics, that proved so incompatible with the old conceptions of nation-states and
nationalism, will benefit a stronger and more coherent idea of Canadian identity.  The
song begins by referencing perhaps the single most cohesive and binding event in
contemporary Canadian culture ("If there's a goal that everyone remembers / it was back
in ol' '72") with the kind of wistful tinge of nostalgia that implies a bygone era.  The
stanza that follows ("You said you didn't give a fuck about hockey / and I never saw
someone say that before / you held my hand and we walked home the long way / you
were loosening my grip on Bobby Orr") immediately shatters the stability and familiarity
established in the first lines of the song and begins to take the narrative down a new path.
 Importantly, the lines "loosening my grip on Bobby Orr" and "loosening the grip on a
fake cold war," which comes in the fourth verse, both serve as metaphors for the process
through which the reliance on old-style nationalism has been broken, first by distancing
oneself from an insular, navel-gazing ideal of Canadian culture (typified by hockey as the
ultimate cultural icon), and then by distancing oneself from the boundaries and blocs of
the Fordist period, typified by the polarization of political and cultural beliefs inherent
within the cold war.  Furthermore, by referring to the cold war as fake, Downie
acknowledges the manner in which national and cultural sentiments are constructed out of
a socio-political context.
The song succeeds in making such statements on national identity and cultural
expression by posing the nation as a metaphor for the domestic ("We hung out together
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every single moment / 'cause that's what we thought married people do / complete with
the grip of artificial chaos / and believing in the country of me and you").  By using
marriage as a metaphor for the relationship between citizen and nation and describing
marriage as a crutch, Downie effectively criticizes the need of the nation to create an
overwrought sense of dependency ("the grip of artificial chaos") to inspire faith within the
citizen.  The conventional conception of nationalism, then, is seen as something that has
received too much emphasis in the process of self-definition within the 'relationship'. 
Freeing yourself from the restrictive parameters imposed by the nation thus opens up new
areas of possibility ("Isn't it amazing what you can accomplish / when you don't let the
nation get in your way / no ambition whisperin' over your shoulder / isn't it amazing you
can do anything").  The song directly acknowledges the slide towards obsolescence taken
by the nation-state, while at the same time describing the position which nationalism is
still expected to fill within many cultures ("Fireworks exploding in the distance /
temporary towers soar / fireworks emulating heaven / til there are no stars any more"). 
Interestingly, Downie has stated that these two stanzas (the second of which reads
"Fireworks aiming straight at heaven / temporary towers soar / til there are no stars
shining up in heaven / til there are no stars any more"), which I interpret as describing the
last bursts of the nation-state, were actually intended as commentary on the fleeting
nature of the star system inherent within American celebrityhood.52  It is fitting, actually,
that an observation on the nature of American stardom as a product of waning influence
would so seamlessly translate into a statement on the decline in importance of the nation-
state within contemporary culture, since the American and trans-national image industries
have traditionally relied so heavily on 'star power' to sell their products (and hence the
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ideological baggage they carry with them) to consumers both domestic and international
in an attempt to bolster and maintain their influence in the world market.  Finally, the last
lines of the song ("this one thing probably never goes away / I think this one thing is
always supposed to stay / this one thing doesn't have to go away") strike a decidedly
optimistic note for English Canadian identity by acknowledging the existence of
characteristics that have contributed to the difficulty in determining English Canadian
identity (the "one thing" Downie refers to is not a specific causal element, but rather the
net result; that the absence, the very lack of substance that typifies English Canadian
identity is in and of itself a central component of who we are) and emphatically insisting
that it can act as a site of empowerment, that it "doesn't have to go away."
Thus, it could be argued that the music of The Tragically Hip, along with the work
of the other artists I have discussed, succeeds in expressing distinctly English Canadian
concerns despite the obstacles and conditions that would seem to render even the
existence of such expression impossible, and therefore supports Richard Collins' assertion
that "The central proposition of the media-imperialism thesis -- that there is an
equivalence between national interest, identity, survival, and communication and cultural
sovereignty -- remains to be demonstrated.  The Canadian case may well exemplify a
reverse thesis -- that nations can survive in robust health even when their media are, as
Tunstall put it, American."53  However, this argument, particularly the degree to which
English Canada's identity as a nation can be referred to as "robust," must be more closely
scrutinized.  It will serve well here to remember Kroker's assertion that the English
Canadian discourse exists "midway" between the ideologies of America and Europe.  In
other words, from the point of view of the dominant discourse, English Canadian cultural
87
expression lacks substantive reference points and exists neither here nor there, a factor
which further contributes to English Canada's status as a culture of absence. 
Thus, even if one accepts that English Canadian culture can be defined and
identified, there still exists a great deal of difficulty in terms of positioning English
Canadian culture and identity in relation to other discourses, particularly that of the
dominant ideology.  This is ultimately manifested in what Michel de Certeau has
identified as the "strategies" of the powerful and the "tactics" of the weak.  Morley
elaborates on this concept, explaining that "The weak are not totally powerless, but, given
their lack of control over institutions and resources, they have to operate in the margins
(temporal and spatial) left (defined) by those who do control such institutional
resources."54  In the next chapter I will examine the manner in which the expression of
English Canadian culture is complicated by the fact that its institutional resources are
controlled by dominant American interests, against which English Canadian culture must
constantly struggle to define itself, and explore in greater detail the manner in which
English Canadian culture is marginalized by the dominance of the American discourse in
Canada.
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CHAPTER IV
THE MARGINALIZATION OF ENGLISH CANADIAN CULTURE
Before beginning my discussion in Chapter V of the appropriation of English
Canadian locales and images by the American and trans-national image industry, I would
like to expand on the manner in which English Canadian cultural expression exists within
the margins of its own nation.  Since this is largely a result of the hegemonic structure
maintained by the dominant American ideology and facilitated and perpetuated by
Canada's inherent dependency, it seems appropriate to examine the role and function of
ideological practices and how they impact on the development of cultural attitudes and
expectations.
English Canadian Cultural Consciousness
The key to understanding the link between identity and expression would seem to
be that of ideology.  In other words, one expresses oneself by communicating through a
particular ideology, which can be defined as a set of "ideas that buttress and support a
particular distribution of power in society."1  When I speak of the dominant ideology I am
not necessarily referring to a particular entity, but rather to the manner and methods by
which certain ideological principles govern the perceptions of a particular group of
people.  Ananda Mitra has argued that "by relating culture and ideology, it is possible to
examine the internal contradictions within practices, thus informing culture itself. 
92
Ideology introduces in the discussion the elements of struggle, contradiction and
dominance, all of which are important in studying culture as a set of practices."2  It is
possible, then, to examine some of the internal contradictions within English Canadian
culture -- such as the fact that recent studies show that a majority of English Canadians
feel that Canadian networks need to broadcast more Canadian films and programs, while
at the same time 79% of English Canadians prefer American television shows over
Canadian programming3 -- by analysing the elements of struggle created by the
pervasiveness of the dominant American ideology in English Canada. 
My goal here is to briefly examine the extent to which English Canadian artistic
voices have been marginalized within the medium of film.  It seems clear that English
Canadian filmic discourse has been pushed so far to the periphery, so far from the
dominant discourse exemplified by Hollywood and the concerns of trans-national media,
that many of the forms of indigenous expression that have been produced appear
incredibly foreign to those versed in the language of the dominant discourse, as Roger
Ebert has noted in his observation that Canadian films often seem more foreign to
American audiences than anything from Europe or Asia.4  Of course, given the impact of
the American media in influencing English Canadian consciousness, the same can also be
said of English Canadians; that many of our own cultural products seem foreign to us
because of the effects of American media on our cultural consciousness.  Indeed, Arthur
Kroker has argued that:
The essence of the Canadian intellectual condition is this: 
it is our fate by virtue of historical circumstance and geo-
graphical accident to be forever marginal to the 'present-
mindedness' of American culture (a society which specializ-
ing as it does in the public ethic of 'instrumental activism'
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does not enjoy the recriminations of historical remembrance);
and to be incapable of being more than ambivalent on the
cultural legacy of our European past.5
The English Canadian discourse, positioned as it is between the ideologies of America
and Europe, would seem to allow for forms of expression that offer perspectives
divergent from those of other discourses, something which I illustrated in my discussion
of The Tragically Hip in the last chapter.  However, as I pointed out in Chapter II, the
dominant American ideology has maintained its firmly entrenched hegemonic authority in
Canada in part by ensuring, primarily through the control of distribution channels for
cultural expression, that peripheral concerns remain on the periphery. 
Essentially then, English Canadian culture is marginalized not only in relation to
the dominant discourse exemplified by American and trans-national media products, but
due to the dominance of this discourse in Canada, English Canadian culture exists in the
margins within its own nation.  For example, consider a comparison between two
successful films, one Quebecois and the other English Canadian.  On the one hand, Louis
Sais' Les Boys (1997) managed to gross over $5 million within a few months of playing
only in Quebec theatres.6  On the other hand, Atom Egoyan's The Sweet Hereafter (1997),
though its profile was bolstered by receiving the Grand Prix at the Cannes Film Festival
and two high-profile Academy Award nominations (best director and best adapted
screenplay), as well as being named on more top-ten-films-of-the-year lists in the United
States than any other film released that year, grossed just under $3 million in Canadian
theatrical release.7  The inability of many English Canadian films to connect with English
Canadian audiences, then, is not due directly to their lack of access to Canadian screens,
but rather their inability to communicate through a discourse that is familiar to English
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Canadians.
The unfamiliarity of English Canadian film to English Canadians is largely due to
the fact that, in terms of utilizing the filmic form as a language of expression, the English
Canadian cinema has evolved on a much different evolutionary scale than that of every
other Western industrialized nation.  This has largely been a result of Canada's dependent
nature, discussed in Chapter I, which in turn has resulted in the continued state of
deficiency and neglect of the infrastructure for feature films in English Canada        
(particularly in the distribution and exhibition sectors), brought about by the consistent
inability of the federal government to both establish an independent industry and deter the
expansion and economic dominance of the American industry.  Magder has noted how
Susan Crean asserts that:
'Canadian culture is consigned to an underground world
where it cannot possibly function as a culture in the true
sense of the word.  This situation is abetted by the contin-
entalist approach to economics, including cultural eco-
nomics, and by defeatist policy-makers who...simply ignore
the fact that U.S. investment in Canada has a stake in our
continued cultural underdevelopment (and in the cultural 
receptiveness of the Canadian public)... Meanwhile, as the 
techniques for distributing mass culture expand, Canada is
bound ever tighter to the U.S. empire.'8
The English Canadian filmic discourse that did evolve, then, is one that has existed both
outside the realm of the dominant discourse and separate from the ideological concerns of
the national consciousness.  As a result, a people existing in a nation where their own
cultural and ideological consciousness is marginalized have, by virtue of circumstance,
been capable of creating only a marginalized mode of expression.  As Chatterjee has
explained, "To make a claim on behalf of the fragment is also, not surprisingly, to
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produce a discourse that is itself fragmentary."9  English Canadian cinema has thus
evolved like an unwanted relative locked in a secret cell in the far reaches of the
kingdom.  Having never interacted with the other subjects on equal terms, it develops its
own eclectic patterns of communication, even though it speaks the same language as the
others.
However, the flip side to this argument demonstrates the degree to which English
Canadian culture has been consumed by the dominant American discourse.  For every
individual, subsisting in the ideologically far-reaching realm of the kingdom, who has
proven incapable of adopting the language of the dominant discourse (i.e. Guy Maddin,
William MacGivillray, John Greyson) there are just as many Canadian countrymen who
have not only proven capable of adapting to the language of the dominant discourse, but
who converse in it so fluently that they have been invited to dine at the king's table on the
basis of their contributions to the dominant culture (i.e. Norman Jewison, Ivan Reitman).
 Others still have been able to actually embody aspects of the very discourse in their own
creative persona, resulting in a kind of iconic status within the dominant culture (i.e.
Mary Pickford in the silent era, Michael J. Fox in the 1980's, Jim Carrey, Pamela
Anderson Lee and Alanis Morissette in the 1990's).  The significance of the success of
such celebrities lies in the fact that even though they are often identified as Canadian
(press clippings and interviews will occasionally mention this fact, bestowing upon it the
same relevance attributed to their zodiac sign or their original hair colour), they are not
identifiable as Canadian.  Perhaps the most telling (and insulting) manner in which the
Canadian-ness of such star personae is dismissed as irrelevant is the use of the label
"Canadian-born", which seems to imply that their nationality is no more than a mere
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geographic technicality that in no way interferes with their ideological and cultural
affiliations to the United States.  Indeed, it can be argued that their inherent
amorphousness makes them rather valuable commodities in an industry that requires
them to exude and personify a variety of ideological principles.10  The Canadian-ness of
such star personae, that is, their ability to be different from and yet exactly the same as the
perceived American norm, ultimately propagates the idea of Canada as a place that exists
somewhere else but nowhere in particular, a site of absence upon which the dominant
ideology can write its own impressions.
Essentially then, with specific regard to filmic expression and film culture, the
dominant American cultural discourse has been so prominent and so firmly entrenched in
English Canadian society, that it has completely marginalized any other form of discourse
to the extent that the following has occurred.  First, those who do communicate in
different discourse(s) seem, to the majority of the population versed in the American
discourse, to be speaking in tongues.  The cultural language that they construct has been
pushed so far to the periphery and been marginalized to such a tremendous extent for
such a long period of time, that it seems to have missed certain stages in the evolutionary
ladder of cinema, making it seem, in many instances, uncinematic, unimportant, or, most
alarming from a nationalist perspective, unpleasurable.  Second, due to the proliferation
of the dominant American discourse in Canada, those who do communicate through it
artistically and creatively are able to speak the language fluently, making them virtually
indistinguishable from the natives.  However, due to their origins within a different
anthropological culture, and therefore carrying with them many ideological distinctions,
these Canadians are able to view matters within the dominant discourse in a different
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light than an American, often to the extent that they either become capable of
commenting on the discourse in very subtle ways, thereby enriching the dominant culture,
or they understand the stipulations of discourse to such an extent that they are able to
epitomise a specific aspect of the dominant society.11   
As I noted in Chapters I and II, the nature of Canada's economic dependency on
the United States has had profound implications for the manner in which the dominant
ideology is filtered through to the English Canadian consciousness.  I have also noted
how this process has been abetted by the Canadian state, particularly in reference to the
Canadian Co-operation Project, through which the federal government chose to align its
vastly underdeveloped cultural policy to the needs of American industry, rather than
establishing some form of regulation to strengthen the Canadian film industry and abate
the advances of the American distribution and exhibition sectors of the industry, which
eventually subsumed the Canadian distribution and exhibition sectors as part of the
American domestic market.  When the federal government has attempted -- beginning
with the formation of the CFDC and CRTC in 1968 and continuing in the years that
followed by more or less tinkering with these two institutions -- to develop a strong
English Canadian culture, it has been forced to do so within the confines to which it has
been relegated by its inauspicious past.  Unable to curtail the flow of American cultural
products (numerous attempts by government ministers have begun in a flourish of
nationalist ballyhoo charged by the anticipation of cultural sovereignty, and have ended in
a battle with the MPAA or other American organizations in which the minister is forced
to withdraw when trade embargoes are threatened against a broad cross-section of the
Canadian economy) or increase the access of Canadian films to Canadian theatres (1998
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saw a 14% increase in screens with the expansion of Famous Players and Cineplex
Odeon, and an increase in Canadian screen time from 1.45% to 1.7%12), the federal
government is left to fund cultural products that can only reach the public through highly
marginalized modes and channels. 
This marginalization of the various forms of Canadian cultural expression is a
result not only of the lack of physical access that Canadian have to the modes and
channels of cultural distribution, but also to the manner in which the psychological
reception of Canadian cultural products by Canadians is affected by the dominance of the
American discourse within the English Canadian consciousness.  As a people whose
national consciousness is consistently characterized by features such as dependency,
absence, and amorphousness, English Canadians have, perhaps quite logically, spawned a
national culture that exists in the space between the desire to legitimate the 'national
image' through the nations communication channels while simultaneously marginalizing
the effectiveness of those very channels through a continual subordinance to the priorities
of dominant interests.  Thus, in addition to the marginalization of English Canadian
cultural expression through film by the hegemonic authority exercised by dominant
interests over the flow of cultural products in Canada, English Canadian culture is also
marginalized within the shared consciousness of English Canadians by the gap which is
created between the conception of what constitutes the national character and the actual
existence of such conceptions in the lived identities constructed by English Canadians. 
This sense of there being a kind of enforced distance between the national ideal and the
national reality is perhaps best exemplified within the Canadian broadcasting industry and
the manner in which it is forced to exist and persist within the shadow created by the
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dominance of the American commercial broadcasting system.  Richard Collins has
explained how this process arises as an inherent result of the structure within which
Canadian broadcasting exists:
The condition [of Canadian broadcasting]... is known by
nationalists as 'cultural dependency' -- the subordinate relation
of a peripheral to a metropolitan culture.  It is to resist and
transform this dependent relationship flowing from competitive
market conditions that the Canadian state has promoted non-
market institutions.  A penalty attached to such practices;
insulation of market conditions (the raison d’être of state policy
and institutions) slows adaptation to changed conditions and
(unless countervailing channels through consumers can express 
preferences are established) stifles responsiveness to demand.13
Thus, due to the necessity of the English Canadian discourse to exist and operate outside
of and in opposition to the American discourse, English Canadian discourses are
immediately marginalized and made subordinate within the priorities and structure of the
dominant American discourse.
Joyce Nelson introduces her book The Colonized Eye with Jean-Paul Sartre's
assertion that "We only become what we are by the radical and deep-seated refusal of that
which others have made of us".  The implication behind the use of this quote in the
particular context of Nelson's book, which focuses on the influence of John Grierson's
policies and beliefs on the landscape of Canadian cinema, would seem to be that
Canadians, as a people colonized by the continentalist tendencies of its ruling elite and
the economic imperialism of America, are only able to define themselves and achieve
some level of self-determination by rebelling in some way against the dominant powers
that be; against the dominant perceptions and conceptions of English Canada and English
Canadians held and propagated by those who control the means of forming opinions, the
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infrastructure of information dissemination, the 'powers of observation'.  However, if
Sartre's words of wisdom offer a set of directions, if you will, for the formation and
definition of a particular distinct identity, then perhaps they also provide an explanation
for the incredible difficulty experienced by English Canada in its attempts towards self-
determination.  In applying Sartre's comment directly to the English Canadian condition,
one must pose the question, Has English Canada, in any kind of radical or deep-seated
fashion, refused the conceptions formed of us by others?  In attempting to answer this
question one must first choose a particular avenue of investigation.  Studies of English
Canadian literature, for example, may reveal signs of such refusal, or perhaps at least
resistance.  The brief case study I provided in the last chapter of The Tragically Hip also
serves as an example of how English Canadian music has, in many respects, successfully
constructed its own discourse that exists outside, and in many ways in opposition to, the
dominant American discourse.14  However, the primary focus of this study is film and
broadcasting media, the most prominent, pervasive and influential avenue available for
cultural expression, and it seems sadly obvious that English Canada has not been able to,
and perhaps in some instances has not been permitted to even come close to the kind of
epiphanal refusal Sartre alludes to. 
Effectively, then, the inability of English Canadians to perform such an act of self-
definition not only propagates the conception of English Canada held by the dominant
ideology, but is also a direct result of the extent to which such a conception is, in its own
way, valid and accurate.  In other words, there may in fact be a great deal of truth in
Richard Collins' assertion that "there is an effacement of aggressive individualism in
Canada that is distinctive and attractive,"15 and that English Canada's amorphousness is in
101
part a result of the antipathy many English Canadians seem to feel towards the fact that
their culture is essentially one of absence.  Wilden echoes this assertion in his insistence
that Canadians represent an "anomaly amongst a supposedly non-third-world people; a
people whose 'national identity' is almost exclusively defined by what we are not."16  My
objectives for the remainder of this chapter are to illustrate the manner in which, from a
purely economic and industrial perspective, English Canada's cultural amorphousness has
in fact been an advantage in many aspects of the international image industry, while from
the perspective of English Canadian identity and culture these developments have further
solidified English Canada's inability to achieve substantial self-determination, suggesting
that an inability to define ourselves, to perform Sartre's act of refusal, is perhaps in and of
itself an essential component of English Canadian identity. 
How 'Canadian' is the Film Industry in Canada?
That's when the powers of observation
come to the periphery town
and we carry their water
we don't make a sound.
-- The Tragically Hip
As I have previously illustrated, the development (or lack thereof) of the Canadian
film industry is implicitly related to the behaviour, principles, and character of the
Canadian state.  Failure on the part of the federal government at numerous points in the
first half of the century to either provide for the development of a feature film industry or
prevent the take-over of the distribution and exhibition sectors by American interests can
be seen as a development in keeping with the character of the Canadian state as a whole. 
As Magder explains:
the establishment and growth of a commercial cinema in
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Canada shared a characteristic common to many other
sectors of the Canadian economy:  a heavy, almost exclusive 
reliance on foreign capital and goods.  The Canadian political 
economy has been, and continues to be, the prototype of
dependent industrialization among liberal democracies.  The 
internationalization of first British and then American capital
are the hallmarks of Canadian capitalist development.  The
history of the cinema in Canada is perhaps the clearest example
of this dependent development in the sphere of cultural
production.  By the early 1930's, the emerging U.S. giants in
the motion picture industry (firms such as Famous Players, 
Paramount, MGM, and Columbia) and their Canadian allies
had established a branch plant distribution and exhibition
network that controlled the Canadian market through monopo-
listic practices and ensured the dominance of foreign -- mostly
American -- films.  For the most part, Canadian capital was
satisfied to assume an ancillary role.  Canadian theatre owners
(or exhibitors) were quite happy to play American films and
seek out permanent arrangements with the Hollywood majors;
a good living could be made showing American films."17
The "Canadian allies" Magder alludes to who helped propagate the branch plant structure
within the Canadian film industry were primarily the Motion Picture Exhibitors and
Distributors of Canada.  This organization was nothing more than the Canadian bureau of
the MPAA.  The founding of the Motion Picture Exhibitors and Distributors of Canada in
1922 was one of the first official acts of the MPAA, also founded in 1922, and it
effectively enabled the American majors to consolidate Canadian screens for their own
benefit.  As Joyce Nelson explains, "Hollywood's vertical integration could successfully
proceed only if these two aspects of the industry, distribution and exhibition, were well
enough entrenched in Canada to prevent indigenous films from playing on local
screens."18  Thus, with no infrastructure in place for the production of feature films and
with no action on the part of the government to either address this fact or curtail the
involvement of American business interests in the other two sectors of the industry
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(distribution and exhibition), Canada rather effortlessly became a part of the domestic
American market for motion pictures.
As I noted in Chapter I, the roots of Canada's economic dependency on an
imperial centre, be it Britain or the United States, have often been perceived in light of
Innis' staples theory, which argued that Canada's basic economic structure during its
development as a nation-state was based on the extraction and exportation of a particular
staple good -- fur, wheat, lumber, minerals, etc. -- to the dominant metropole where it was
manufactured into a finished product which was then exported to other countries,
including Canada, for the benefit of the dominant business interests overseeing
production.  Indeed, it has been argued that so ingrained was this process in the Canadian
economic mind-set that it also came to determine the economic relationship between
western and central Canada for the better part of this century, with the older established
firms in Ontario forming the dominant metropole in relation to the peripheral western
provinces who were utilized for the extraction of resources necessary for the success of
businesses in central Canada.  Collins, among others, has argued that staples theory is an
insufficient component of dependency theory, which he also feels has failed "to have
decisively demonstrated its contentions,"19 and that Canada's economic situation, is not
"one that necessarily has to be perceived as disabled by dependency,"20 but rather can be
more accurately explained by the restrictions placed on Canada by geographic and
climatic circumstances. 
However, it would be more accurate to suggest that all these aspects contributed
equally in separate regards to the formation of Canada's economic character, and are in
fact still affecting Canada's economic behaviour.  One can see many aspects of Innis'
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staples theory, for example, presently at play in the use of Canada, though primarily
British Columbia and particularly Vancouver, as a branch plant for American film and
television productions.  The criteria Innis established for understanding the dynamics of
staples theory can be directly applied to the current climate of American film production
in Canada with a great deal of ease.  "Agriculture, industry, transportation, trade, finance,
and government activities," Innis argued, "tend to become subordinate to the production
of the staple for a more highly specialized manufacturing community.  These general
tendencies may be strengthened by government policy as in the mercantile system but the
importance of these policies varies in particular industries."21  The more highly
specialized manufacturing community in question here is of course Hollywood, which the
B.C. film industry has come to serve by specializing not just in the production of
American products for the international image industry, but more specifically in the
making of syndicated television series and movies-of-the-week (MOW's), which
represent the bulk of American productions in Canada.  Recent statistics show that 80-
85% of film production in B.C., the total of which in 1997 was $630 million22 and in
1998 $808 million (not to mention more than $2 billion in spin-off revenues),23 consists
of American productions, be they film or TV programs.  Largely as a result of such
activity, B.C. is now the largest film production centre in North America behind Los
Angeles and New York.24  Also in evidence are the government policies Innis refers to,
which not only encourage American film production activity in B.C., but in many
respects make it possible.  For example, B.C. Premier Glen Clark recently initiated an
11% tax credit for all foreign productions in B.C., in response to Ontario Premier Mike
Harris' similar tax credit, which was aimed at drawing some of the American productions
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away from Vancouver to Toronto.  The producers of films and programs shot in Canada
consider these policies, which also include Film Incentive B.C. and the Canadian Film or
Video Production Tax Credit, a major incentive for shooting there.
The provincial governments not only ease and encourage the use of their
geography, labour, and infrastructure as a branch plant for the international image
industry, they also actively pursue it.  In April 1998, just prior to instituting the 11% tax
write-off to foreign productions, Premier Clark and his "Team B.C." of industry insiders
made a three-day trip to Hollywood where they met with the top executives and decision-
makers at 20th Century Fox, Paramount, MGM, and other prominent studios.  Also, in
October 1997, shortly after the announcement of an 11% tax credit offered by the federal
government, the Canadian consulate in Los Angeles held a tax seminar focussing on the
advantages and procedures involved in filming in Canada which drew more than 250
executives from all the major American studios.25  As I pointed out in Chapter I,
however, the desire to pursue economic security by establishing a branch plant of
American industry in one's community or region is virtually engrained within the
Canadian political and economic frame of mind.  Michael Bliss has explained that at the
turn of the century, when the Canadian confederation was still relatively young and the
most recent economic credo was that of the Macdonald government's National Policy,
every Canadian province, every Canadian city, every Canadian
hamlet pursued its own 'national policy' of offering all possible
incentives to capitalists and developers to come into its territory
and establish manufacturing enterprises.  The practice of
granting bonuses to industries in the form of free sites, free
utilities, tax concessions, loans, and outright cash grants was
universal and persistent...[and] was responsible for the attraction
of countless American branch plants to specific cities.26
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In other words, the plight of Canadian culture is very much a result of the necessity, or at
least the reality, of Canadian economics.  As Magder explains, "Whereas dependency
theorists might see Canada's feature film policy as being produced at the behest of the
American film industry and the American state, I see it as being determined by forces
within Canada that are influenced by the process of dependent capitalist development."27
At this point, however, a significant distinction must be made between the
'Canadian film industry' and the 'film industry in Canada'.  While one can talk at length
about the activities of the film industry in Canada, any such discussion of the Canadian
film industry would prove impossible, or at the very least unproductive and misleading,
for the simple reason that a Canadian film industry does not exist.  A film industry per se
is comprised of three sectors:  production, distribution, and exhibition.  Since Canadian
firms exercise extremely limited control and influence within the distribution sector in
Canada, and virtually none whatsoever in exhibition, a feature film industry that can be
identified as Canadian simply cannot be located.  One can, however, speak of a Canadian
film production industry, since the production of feature films in Canada by Canadians is
a viable, though highly marginalized, enterprise, and is even extensive enough in terms of
capital (manpower as well as monetary) to warrant consideration as an industry in and of
itself.  Historically speaking, Michael Dorland has asserted that the only thing resembling
a film production industry in Canada has been "a peripheral film production infrastructure
sufficiently established to support the periodic emergence of discursive formations
(among critics, filmmakers, producers, or government bureaucrats, for instance) that
produce 'talk' about an imaginary or potential industry.  In displaced national cinema
contexts, it is the survival of these production elements that made possible the
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continuation of the polemic.  In this sense, the 'film industry' both exists and does not
exist simultaneously."28
When one speaks of the film industry in Canada, then, one is generally referencing
that portion of the American film production industry that has taken up shop in several
Canadian urban areas (though primarily Vancouver and Toronto) as a cheaper alternative
to shooting in the United States.  Far from constituting a Canadian film industry, these
productions, though often consisting of feature films with Hollywood budgets, primarily
consist of syndicated television programs, designed for export as much as for domestic
consumption, and MOW's which networks and studios favour for their low budgets and
short shooting schedules and their ability to deliver time slots that demand relatively high
advertising rates.  In short, this 'film industry in Canada' can be seen as yet another
manifestation of the branch plant economy at work between American business and
Canadian labour:  a raw material, which in this case can be either a location (chosen for
its suitability for a particular production) or the labour itself (attractive for the financial
advantage it offers in an industry notorious for stratospheric budgets) or both, is utilized
for purposes laid out by American business interests, shipped back to the United States
where its production as a finished product is completed,29 and then exported around the
world and back into Canada by way of the extensive and tightly controlled American
distribution system.  Taking into consideration both the dependent character of the
Canadian state and its inability to provide the Canadian nation-state with a film industry
equivalent in form and function to other Western industrialized states -- complicated
further by the Canadian tendency to ignore the fact that resistance against the hegemonic
order is nullified by its own dependent, branch plant economic structure -- it is helpful to
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remember Dorland's explanation that, "for Tadros, Canadian policy development
consisted in a dialogue of illusions, between, on the one hand, a production milieu given
to massive self-delusion as to its own capacities, and, on the other hand, a state apparatus
given to 'totally misguided readings of the industry workings'.  The interaction between
the two would produce film policies she characterized as 'the great lie'."30  The 'film
industry in Canada', then, requires Canadians to fulfil their somewhat familiar roles as
hewers of wood and drawers of water within the new technological and economic
parameters of the international image industry.
The question of how 'Canadian' is the 'film industry in Canada' not only concerns
the preponderance of American stories, images and locales reproduced by Canadian
labour for international consumption, but also, and perhaps more importantly, the
difficulty in determining the 'Canadian' characteristics of actual Canadian programming. 
In many cases, the attitude of those within the Canadian broadcasting industry seems to
be that American programs -- series that are at the very least set in America, featuring
American characters and narrative tropes -- are simply a more economically viable
undertaking than a program set in Canada with Canadian characters and narrative tropes. 
Collins notes how Caplan and Sauvgeau assert that "'what does sell, when we succeed in
the big time, is in most instances American programs made in Canada.  The actors and
production personnel may be more or less Canadian, the locations usually neutralized by
altering licence plates and taking down flags, may be Canadian, but the programs in their
style and substance are American.'"31  Collins also offers a practical, industrial
explanation for this activity, arguing that "The availability of American services has
denied Canadian commercial broadcasters revenue and raised audience expectations so
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that Canadian programming must now offer gratifications to those of U.S. productions,
which are funded by a revenue pool many times larger than that in Canada."32  However,
the assumption that Caplan and Sauvgeau seem to make here, which Collins also alludes
to, is that there exists an identifiably Canadian style and substance that is simply passed
over in favour of the more economically viable American model.  A much more accurate
argument, however, is that a Canadian filmic "style or substance" has been so
marginalized by the dominance of the American narrative discourse in English Canada,
made possible in no small part by the infiltration of American media in English Canada
for more than half a century at the least, that it has become something of a matter of
survival for business interests within the broadcasting industry to produce 'American'
programs, even for consumption by Canadian audiences. 
Indeed, many Canadians involved in these productions may not even feel that
communicating through an American discourse threatens English Canadian identity,
arguing instead that the creative energy and financial resources coming from Canadian
individuals is enough to qualify the program as 'Canadian', irrespective of the actual
ideological messages through which the program communicates.  For example, Brad
Wright, a Canadian and one of the producers and writers of Stargate SG-1, an American
syndicated series shot in Vancouver (which will be discussed in detail in the next
chapter), has publicly criticized the Canadian Gemini (equivalent to the Emmy)
nominating committee for overlooking the show and its crew on the basis that it is an
American program:  "I'm a Canadian writer, a Canadian executive producer," Wright has
exclaimed, "who hires Canadian actors, Canadian production designers, a Canadian crew.
 Yes, there is a certain amount of American money.  Yes, it's sold to the American
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market.  But Due South was sold to the American market.  It had to have a guy in a red
Mountie suit to call it Canadian."33  It would seem, in fact, that the only programs that do
manage to employ a very identifiable Canadian 'style and substance' are those which
diverge from the dominant discourse to such a tremendous extent, utilizing narrative
tropes and character traits akin to the dominant discourse only in a highly ironic, satirical,
and oppositional fashion, that they are either seen by Canadians as being extremely
marginal and therefore are largely ignored (ie. Ken Finkleman's brilliant but short-lived
1997 CBC comedy The Newsroom), or are recognized as being so far from the dominant
discourse that they provide a kind of perverse, cultish attraction that also, significantly,
appeals to American viewers as well (ie. SCTV, The Kids in the Hall, and also, it can be
argued, Saturday Night Live, produced as it is by Canadian Lorne Michaels and featuring
a long history of Canadian writers and performers, including Dan Aykroyd, Martin Short,
Phil Hartman, and Mike Myers). 
The unwillingness of many Canadians to subvert the practices of the dominant
discourse, preferring instead to enjoy the security provided within the international image
industry, can perhaps be explained in part by Morley and Robins' assertion that "There is
a fear of knowing the truth which can make people desire to limit their freedom of
thought and thinking."34  They go on to quote Jean Baudrillard, who suggests that "'The
deepest desire is perhaps to give the responsibility of one's desire to someone else...
Nothing is more seductive to the other consciousness (the unconscious?)...than not to
know what it wants, to be relieved of choice and directed from its own objective will...
One factor, at least, in the crisis of politics may well be the desire to not know, to not act.
 And it may be that television, particularly, functions to support the processes of
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inhibition and evasion of anxiety."  The particular process of television that Baudrillard is
referring to here, of course, is that of consumption by an audience.  I would propose,
however, that the economic rewards available within the international image industry are
attractive enough to have this same effect on those who produce the images for
consumption.  Again, referring back to Sartre's earlier assertion, the power of a Canadian
'style or substance' that might be identified, then, must involve a refusal of the ideological
conceptions made of us and disseminated by the dominant ideology, which begins with a
refusal of the ways in which that ideology operates.  Therefore, a show like Stargate SG-
1, regardless of the nationality of those involved in its creation, strongly reaffirms its
affiliations to the values and priorities of the dominant ideology by complying with the
conception of Canada held by the dominant ideology (as well as for all the other reasons I
will illustrate later).  On the other hand, consider the symbolism and implications that are
apparent in the opening sequence of SCTV, which features a shot of dozens of television
sets being thrown from the windows of an apartment complex, smashing to pieces on the
street below.
English Canada, then, with its long history of dependency on British and then
American capital, has developed a culture based in no small part on reacting and
responding to the manner in which the agenda of the dominant power affects English
Canadian perceptions of the world, both within the nation-state and outside of it.  As
Anthony King explains, "In any discussion about identities, the built environment of
space and place is a crucial, critical factor which both inhibits as well as facilitates the
construction of new individual as well as social identities."35  Since American media have
been so prevalent in Canada for so long, it should not be surprising then that they have
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been as much a factor in the construction of social identities in this century as Canada's
colonial history and the absence of a revolution were in influencing the Canadian
character in the nineteenth century.  Furthermore, when considering the factors of English
Canada's built environment, that is, the cultural character that has been constructed over
time, one must consider the milieu in which the events and attitudes that contributed to
this environment occurred and were formed.  As Ananda Mitra has argued, "Culture
becomes imbedded within the structures of dominance that characterize society and the
network of practices and relations within which particular individuals are positioned and
identified."36  Proceeding from this assertion, then, it can be said that an indelible aspect
of English Canadian identity is one of subordinance, or obedience, to the dominant order;
and that this aspect manifests itself in cultural forms and expressions either as modes of
resistance to dominance or of acceptance.  In the final chapter, I will elaborate further on
the marginal and subordinate position of English Canadian identity and culture by
discussing modes of acceptance in greater detail in my analysis of back lot Hollywood
productions and the numerous syndicated American television programs that receive
Canadian funding and production assistance. 
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THE PERPETUATION AND APPROPRIATION OF ENGLISH
CANADA'S ABSENCE AND AMORPHOUSNESS
Canada's status as a dependent capitalist state has had a long history.  The lack of
autonomy engrained into the socio-political consciousness is a result of geographic
circumstance, two hundred years of colonial rule, and over a century of economic
dependency on a dominant power, all of which has made Canada the nation that it is,
always subject to but constantly resisting -- or at least trying to convince itself that it is
able to resist -- the ramifications of its own fate.  As I illustrated in Chapter III, many
characteristics of Canada's socio-economic character -- itself a product of history, a result
of Canada's general evolution -- are now in evidence in other nation-states around the
world, ostensibly a result of the effects of  increasing globalization and the manner in
which this has forced these nations to deal with the same kind of culturally threatened
situation that has been continually faced by Canada.  Also in the last chapter, I alluded to
the commonly-held conception that the nation-state as we know it is teetering on
functional obsolescence and that new imperatives -- market driven imperatives rather than
those motivated by national concerns or sentiment -- will likely be the force shaping and
determining  the development, or should I say evolution, of the new nation-state. 
If the traditional model of the nation-state is truly in retreat, then perhaps what
117
will replace it is a cluster of regional nationalities all vying for economic affiliation with
the trans-national corporations that exist outside the boundaries and framework that
restrict the current nation-states; clusters of peoples who identify themselves with
particular nationalist traits, but at the same time place a greater emphasis on satisfying
their specific economic requirements, willing to sacrifice the character of their culture for
the benefits to be reaped from the culture of the market.  Morley and Robins have
explained how:
The new culture of enterprise enlists the enterprise of culture
to manufacture differentiated urban or local identities.  These
are centred around the creation of an image, a fabricated and
inauthentic identity, a false aura, usually achieved through
'the recuperation of history (real, imagined, or simply created
as pastiche) and of community (again, real, imagined, or
simply packaged for sale by producers)'.  The context for this
is the increased pressure on cities to adopt an entrepreneurial
stance in order to attract mobile global capital.  The marketing
of local identities and images is a market of inter-urban com-
petition, and success 'is often short-lived or rendered moot by 
competing or alternative innovations arising elsewhere'.  Under
such conditions, local economics are precarious and local
identities and cultures may be false and fragile.1
In this context of "intensified inter-urban competition," aspects of placelessness and
cultural amorphousness can be seen in a way as advantageous, allowing for the locales
and images to convey the persona not only of the area itself, but also of another location,
or, to an even greater extent, appear universal rather than distinct, filling in as 'anywhere
at all' rather than 'somewhere in particular'.  Morley, drawing heavily from Meyerowitz,
has argued that as a result of this abolition of a sense of locality, "these media...create
new 'communities' across their spaces of transmission, bringing together otherwise
disparate groups around the 'common experience' of television... It is in this sense,
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Meyerowitz argues, that the electronic media are destroying our sense of locality, so that
'places are increasingly like one another and...the singularity...and importance of...locality
is diminished'...so that 'locality is no longer necessarily seen as the centre stage of life's
drama'."2  The ability of a place to facilitate this process as easily as possible (i.e., without
the time and labour intensive efforts of the production crew to construct or fabricate
necessary amenities or, inversely, to hide or conceal specific regional markers that would
betray the intended transformation) would therefore be seen as a definite advantage from
a logistical and economic perspective. 
In many respects, then, regional and national cultures are increasingly required by
the international image industry to repress the distinctiveness of their culture, geography,
and other defining characteristics in order to fulfil the requirements of an industry intent
on conforming to the cultural signs and narrative tropes of the dominant discourse. 
Though there are exceptions of locales that are deemed to be so intrinsically distinct that
they are rarely utilized to 'stand in' for other regional or national contexts (New York City
and Ireland are good examples of this), this is clearly not the case with Canada, whose
amorphousness lends itself to portrayals of locales that seem either anonymous and
rootless or recognizable but indistinct, and in many ways actually makes the portrayal of a
distinctly 'Canadian' sense of location almost impossible (this will be discussed further in
my analysis of the film Intersection).  Massey has explained that, as a result of this
cultural synchronization, "the vast current reorganizations of capital, the formation of a
new global space, and in particular its use of new technologies of communication have
undermined an older sense of a 'place called home', and left us placeless and
disoriented."3  This sense of distance from a 'place called home'  has become a recurring
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theme in products produced by and consumed through the international image industry,
and Canadian locations, with their inherent amorphousness within the dominant ideology,
have proven to be the ideal commodity to facilitate the materiality of this alienation. 
Films and Television Series and the Appropriation of Canadian Space:
From A Culture of Absence to An Amorphous Community
I have selected nine television series (see Appendix), produced and distributed by
American media production companies affiliated with trans-national corporations, all of
which are filmed in Canadian locations, Vancouver being the most common.  These
programs, both in their use of locations and in their narrative concerns, utilize their
setting -- in other words, Canadian space -- in one of two ways:  Canadian locations are
positioned as either 'Anywhere,' or 'Nowhere'.  In either case, the Canadian-ness of the
locations is perceived to be irrelevant within the context of the programs, all of which are
set in American or 'Americanized' locations.  I will be discussing some of these series in
more detail than others, based on the extent to which the actual content of particular
episodes lends itself to in-depth analysis.  Two of the series, The Outer Limits and
Nightman (whose descriptive information is included in the Appendix, Table 1), will not
be discussed in the body of the text due to the similarities they possess to the other
programs in terms of their conception of space and the redundancy that would result from
their analysis.
I would like to take a moment here to clarify the manner in which I am analysing
the use of locations in these films and programs, and extrapolate on the implications of
these practices on the general conception of English Canadian identity.  Obviously, the
use of one location to stand in for or 'play the part' of another is nothing new within the
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medium of film.  Shooting a movie in a location different from the actual setting of the
film is often one of the main ways of keeping the production budget within reasonably
feasible limits, even if other steps need to be taken to ensure the appearance of
authenticity within the film itself.  Examples of motion pictures that were shot in a
location drastically different from the film's setting are plentiful.  The famous scene in
David Lean's Doctor Zhivago (1964), in which the characters return to their long-
abandoned house to find it thoroughly frosted over, was shot in Spain, with bee's wax
used to give the impression of an all-encompassing ice.  The shot that concludes this
scene, a long-shot of Zhivago riding his horse carriage across the horizon, required that an
entire field be thickly covered in fake snow.  Similarly, there have been many films
renowned for their depiction of a specific milieu and environment that were actually shot
somewhere else entirely.  For example, Martin Scorsese's Mean Streets (1973), famous
for its naturalistic portrayal of life in New York's Little Italy, was shot primarily in Los
Angeles.
In instances such as these, the locations used for shooting the film are altered,
adapted, or shot in such a way so that any identifiable traits or characteristics of the actual
location are repressed to prevent them from obscuring the fictional or otherwise specified
location in which the action of the film takes place.  In the case of these television shows
shot in Canada, however, in addition to the fact that Canadian space -- be it in a studio or
on location -- is being appropriated by American and trans-national interests for their own
economic and ideological benefit, any identifiable traits and characteristics of the
particular Canadian locations are considered to be irrelevant within the Americanized
context of the program.  In other words, even though American societal signifiers (i.e.,
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flags, mail boxes) or regional markers (i.e., licence plates) are utilized to assert the
American-ness of the show's setting, signifiers and markers that connote the specific
Canadian or regional identity of the location itself (i.e., distinctive landmarks, street
names and addresses, background paraphernalia that carries certain intertextual baggage)
are often not omitted from the show, as though there were nothing regionally or culturally
distinctive about them at all.  In fact, a more recent trend is that many distinct markers
and signifiers, such as geographic or man-made landmarks, have come to be appropriated
by some of these series in an attempt to lend a sense of authentic specificity to the show's
fictionalized setting (examples of this will be discussed later). 
But it is not just the use of geographic locations that reveal the placelessness of
English Canada within the dominant ideology.  It is also a matter of how the use of these
locations -- and the manner in which all the intertextual baggage associated with them as
Canadian locations is deemed to be unspecific, intangible, and amorphous -- illustrates
both the conception of Canada and of global space within the dominant ideology as that
which exists to be shaped, manipulated, and utilized for the ideological means of
dominant interests.  Conceptions of locality, and of the identity associated with a
particular community, are not just a matter of how geography is conceived of, utilized,
and represented, but more so of the attitudes and preconceptions that both determine and
disseminate conceptions of characteristics attributable to a particular space and place.  As
Morley explains, it is not simply "a matter of physical geography somehow ceasing to
exist or ceasing to matter.  It is rather a question of how physical and symbolic networks
become entwined and come to exercise mutual determination on each other."4  Or as
Shields explains, "Spatializations are central to cultural hegemony and dominant
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ideologies as well as what we might call 'dominant practices'."5
Television Series that Position Canadian Locations as 'Anywhere'
As Morley and Robins have explained, the mandate of many production
companies within the international image industry, reacting to the pressures and demands
of a globalized world, has been to create within the story worlds of their programs a
"fabricated and inauthentic identity," usually achieved through the "recuperation of
history and of community".  The history and community through which these programs
(see Appendix, Table 1) seek to fabricate this sense of identity is typically that of the
dominant American ideology, whose values and priorities largely dictate those
represented within the image industry.  However, the creation of a fabricated and
inauthentic identity seems destined to result in an empty, generic identity that further
alienates people from a sense of history and community and instead creates an increasing
sense of ambivalence towards the markers and signifiers that people are used to relying
on for their sense of identity.  As Massey notes, "it is argued that this new round of time-
space compression has produced a feeling of disorientation, a sense of the fragmentation
of local cultures, and a loss, in its deepest meaning, of a sense of place... [P]laces seem to
become both more similar and yet lacking in internal coherence; home grown specificity
is invaded -- it seems that you can sense the simultaneous presence of everywhere in the
place where you are standing."6  As a result of their inherent amorphousness, Canadian
locations, as I have explained and will now illustrate further, facilitate the production of
space that lacks "internal coherence" and thus can be utilized to represent Anywhere, at
the expense of ultimately seeming as though they really exist nowhere. 
Something that these programs tend to capitalize on is an overall feeling of
123
longing for a sense of 'home', predicated by the manner in which the processes of
globalization have altered the ways by which people relate to place and space, and to their
nation-state, the entity that supposedly has the responsibility of preserving the sense of
identity which people base on their sense of location within the world, both physically
and ideologically.  As Massey explains, "Powerful forces for forging a sense of what is
'home' are produced by capital which comes from somewhere else entirely.  Their
messages flow across old earth boundaries in ways which no national government can
easily prevent."7  This has resulted in an inability of people to identify their national,
cultural, or even individual identities based on location, on a sense of place and space,
and has thus caused people to look beyond the traditional realm of space and place in an
attempt to locate a new 'place called home'.  As Naficy explains, "Today, it is possible to
be exiled in place, that is, to be at home and to long for other places and other times so
vividly portrayed in the media.  It is possible to be in internal exile and be unable to, or
wish not to, return home."8 
A recurring theme in these programs that position their Canadian locations as
Anywhere is the quest to locate oneself in a place called home, a process which is
portrayed to be paradoxically a result of and reliant upon the characters' predilection
towards technology.  In other words, their reliance on technology -- whether it be a single
technological device or system or, in a more comprehensive sense, the overall impact of
modernity on their lives and well-being -- has gotten them into this mess, and yet they
also see it as the only means to escape their predicament.  The cast of Sliders, for
example, are sucked into a portal created by junior physics genius Quinn Mallory (the
goofily amorphous Canadian Jerry O'Connell, serving as a typical apple-pie-faced
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American hero) that transports them instantaneously to an alternative dimension that is
exactly the same as, but fundamentally different from, their place called home, due to the
fact that it is a world "whose history diverged from ours at some point in the past."9  They
are thereby forced to 'slide' into a new version of home every episode, hoping that the
next slide will lead them to their real home(land).  Stargate SG-1 utilizes an almost
identical premise, with the exception that this group is a military unit, accompanied by an
alien co-hort, who operate out of an American military base in Cheyenne, Wyoming. 
Their episodic mission is to 'gate' to other planets possessing Stargates (the SG-1 of the
title refers to the Cheyenne home base, while gates on other planets are designated SG-7,
SG-12, etc.) in the attempt to connect all the worlds together in an interglobal alliance
that transcends time and space.  Along the way our heroes encounter developing
civilisations whom they assist in both a technological manner (i.e., giving them
equipment, teaching them how to do things more efficiently, saving them from a
technologically advanced rival, etc.) and an ideological manner (i.e., teaching them new
ways of thinking and of perceiving their own and other worlds10). 
There are also individual Stargate SG-1 episodes which, aside from conforming to
the criteria above, also illuminate other ideological priorities that seem to be of particular
concern to the operation of the trans-national corporations who fund this and other
programs.  For example, in an episode from the first season entitled "Singularity," a child
is transported through the Stargate from one of the alien planets to the Cheyenne home
base (in other words, from the periphery to the centre).  Her presence at the military base
causes a great deal of anxiety when it is discovered that an alien race has manipulated her
genetic tissue in such a way that her voyage through the Stargate triggered the production
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of an organic device next to the girl's heart that threatens to destroy the base.  The timer
of the bomb was activated when the girl was taken through the Stargate, and is set to
explode either in two hours, or if the girl is taken even close to the Stargate, or if the
device is tampered with.  The situation is resolved when, after isolating the girl in an
underground nuclear testing facility, the bomb fails to detonate, and it is later diagnosed
that the distance from the Stargate caused the device to recede back into the girl's normal
genetic makeup.  The denouement of the episode takes place in a park where the
members of the military unit discuss how the girl, who cannot travel through the Stargate
again due to the threat it poses to her life and the existence of the Stargate home base,
will be assimilated into 'earth culture', facilitated by the adoption into a family with the
proper security clearance.  The final minutes of the episode consist of a discussion
between the girl, Cassandra, and Captain Carter, a member of the Stargate team who
brought her to earth and who has assumed the role of Cassandra's surrogate mother. 
Their conversation, in which Carter ensures that Cassandra is familiar with the details of
her assimilation into the dominant culture, deserves full attention here:
Cassandra:  "When you find me a new home, will you come and 
        visit me?"
Carter:  "You betcha, all the time."
Cassandra:  "That is, when you're on earth."
Carter:  "Right.  Now, about that, Cassandra..."
Cassandra:  "I know -- Stargate is a secret, and I was born in a place 
     called... Toronto?"
Carter:  "Right."
Cassandra:  [looking across the park] "What are those."
Carter:  "Ah.  Those are swings."
Cassandra:  "Never had any of those... in Toronto." [the episode 
       then fades to credits with Carter and Cassandra running towards   
      the swings]
The key to understanding the motivations behind the ideology inherent within this
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particular episode is its title, "Singularity", which is never spoken by any character during
the episode and does not refer explicitly to any activity or event relevant to the episode's
plot.  It would seem, rather, that the 'singularity' with which this episode is concerned is
that of culture, and all the implications of character and identity associated with it.  The
threat posed by the object from the periphery is nullified once the object in question is
distanced from the periphery11 and assimilated into the dominant culture.  It is also
important to note here how Canada is perceived to serve as a suitable place of origin for
this person who comes from a place that no one knows anything about.
Another series that is very concerned with issues of culture and ideology between
the centre and the periphery is Earth: Final Conflict (EFC), a twenty-first century
science-fiction series based on a premise and pilot written by Star Trek creator Gene
Roddenberry, which is currently in its second season and has been renewed in 85% of the
U.S. for the next two years.  The show, which operates on a very allegorical level, is
highly invested in examining such issues as the obsolescence of the traditional nation-
state, the manner in which power and technology are utilized to sustain the hegemony
between the dominant centre and the marginalized periphery, and the extent to which a
successful resistance against hegemony must involve the willing and collective refusal of
the marginalised group.  In this sense the show can be seen as an interesting hybrid,
addressing the concerns of the marginal from the perspective of the dominant ideology. 
In many ways, the appropriation of Canadian locations for this program, which is set in
the United States (though in the future) and focuses on American characters, makes a
certain amount of sense in a particularly post-modern context, and may perhaps explain
the amount of Canadian financial involvement in the show's production (see Appendix,
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Table 1), as well as the fact that many fans of the series actually acknowledge it as a
Canadian program.12
In EFC, an alien race known as the Taelons has come to earth on a mission of
peace, and within the first several years of interacting with humans they have managed to
use their highly advanced technological knowledge to rid earth of virtually every disease,
thereby winning over the trust and acceptance of most of the human population. 
However, the overall goal of the Taelon 'nation' would appear to be the utilization of the
human species as 'volunteers' for the benefit of Taelon operations in other parts of the
galaxy, and the technology with which the humans were won over was simply a series of
token gestures aimed at winning their support and allegiance.  While the majority of
humans have either embraced the Taelons or continue to treat them with ambivalent
indifference, an underground resistance, which works in concert with a Taelon faction
that opposes their nation's human agenda, has emerged.  The goal of the resistance is not
to defeat the Taelons in any way or to try and rid Earth of their presence; such actions,
though pursued by some of the more radical members of the resistance, are viewed by the
resistance leaders as merely digressive and ultimately impossible.  Instead, the resistance
aims to reveal the manner in which the Taelons maintain their hegemonic power over the
humans, thus allowing the human race (embodied by the American characters who
constitute the resistance) to return the balance of their lives to the place they know as
'home', where they constitute the dominant order, rather than being marginal and
subordinant.
The essential conceit of EFC, then, is that American culture has lost its dominant
position and is marginalised, even to the extent of only surviving as an 'American'
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cultural identity through an underground resistance, which positions itself against not
only the Taelons, who through their superior technology have assumed the role of
planetary protectors, but also the American political system itself, which the resistance
distrusts for its laissez faire policy towards the Taelons.13  The series essentially puts
American culture in a position similar to that faced by other national cultures in the face
of media imperialism.  The series does tend to preserve the dominance of the American
ideology, however, in the sense that the 'American' resistance is depicted as the best
chance for the 'human' resistance in the struggle against the Taelons.
Although the parallels between the on-going plot of Earth Final Conflict and the
historical and continual plight of English Canadian culture and identity seem fairly
obvious and direct, I am not proposing that the show's premise is based on some kind of
Canadian cultural allegory.  What I would argue, however, is that this series, along with
the others I am discussing here, are reacting in various ways from an American
perspective to the numerous shifts in the economic, political, and social aspects of the
American 'way of life' that have resulted from the processes of globalization and the
impact of these on the stability of the traditional ideal of the nation-state.  It would seem
that the dominant American ideology, as I have been referring to it throughout my
analysis, has become so pervasive and so reliant upon its continual evolution for its own
survival (a true perpetual motion machine, as I described it in Chapter II), that it has
somehow alienated the needs of many American people, who, paradoxically, still see it as
the means by which their alienation can be averted.  The significance of the Canadian
cultural situation in this regard, then, is the manner in which it has anticipated many of
these circumstances through its natural evolution.
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The X-Files, the longest running and easily most popular and successful of
 all these shows, is perhaps the prototype for these kinds of programs that are invested in
themes of placelessness and dislocation (both physical and ideological) whose materiality
is facilitated by the use of Canadian locations.  The series follows FBI agents Fox Mulder
and Dana Scully as they travel to every corner of the U.S. and occasionally other areas of
the world investigating anomalous events and attempting to uncover government
conspiracies (thereby both safeguarding and debilitating the nation's ideological and
physical borders).  Though the series' structure shifts from episodic to serial, the narrative
is primarily motivated by Mulder's search for a place called home, which exists in the
ideological sphere in the sense that it can only be attained through the provision of
answers.  These answers, it appears, are at once both repressed by certain factions within
the U.S. government and yet are only obtainable by Mulder and Scully through the
financial and technological means provided by the U.S. government (the partners' travel
expenses have become a recurring joke both amongst the show's fans and within the
episodes themselves).  However, rather than bringing the series to a cathartic sense of
resolution, the more answers Mulder obtains the more disillusioned he becomes in his
search for 'home', which as a result comes to seem farther away, if not completely
unreachable.  This same structure is also applied to episodes and narratives that do not
concern Mulder at all, even though his character provides the impetus behind the search
for truth that will supposedly lead to the place this series calls 'home'.  For example, the
1997-98 season featured several episodes centering on Scully's remorse for the death of a
child she originally tries to identify and protect, and later on learns to be her own
daughter.  Essentially, then, The X-Files' structure is one based on the belief that 'the truth
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is out there', and the constant realization that the 'truth' is not what the characters had
hoped for, therefore frequently shattering and relocating the 'place called home' that the
characters strive to identify and locate.
To summarize, then, and doing so in an analysis based on both the actual diegesis
of these programs as well as the extra-textual baggage they carry with them as
productions, these shows that position their Canadian locations as Anywhere are
essentially about a group of Americans (actors, representatives of the international image
industry), running around in a strange new world that seems the same as the one they
know as home but has been altered in some crucial way by its relation to technology (and
whose materiality is facilitated by Canada).  Their presence in this new world is a result
of their access and ability to manipulate advanced technologies (the technological and
financial superiority of the dominant order), which they occasionally use to solve
problems that result from their presence in a new environment, or to assist the inhabitants
they encounter (which not only reinforces their own dominance but also the inhabitants'
dependency upon them).  Ultimately, the desire of the characters (who, in The X-Files,
Stargate SG-1, Earth Final Conflict and often in The Outer Limits, are all representatives
of either the United States government or military) to return to their place called home,
within individual episodes and the series in their entirety (so far, at least) remains
unresolved and ambivalent.  In other words, with the nation-state which these characters
identify as 'home' in a state of flux, they are forced to soldier on, with their ideological
values and priorities still largely intact, using their technological and ideological
dominance to try and make sense of the amorphous space they find themselves in. 
Canada, it would seem, provides the perfect place where the materiality of this
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amorphousness can be realised.  As Naficy explains, "It now appears that one's relation to
'home' and 'homeland' is based as much on actual material access as on the symbolic
imaginings and national longings that produce and reproduce them."14  The anxieties
within the dominant ideology towards the question of what constitutes 'home', which
seem to be a result of a general disillusionment towards the function and legitimacy of the
American nation-state, are addressed by creating a kind of pseudo nation-state in which
the tensions and concerns of 'home' can be presented and examined without actually
tarnishing the function and legitimacy of the ideals and values which the American
nation-state stands for and represents.  But what is the effect, then, of the
commodification of Canadian locations as part of the attempt by those within the image
industry, who rely upon the health and perpetuation of the dominant ideology, to
somehow relocate their idea of 'home' and 'homeland'?  Would this not ultimately
constitute Canadians as exiles in their own homeland, and render the history and
character of Canada as nonexistent within the dominant ideology?  After all, why would
Canadian history, or for that matter Canadian identity, be considered distinct or unique
when the history and identity of Canada predominantly purveyed through the dominant
discourse is conveyed as virtually nonexistent, and Canada itself as merely an amorphous
space indistinguishable from anywhere else in which dominant interests can attempt to
dispel their anxieties towards their own 'homeland' by expanding upon what they consider
to be 'home'?  The most alarming rebuttal to these questions, however, is that these
developments parallel the evolution of the Canadian nation-state from its infancy,
reflecting the extent to which Canada remains subordinate to the ideology of the
dominant interests as a result of our dependency upon the capital of the dominant order. 
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Magder notes how "Dallas Smythe sees the extension of American culture and
communications into Canada as the necessary corollary to economic dependency.  The
'consciousness industry,' in Smythe's words, functions to produce 'the necessary
consciousness and ideology to seem to legitimate that dependency.'"15
Television Series That Position Canadian Locations as 'Nowhere'
As I mentioned earlier, many of these productions reflect the conception of
Canada as irrelevant, intangible, and placeless through their failure or reluctance to
obscure or repress in any way the distinctive geographical markers and signifiers of their
Canadian locations.  In fact, it would seem that one of the advantages, from the
perspective of the production companies who shoot these programs in Canada, of filming
in a Canadian city is the availability of all the amenities necessary for the portrayal of an
urban American environment without the recognizable distinctiveness that marks them as
being foreign or from another identifiable location.  This way of thinking reflects the
conception of Canada within the dominant ideology, as well as the manner in which such
conceptions are not based on actual physical locations or markers, but rather on the
system of representations that both determine and perpetuate the character and definition
of that which is being identified.  As Natter and Jones explain:
space is not simply a socially produced materiality but a socially
produced -- and forceful -- object/sign system.  This, which we
refer to as a 'system of representation', does not deny materiality,
but rather argues that any materiality is attached to the represen-
tation(s) through which that materiality both embeds and conveys
social meaning... Social space, despite its apparent substantive
materiality, is thus also characterized by an emptiness, one which
social powers work to substantiate with meaning content, truth
value, objectivity.16
The purveyors of the dominant ideology, then, in Natter and Jones' words, assume that the
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materiality of these locations as 'Canadian' can only be attached to the representation of
those locations which in turn both "embeds and conveys social meaning".  There is
therefore nothing inherently Canadian about these locations so long as the dominant
discourse -- the dominant 'system of representation' -- continues to present them as
American, thereby further embedding and conveying the meanings which they represent
within the dominant ideology. 
These series simply assume that the Canadian origin of these landmarks,
signifiers, and the general space itself is of little relevance to the fact that it is all being
used to portray an Americanized location.  I say Americanized because all of these
programs that position their Canadian locations as 'Nowhere', which, incidentally, are all
shot in Vancouver (see Appendix, Table 2), are set in fictional urban American areas. 
Viper, for example, is set in Metro City (which exists in an undisclosed state), and The
Sentinel takes place in Cascade, Washington.  Though it may seem that this approach
would have the effect of positioning the locations of these shows as 'Anywhere' -- due to
the attempt to make the show as generically American as possible and therefore appear as
though it could be taking place 'anywhere' in the country -- they come across instead as
'nowhere' due to the indistinctness of their environments created by the attempt to appear
generic, and by the lack of a sense of place caused by the unwillingness to address the
programs' actual physical location.  Referring back to the quote by Natter and Jones
above, it is as though the emptiness that characterizes the social space attempting to be
created within these shows, which the programs try to substantiate by being situated
within the reference points of American society, cannot be fully overcome or
substantiated.   What these programs are trying to accomplish, in other words, is to use an
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amorphous space for the production of another amorphous space.  The end result is a
representation of placelessness.
These programs that position their Canadian locations as 'Nowhere' project a
much different relationship to concepts of 'home' and 'homeland' than do the 'Anywhere'
shows discussed above.  The 'Anywhere' shows seem convinced that the current
manifestation of the American nation-state is somehow incompatible or insufficient with
the needs of the American people, and therefore offer fantasy scenarios which facilitate
the desire to locate a sense of 'home' which can no longer be obtained in the present
'homeland'.  Their Canadian locations are positioned as 'Anywhere' to support the
assertion that the dominant American ideology can still prevail in new circumstances and
environments, and can therefore still serve as the means by which a new homeland can be
located.  These 'Nowhere' programs, however, are not nearly as invested in themes of
'home' and 'homeland', and can actually be better understood through an analysis based on
the object/sign system of representation referred to above by Natter and Jones.  If
anything, the 'Nowhere' programs' generic American-ness -- conveyed not only by setting,
which is utilized to appear universal(ly American), but also by their narrative tropes and
ideological motivations (all these programs feature either police officers or crime-fighting
heroes) -- represents an attempt to reassert the traditional idea of 'home' which the
anywhere shows assume to be lost or inaccessible in some way (although The Crow does
serve as an exception to this).  Indeed, the ease with which these programs believe their
Canadian locations can stand in for American ones -- indicated by the failure to omit
Canadian signifiers (The Crow has featured scenes in which the cars are adorned with
British Columbia licence plates), as well as by the use of distinctive landmarks to
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represent specific locations within the series' diegesis (numerous examples of this shall be
cited) -- acts as an assertion that the American ideology and all its attendant amenities,
values, and characteristics can be transplanted into Canada, that part of the world which
has been most affected by the transmission of American culture.  In the eyes of the
international image industry and the dominant ideology, then, Canada serves as a
successful product of the process of cultural synchronization; it is perceived to be
virtually indistinguishable from the dominant culture and exists as a subordinate and
dependent satellite which can be utilized to fulfil the needs of dominant interests.
Before moving on to discuss the programs that position their Canadian locations
as 'Nowhere,' I would like to momentarily address the fact, which I alluded to in my
discussion of Earth: Final Conflict, that most of these series, including the five I have
discussed above, could very easily be mistaken for Canadian programs, not necessarily
because the locations themselves can be identified by an American or international
audience as being distinctly Canadian, but rather because the shows that receive financial
assistance from government incentive programs or are funded in part by Canadian
production companies contain a very prominent title card in the end credits, advertising   -
- as though it were a seal of approval -- the involvement of "Canada" in the show's
production (see Appendix).  Even though this is most likely meant to illustrate the
involvement and autonomy of Canadian interests in the respective productions, it actually
has the effect of propagating Canada's economic and ideological dependency on the
United States in several ways.  First, it perpetuates the idea of Canada as a mere
appendage of the United States.  What else should one think after watching a show about
American characters in an American city with American flags and U.S. mail boxes and
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then seeing a very prominent "Canada" sign posted in the production credits?  Second,
such actions reaffirm Canada's position of ideological subordinance to the United States,
solidifying the hegemonic order through the acceptance by Canadian officials and
business interests of the criteria established by dominant interests.  And ultimately, it
further contributes to the sense of Canada as an amorphous space; a place that exists
somewhere else but nowhere in particular, geographically resourceful but ideologically
indistinct.
A series that can be discussed in the context of its use of Canadian locations as
both 'Anywhere' and 'Nowhere' is The Crow: Stairway to Heaven, which is the next
installment in the franchise which began with the comic book series and has also spawned
three feature films.  The series resembles in many ways the shows discussed above, in the
sense that it is driven by the quest of the lead character, Eric Draven, to find his particular
'place called home', and also by the fact that he often utilizes a portal to other worlds to
try and accomplish this goal, thereby emphasizing the importance of the concept of time-
space compression within the show's thematics.  Eric himself exists quite literally
between worlds.  After both he and his girlfriend Shelley are brutally murdered, Eric rises
from the grave and assumes the form of the living, fulfilling an ancient prophecy that a
crow can carry the soul of a person back from the land of the dead so that they can set
right the terrible wrong done against them.  Like The X-Files, The Crow is both episodic
and serial in its narrative structure, but is ultimately driven by Eric's quest to avenge his
and Shelley's deaths and somehow reunite with her, either in the land of the living or the
land of the dead.  Although he kills the ringleader of the gang responsible for their deaths
in the series' first episode, a sense of resolution or closure, of coming one step closer to
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'home', is not achieved, and the ringleader actually returns from the dead in a later
episode.  Other attempts to seek revenge against those who performed the murders
consistently fail.  Eric often uses a portal, which is normally but not always provided by
the large, circular window of his apartment from which he was thrown to his death, to
travel back in time to the night of the murder to try and set things right. 
Physical geography, then, is largely irrelevant within the thematics of this series,
and the protagonist instead manipulates time and space in an attempt to locate himself in
an ideological sphere where reality conforms to his ideal.  However, not only can his and
Shelley's fate not be averted, but in one particular episode his time-travelling attempt 
actually results in the death of Det. Albright, another major character who assists Eric in
his quest.  Albright was alive again in the following episode without any mention of his
death the previous week, emphasizing again the manner in which physical reference
points are largely irrelevant and time and space are manipulated in this series.  The portal
which Eric travels through also takes him to places and times in the distant past, utilizing
the conceit that he and Shelley have been together in past lives.  This recreation, or
recuperation, of history results in the wrongs of the past being set right, but never results
in the union of Eric and Shelley, thus driving the cycle for the search of Eric's place called
home upon which the show relies.
The series, however, also differs in ways that distinguish it from the 'Anywhere'
programs above and are more similar to the shows that position their Canadian locations,
which in the case of all these shows is Vancouver, as 'Nowhere'.  The Crow, perhaps in an
attempt to emulate its comic book heritage, takes place primarily in a non-descript, urban
American city.  So invested is the show in its urban anonymity that the name of this
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fictional city, Port Columbia, was only revealed towards the end of this, its first season. 
Markers and signifiers remain purely generic.  U.S. mail boxes and flags appear when
appropriate, and licence plates, it appears, are actually British Columbia plates, but are
kept out of focus whenever they are in the shot.17  The police and law enforcement
branches, which are figured prominently due to Det. Albright's role in the show, are
identified as typically American in structure, function and purpose.  However, The Crow
utilizes many Vancouver landmarks to construct a milieu specific to this fictional, generic
city.  The Suntower building, a distinct Vancouver landmark with a pale-green, copper-
roofed tower, is used frequently as an establishing shot to signify the location of Eric's
apartment.  The red Woodwards 'W', one of Vancouver's oldest and most recognizable
landmarks, is used as a recurring motif of the city's urban sprawl, and is featured
prominently in the opening credits as well as being visible from Eric's apartment
window.18  Also visible from Eric's apartment is the Harbour Centre Tower, and playing a
major role in creating the character of the fictional environment in The Crow is the
Capilano suspension bridge, a popular Vancouver tourist site which is featured in the
opening credits and used in several episodes as the link between the world of the living
and the world of the dead.
Two other series that follow this same pattern of utilizing Vancouver locations
and landmarks in an attempt to somehow substantiate the fictional character of their
settings are Viper and The Sentinel, which are both the products of executive producers
Danny Bilson and Paul DeMeo and are produced and distributed in first-run syndication
by Paramount.  Viper, which is sold in more than 185 markets representing 95% of the
United States, is set vaguely in the future (the show's official website describes it as being
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"set the day after tomorrow") in the fictional Metro City (identified in the website only as
a "western city"), while The Sentinel takes place in Cascade, Washington, a kind of
pseudo Seattle.  Both series, then, attempt to situate the program's diegesis within the
reference points of American society while at the same time attempting to extend the
boundaries within which the American ideology operates and exists.  Though the end
credits of each series identify Vancouver, British Columbia as the production site, neither
show's website, key components in connecting with the audience and fan base, makes
mention of Vancouver or Canada in any way.  In fact, the only program's website to do so
is that of Earth: Final Conflict, and it is done only to address the query of its fans who
mistake the show for Canadian and explain that it is in fact an American show (Figures 2
& 3 illustrates how this misconception is understandable, in spite of the American
societal reference points that populate the series). 
Viper seems to be even less concerned with any distinctiveness of the locations it
utilizes than The Crow, and has fully appropriated very distinct Vancouver landmarks to
serve as amenities within the fictional world of Metro City.  For example, in one episode 
the Viper squad, a special investigations unit of the FBI who utilize a state-of-the-art car,
which morphs into a bullet-proof machine with all manner of technological devices
known as the Defender, in their crime fighting endeavours, attempt to foil an
assassination attempt against a U.S. Senator.  The assassin plans to shoot the Senator as
he arrives at the Metro City Science World (which is actually the Vancouver Science
World, a very distinctive-looking building originally built for the World's Fair held in
Vancouver in 1986, whose very name is apparently felt to be amorphous), and has gained
the best shooting angle by climbing atop the nearby Metro Stadium (B.C. Place Stadium,
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which, due to its grey concrete base and puffy white dome, seems a particularly
amorphous structure, and has also appeared in a number of films set in Seattle,
presumably as a stand in for the King Dome, which it hardly resembles).  Interestingly,
the Senator is greeted by a group of protestors picketing with signs emblazoned with the
slogans, "American jobs for Americans," and "America runs on American jobs," a vicious
irony that seems completely lost on the producers of this American show shot in Canada,
and serves as another example of the manner in which these programs attempt to
completely transplant their ideological motivations, insisting that their Canadian locations
will in no way act as a barrier.   
The Sentinel, in its fourth season premiere episode, "Siege," also utilizes another
Vancouver sports arena, the PNE (Pacific National Exhibition) Coliseum, which is
identified as the Cascade Arena.  This episode, in which an American militia group takes
an arena full of people hostage and the Sentinel and his partners, members of the Cascade
police force, must protect the innocent civilians and capture the militia's leader, serves as
an interesting counterpoint to the premise and motivations of Earth: Final Conflict -- in
which the show's protagonists are all essentially militia members -- and helps accentuate
the different attitude towards concepts of 'home' and 'homeland' communicated by these
two types of programs.  While EFC focuses on protagonists who are attempting to locate
a new ideal of 'home' by revitalizing the revolutionary character of the United States
(albeit in reaction to an alien rather than American entity), The Sentinel treats such an
organization as a direct threat to the ideals, values, and ideological priorities of the show's
protagonists, thereby illustrating again the extent to which the values and priorities of the
dominant ideology are transplanted intact in this fictional environment.19
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 Series like The Crow, The Sentinel, and Viper, then, essentially represent an
attempt to construct a fictional, generic, and anonymous urban American environment
utilizing the real amenities that constitute the character and substance of Vancouver.  It is
as though Vancouver were seen as nothing more than a giant prop shop, a warehouse, an
already-built set full of all the necessary amenities needed to create a particular milieu,
and all of which comes with the added bonus of being recognizably characteristic but not
recognizably distinct.  The use of actual, existing locations to stand in for other
recognizable locales would be unthinkable in Los Angeles or New York, and is why
American studios and production companies have always relied on studio space and back
lots in order to construct from scratch a particular area, environment, and scene.  For
example, American television shows regarded for their depiction of or investment in a
specific urban milieu are either shot on a back lot constructed to look like somewhere else
(i.e., Seinfeld and NYPD Blue have both shot their exteriors on a lot in Los Angels), or
take the pains to actually coordinate location shooting in the specific location where the
show is set (i.e., Law and Order is shot on the streets of New York City, Homicide: Life
on the Streets in Baltimore, and the producers of ER seem to feel that it is worth the
expense to shoot many of the show's exteriors in Chicago, even though the bulk of the
production takes place in Los Angeles).  Vancouver, and Canada in general, however,
does not seem to benefit from possessing an identifiable character within the reference
points of the dominant ideology that would prevent it from being used as a mere stand-in
for another environment, and has therefore become a kind of post-modern, globalized
back lot for American production.
These 'Nowhere' programs, then, rely heavily on the object/sign system of
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representation referred to by Natter and Jones above to establish and convey a specific
sense of environment through the use of geographical markers and signifiers.  However, it
is the inherent lack of specificity of these markers and signifiers within the overall system
of representation (the dominant discourse) that facilitates their ability to represent these
fictional, generic environments.  With the physical space utilized by these programs
represented as merely generic -- and generically American -- Canadian space is relegated
to the ideological wasteland of the American consciousness, existing as an unspecific,
generic replicant of American space.  As representations increasingly supplant materiality
as the basis for conceptions of reality, the ideological imperatives that dictate the function
and application of systems of representation increasingly become the templates which
determine the character and identity of that which is being represented.  Canadian
identity, then, becomes increasingly amorphous as a result of its inherent absence and the
manner in which this is perpetuated within the system of representations disseminated by
the dominant discourse.  Morley and Robins explain further how systems of
representation blur the line between the real and the imaginary to the extent that the
imaginary comes to assume the representation of the real:
Richard Kearney describes a world in which the image reigns 
supreme, a 'Civilisation of the Image' in which 'reality has
become a pale reflection of the image... The real and the
imaginary have become almost impossible to distinguish'. 
With 'the omnipresence of self-destructing images which
simulate each other in a limitless interplay of mirrors', argues 
Kearney, 'the psychic world is as colonised as the physical
world by the whole image industry'.  This globalization of image 
flows and spaces is fundamentally transforming spatiality and
sense of space and place.  Frederic Jameson refers to the
'existential bewilderment in this new postmodern space', a
'culture in which one cannot position itself'.20
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This evaluation of postmodern space and the existential bewilderment it necessitates
seems to apply directly to the English Canadian consciousness, which, it seems quite
clear, cannot be positioned within its own culture as a result of the perpetuation of its
inherent amorphousness by the dominant ideology.  Keeping in mind the historical
developments and the set of circumstances that facilitate this process, the amorphousness,
indistinctness, and placelessness of English Canadian identity, then, can be interpreted as
a product of Canada's inherent dependency, perpetuated through the hegemonic
relationship with the dominant American order.
The Conception of Canada Within the Dominant Ideology
I would like to accentuate these points above by citing examples from Hollywood
movies that use Vancouver as a back lot for locations that are set somewhere else, but
somewhere specific and tangible, as opposed to the generic and fictional locations of the
'Nowhere' programs or the rootless and indistinct locales of the 'Anywhere' shows.  These
films also serve to illustrate why Canadian culture cannot position itself within its own
space, due to the appropriation of Canadian space and signifiers and the assertion that
Canada, as a result of the amorphousness of these locations and markers, can simply
stand in for another location and environment. 
In the case of the film Unforgettable (John Dahl, 1996, MGM), the setting is
clearly and repeatedly identified as Seattle, with several establishing scenes shot at
locations such as the Space Needle to confirm this conceit.  The majority of the film,
however, was shot in Vancouver, and many identifiable landmarks, locations, and even
street names are appropriated and presented as though they exist as Seattle.  For example,
St. Paul's Hospital on Burrard Street in the downtown core is portrayed as, well, St. Paul's
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Hospital.  The University of British Columbia Main Library is used to signify the exterior
of a university research lab, the second floor of which is destroyed by a bomb.  At one
point in the film, Dr. Krane (Ray Liotta), a King County medical examiner investigating
the murder of his wife, gets a lead that the suspect is “staying at the Dorland Hotel, 25
Hastings Street.” Interestingly, Unforgettable utilizes the copper-roofed tower of the
Suntower building on Pender, also used prominently and repeatedly in The Crow:
Stairway to Heaven, in a shot that is immediately followed by the Space Needle in order
to both reaffirm the film's Seattle setting and, in the process, claim any distinctiveness of
the Suntower building and the overall space for its own.  This kind of geographical
transplantation occurs completely at the expense of the Canadian-ness of the reference
points utilized in the film.  The object/sign system employed by the film embeds the
locations with meaning by associating them not only with American societal reference
points, such as flags, licence plates, newspaper boxes, and law enforcement characters,
but also with American geographical reference points, such as distinctly recognizable
landmarks, all of which combine to convey these locations as part of a specific American
urban environment.  Vancouver itself, then, is positioned as Nowhere due to the fact that
if it were perceived to be Somewhere, this kind of embedding of meaning would not be
conceived to be possible.
Another Hollywood film that also conveys this same conception of Vancouver as
Nowhere is Intersection (Mark Rydell, 1994, Paramount), which is quite ironic, or
perhaps perfectly appropriate, considering that the movie is actually set in Vancouver.
The film centres around the life of Vincent Eastman (Richard Gere), a successful
architect torn between his ex-wife and his new lover, who has just completed a museum
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dedicated to the preservation of the culture of the local aboriginal peoples.  Though the
film explicitly establishes its Vancouver setting, through geographical reference points as
well as written signs, the characters never acknowledge the fact that they are in
Vancouver, and the story and plot of the film itself is such that it really could take place
anywhere in America.  Most importantly perhaps, the characters and situations portrayed
are typically American, which is to say that I, for one, could not determine whether
Richard Gere's character (and the others for that matter, played by recognizable American
actors Sharon Stone and Martin Landau) was a Canadian architect or simply an American
who managed to get a job building a museum in Canada.  Rather than transplanting
Canadian locations into an American environment, Intersection serves as an example of
the manner in which the dominant ideology finds it equally acceptable and possible to
transplant an American environment (in terms of ideological values, priorities, and
reference points) into a Canadian setting.  It would be more accurate, then, to say that the
film is set in the conception of Vancouver possessed and expressed by the dominant
ideology, and not in the city of Vancouver itself; the imaginary representation usurps the
materiality of the real.
This emphasis on imaginary representation is perhaps best exemplified in the film
by the fact that the museum which Richard Gere's architect (a builder and manager of
space) has built is actually the UBC Museum of Anthropology (an award-winning
structure which, to my understanding, is very famous in architectural circles) built by
Arthur Erickson.  By saying that the museum of the film is actually the real museum, I do
not mean that the Museum of Anthropology is utilized in Intersection in the same fashion
as the buildings and landmarks I discussed in the subsections above, as a kind of stand-in
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to merely represent a museum.  Rather, the film positions the Museum of Anthropology
as an actual creation of the architect played by Gere.21  In other words, even though this
film is set in Vancouver (which itself seems nothing more than an act of appeasement to
Canadian interests, something I will expand on towards the end of this chapter), the
Canadian space used for production is still fully appropriated to suit dominant ideological
priorities.  The reality of the Canadian space is substituted with the imagined
representation of what the dominant ideology deems to be Canadian space.  In what
would appear to be an attempt to compensate for this misrepresentation (again, most
likely in an attempt to maintain good faith with Canadian officials), the film positions the
museum in a different location than that of the actual Museum of Anthropology, achieved
by having characters refer to the location of the museum in such a way that positions it
nowhere near its actual location.  But this of course only worsens the matter.  Not only is
the structure itself appropriated by dominant interests, but by repositioning the landmark's
location within its native geography, the dominant ideology reinforces the amorphousness
of Canada and Canadian space, and further asserts the ability it possesses in determining
the representations that define conceptions of Canada.
Other examples of the irrelevance of specific Canadian landmarks, locations, and
cultural signifiers within the dominant discourse disseminated by Hollywood movies can
be seen in the John Badham film Bird on a Wire (1990, MCA/Universal), which seems
intent on making full use of what it perceives to be the amorphousness of its Canadian
locations.  Shot in and around Vancouver and Victoria, the film, which is essentially a
road movie, is set in Hunsboro, Pennsylvania, New York City, Atlantic City, Detroit, and
Racine and Loyal, Wisconsin.  All of the exterior scenes set in these locations utilize
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actual Vancouver and Victoria locations as a back lot, as though they were -- as I have
described above -- an already-built set, or a warehouse of various amorphous locations. 
In fact, so blank, indistinct, and lacking in any kind of recognizable specificity are these
locations from the perspective of the makers of this film that some very distinct Canadian
cultural signifiers are actually included within the film's diegesis.  At one point, when
Rick (Mel Gibson) and Marianne (Goldie Hawn) are shopping in a mall in downtown
Detroit, they walk down a flight of stairs and are flanked by several Canadian provincial
and territorial flags hanging in the background.  Despite the fact that the location has been
dressed with Detroit newspaper boxes, the cars have been adorned with Michigan licence
plates, and the entire foyer of the mall has been cordoned off and blocked with dozens of
extras and all manner of film equipment, the removal of these flags was apparently not
perceived to be a priority, due to the sheer irrelevance of their meaning and significance
within the dominant ideology.
Natter and Jones have explained that "hegemony not only perpetually processes
identifications to which 'identity' may then become attached, it does so spatially, by
disciplining the meanings and practices associated with any social space.  This
structuring, historically and geographically, has served the aim of stamping both identity
and space with a resolute correspondence:  every identity has its place."22  Thus, the
categorizations of Canadian space constructed by the dominant discourse as either
Anywhere or Nowhere, and the ease with which the dominant ideology imagines this to
be possible (evidenced by the antipathy towards cultural signs and markers that would
seem to contradict the messages attempting to be conveyed), implies rather prominently
that English Canada has no tangible place, no substance or presence, within the
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conceptions held by the dominant ideology and disseminated by the dominant discourse
by way of the international image industry.  Furthermore, this dissemination is aided and
abetted by Canadian governmental and business interests, continuing the legacy of
Canada's economic dependency and the hegemonic order that it both enables and
perpetuates.
Those who disagree with the principles of staples theory and oppose its
application to American film production in Canada, would argue perhaps that the
production industry in Canada is strengthened by such activity; that statistics and profit
margins indicate that there is little imbalance between the use of Canadian labour and
locations and the ultimate profits of the American production companies involved, and
that it is therefore not a situation in which the Canadian side is being exploited by
American interests.  However, as I have been suggesting throughout this thesis and have
argued more concretely in this chapter, the primary channels through which dependency
is established and maintained are those of ideology and discourse, and it is through the
images conveyed, the caricatures portrayed, and the attitudes transmitted by these (and
certainly most other American) films and television shows that English Canada is
ultimately relegated to the ideological wasteland it has continually occupied within the
film and media industries; a resource hinterland that remains placeless and amorphous,
perceived to be somewhere else but nowhere in particular, in both geographical and
ideological terms.  It would seem, in fact, that Watt was quite correct when he observed
in 1966 that, due to elements such as our "'indistinctness, apathy, [and] uncertainty of
behaviour, this facelessness is beginning to be recognized as a national characteristic'."23 
Indeed, the placelessness, as it were, of Canada as an entity would become so tangible as
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to actually serve as a commodity, ripe for export and exploitation by both American
industry and the Canadian state.
Conducting the research for, as well as ultimately writing this thesis while living
in the United States has offered a particularly interesting optic through which the issues I
am concerned with can be analysed.  Surely, the amorphousness of English Canadian
identity and the manner in which Canadian locations are rendered blank and placeless
when used in American films and programs becomes much more apparent, much more
relevant when viewed from within American culture itself.  Even in everyday
conversation with my American friends and colleagues, I am consistently surprised by the
lack of reference points -- be they cultural, political, social, or geographical -- they have
to associate with Canada or Canadians.  However, it is not so much the lack of reference
points that best exemplifies the conception that Americans have of Canada, as these are
fairly common factors that distinguish most nation-states, even ones so closely associated
in matters such as trade and international finance.  After all, not many Canadians would
be able to name a territory of Mexico or Japan, or even be able to point to Mexico City or
Tokyo on an unmarked map.  Rather, it is more the case that most Americans do indeed
have a very tangible, very concrete conception in their general consciousness of Canada
as an entity, which is that Canada is intangible, unspecific, and exists somewhere beyond
the realm of that which is America.  In fact, it actually does not seem uncommon for the
American consciousness, not to mention those of other nationalities whose conceptions of
Canada are based largely on information filtered through the dominant American
discourse, to consider Canada to be both within and yet somehow separate from the
common reference points of American culture; just like America, but without actually
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being America.
Thus, the conception of Canadian locations as blank and anonymous, as culturally
amorphous and geographically indistinct, is utilized in the image industry as a commodity
in and of itself, a resource.  And in an industry notorious for extremely large overhead,
such a commodity -- which also includes an attractively low exchange rate (subject to
periodic fluctuation) as well as incentive programs and tax credits offered by provincial
and federal governments -- becomes incredibly attractive and economically sound, both
for the producers writing the cheques and the labour, agencies, and ancillary services who
cash them.  However, the same reasoning and set of perceptions that results in this
activity also reflect the manner in which dominant interests perceive these locations in
general, and when it comes time for Canada to have her close-up, her portrayal is affected
by the same attitude that landed her the starring role in the first place.
This is a common occurrence among films and particularly television shows that
are shot in Canada but set in a different (usually indistinct) location.  Every so often there
will be a film, or in the case of television series a scene or subplot or episode, in which
the action of the story actually takes place in Canada.  On the one hand, this is a move by
the producers to maintain good faith with the Canadian officials through whom the
shooting of the program/film is arranged.  The final episode of The X-Files fifth season,
for example, was the only episode of the series, which had been shot in and around
Vancouver for five years, to actually take place in Vancouver, and can be seen as a kind
of 'thank you' to the local industry and community on behalf of Chris Carter, the series'
creator and executive producer.  On the other hand, such acts of appeasement can be
interpreted as an extension of the same philosophy behind the Canadian Co-operation
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Project; that Canadian audiences, who represent an important part of the domestic
American market, will take more interest in the material if they contain some form of
'Canadian content'.  The overall response to shifting the diegesis of such material to
Canada is generally a positive one from both American producers and Canadian
production services and audiences, the opinion being that the representation of actual
Canadian locations in such films and programs helps increase the profile of Canada and
Canadians.  This, however, is really nothing more than a continuation of the mentality
that led to the acceptance of policies like the Cooperation Project fifty years ago.  I would
argue that these instances propagate the conception of Canada as placeless, as seeming to
exist somewhere else but nowhere in particular.  Morley and Robins note how Michael
Rustin has referred to this phenomenon of placelessness as "'abstract universalism, with
its 'denial of the particular location of human lives in place and time', its placeless and
nonreferential sense of identity."24  This is primarily due to the fact that, since these
programs/films that are shot in Canada are not actually set in Canada, when characters in
the program participate in a story set in Canada, they must leave the location of the
program's diegetic setting, which has been constructed to be Anywhere, in order to go to
Canada as it is presented in the program.  How can a program/film be said to be fostering
a sense of Canada on screen when the representation of Canadian locations requires that
the diegesis deny its actual Canadian location?
Keeping in mind Sartre's assertion that a people can only define themselves by
refusing the definition applied to them by others, I would argue that Tony Wilden is
exactly right in his assertion that "We have been brought up with an artificial nation, a
'Canada' created by other countries for their benefit.  This imaginary nation is not the
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same as the country we live in, nor the land we know:  the entire 'consciousness industry'
in Canada thrives on manipulating this national derangement."25  In other words, having
yet to refuse the conceptions of us held and propagated by the dominant American
ideology, the definition of Canada and Canadians is disseminated by the international
media empire through which the dominant discourse communicates.  So powerful and
pervasive is this discourse and the channels upon which it relies to convey its messages,
that the images created about English Canada, and images that utilize Canada as a
substitute or stand-in for another locale, remain primarily for the benefit of others even
when such images are created by English Canadians.  The mentality becomes so
pervasive that it dictates economic necessity and affects the creative process, as was
illustrated in my discussion of the syndicated television series shot in Canada.  The end
result, to quote Wilden's laceratingly accurate assertion, is that English Canadians (or
Anglo Canadians as Wilden prefers, thereby emphasizing the commonality of language
rather than that of a supposed 'English' heritage) exist "in Notland, where 'being Canadian'
means not being someone else -- not English, not American, not Asian, not European, and
especially not French."26  This sense of English Canada as a placeless place, an
amorphous space, which has been created by centuries of colonial existence and
propagated by the dominant discourse, is now being utilized as a commodity for the
creation of products for the benefit of the dominant ideology. 
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AFTERWORD
LOOSENING OUR GRIP ON BOBBY ORR:  CONCEPTUALIZING CANADIAN
SPACE WITHIN THE "WIDER NETWORK OF RELATIONS"
"I'm fascinated by the process of loss.  What do you do
when you lose something you need emotionally?  How do you
reconstruct that?  What rituals, what obsessions begin to take 
over the mind that is in need of something that it doesn't
have access to?"  -- Atom Egoyan
A key concern running through most of my analysis and fuelling much of my
argument is the extent to which Canada's dependent nature has continually resulted in a
lack of autonomy in areas where outside interests are dominant, particularly in the
distribution of cultural products in Canada, thereby weakening the ability to both define
and defend a notion of Canadian culture, while simultaneously strengthening the
hegemonic authority of the dominant American discourse in Canada.  Specifically then,
the English Canadian filmic discourse that has evolved under these circumstances is one
that has existed both outside the realm of the dominant discourse and, due to the
dominance of this discourse in Canada, separate from the ideological concerns of the
national consciousness.  As a result, Canadian interests, existing in a nation where their
own cultural and ideological consciousness is marginalized, have by virtue of
circumstance been capable of creating only a marginalized form of expression. 
Dominant 
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interests, on the other hand, capitalizing on the inherent dependency of Canadian
interests, have perpetuated the marginalization of English Canadian culture within
Canada and the amorphousness that arises from Canada's intrinsic lack of autonomy, by
appropriating Canadian space and capital for the furthering of their own financial goals
and the benefit of their ideological imperatives.  The amorphousness of Canadian space
within the dominant ideology is thus established by Canada's inherent dependency on
dominant capital, maintained by the hegemonic structure of dominant interests, and
perpetuated by the commodification of this very amorphousness within the international
image industry, which in turn helps to continue the cycle of Canadian dependency that
contributes to Canada's amorphousness.
Ultimately, a strong, distinct understanding of English Canadian identity must of
necessity be one that incorporates rather than denies issues of dependency.  Dependency
itself must be incorporated into conceptions of English Canadian identity in order for
such conceptions to be legitimate.  It is not my contention that Canada's political and
economic culture are disabled or handicapped by dependency, but rather that they are
inherently characterized by dependency; that the very structure of the national apparatus
that determines the character of English Canadian culture and identity is defined in
relation to the parameters of Canada's dependent nature.  Only by coming to terms with
the impact of dependency on the Canadian consciousness and the manner in which
Canadians construct their lived identities will Canadians be able to forge a distinct,
identifiable discourse that is able to address concerns relative to the national
consciousness and yet still manage to exist and operate within the modes and channels
made available by hegemonic interests.  To ignore, discount, or downplay in any way the
158
inherent dependency of the Canadian condition is to continue to struggle against the
discourse of the dominant ideology on its own terms, thereby continuing to marginalize
English Canadian culture within its own national boundaries, both physical and
psychological.
One factor that contributes to this process of struggling against the conceptions of
the dominant ideology is the tendency to fetishize the modes and channels of cultural
resistance that are available to Canadians.  In other words, the means of production and
distribution of cultural products in Canada is constructed as the means to achieve cultural
sovereignty, when in fact this process is immediately sabotaged by the lack of access
Canadian cultural producers have to cultural distribution in Canada.  As a result, the
process of attaining cultural sovereignty and the institutions through which the realization
of this process is attempted become fetishized due to the inherent lack of access they
actually provide to that which is ultimately desired:  an autonomous and distinct
conception of Canadian culture and identity.  This, again, is very much a result of
Canada's inherent dependency and the manner in which Canada's historical subordinance
to a dominant power resulted in an intrinsic lack of autonomy.  The statement by Atom
Egoyan that introduces this chapter concisely summarizes the situation faced by English
Canadian artists in the face of the inherent amorphousness of English Canadian culture.  
The amorphousness of English Canadian identity, then, can be seen as a result of
Canada's inherent dependency, and, as I have illustrated is further perpetuated by the
dominant ideology by way of the international image industry and the dominant
discourse, the system of representation whose imaginary construction of our identity has,
in many ways, provided the substance that has filled the absence inherent in English
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Canadian culture.  Rotstein has suggested the inevitability of this process, stating that, "In
the absence of a vision of our nationhood and of a political culture possessed of symbols
to evoke and protect our independence, it is no cause for wonder that the ideological pull
of the United States has been strong and attractive throughout our history.  We have
found no alternative vision to sustain us in terms of our own political culture."1  With our
increasing tendency to live vicariously through the ideological reference points of the
United States, even if it is largely in opposition to such values, priorities and
preconceptions, we have effectively become something of an appendage to American
society and culture.  I am not in any way suggesting that Canada can be considered a
'miniature replica' of the United States, and my discussion in Chapter III has outlined in
better detail the distinctiveness of English Canadian culture and identity.  Rather, the
characteristics and traits that connote Canadian-ness can often only be identified and
recognized in relation to or in the context of American-ness.  From a Canadian
perspective, this results in a hyper-awareness of what 'America' is, what it represents and
what it stands for.  This is quite simply a necessity in the efforts to try and understand
what we represent and stand for as a national culture.  However, since we can only be
defined in relation to the United States, from an American perspective we remain
irrelevant, intangible, placeless and amorphous, and it is this conception that we have
constantly been struggling against in our Sisyphean attempt to achieve that which we do
not inherently possess in our own culture by absorbing it from the dominant society.  In
short, the American cultural discourse is not an oppressive, suffocating force descending
upon us through media and other avenues, but rather it is something that Canadians
ingest and engage with in order to help fill the inherent absence of our own culture.  
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In fact, many of our business elite and government officials have throughout the
nation's history actively engaged with American interests in order to fill the economic
absence resulting from our history as a colonial state and the circumstances we have
faced due to geographic and climatic conditions.  However, if the Canadian pursuit of
American capital takes place in an attempt to provide that which is inherently lacking in
Canadian political culture, perhaps it can be argued that the American appropriation of
Canada's absence and amorphousness (indeed, the very commodification of these
qualities, as I illustrated in the last chapter) can be seen as an attempt on the part of the
American elite to provide that which is unobtainable in American culture, namely a
peaceable, politic society exemplified by an ideal de-ethnicized whiteness, itself typified
by an inherent absence.  This is an assertion that I touched on briefly in my discussion in
Chapter IV of Canadian celebrities who have been able to exude and personify certain
desired traits within American culture.  I have chosen to discuss this topic in my
Afterword as opposed to the body of the text due to the fact that the appropriation of
Canadian whiteness by American culture seems a particularly weighty subject, and one
that really deserves further study of its own.  The analysis I have provided can serve as a
kind of backdrop for a discussion on issues of whiteness, which has been taken up in
greater detail by George Elliott Clarke, whose observations deserve mention here:
Left pretty much to its own devices, the white majority in 
Canada exudes a kind of ideal whiteness, ready for export.  
All my life, I've considered Canada to be a kind of discount 
warehouse where American networks and film companies go 
to purchase images of immaculate, politic whiteness.  You 
want cool?  Check out Mike Myers or Dan Aykroyd.  You 
need cerebral poise?  Try Alex Trebek or Peter Jennings.  You 
want family values?  Here's Michael J. Fox.  You want sex 
appeal?  Take Pamela Sue Anderson or Shannon Tweed.  You're 
in the market for a sellable lesbian.  Choose k.d. lang.  You're 
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searching for clean-cut action heroes?  Hire William Shatner or 
Keanu Reeves.  Weary of Alice Walker?  Read Alice Munro.  
Sick of Babyface winning all the Grammys?  Give one to Celine 
Dion.  Bruce Springsteen too aggressive for your sensibilities?  
Listen to Bryan Adams.  Polite, pacific, respectable, Canadian 
whites are abundantly available for Americans who want to 
glorify whiteness...2
The key distinction of such celebrities, of course, is that they are used to glorify an ethnic
ideal without actually being identified as ethnic.  After all, is 'Canadian' an ethnicity?  It
would seem, rather, that Canadian-ness represents the closest available materiality to a
white ideal for American culture, which also explains the use of Canadian locales as a
kind of back lot or warehouse for American films and television shows that attempt to
relocate the American idea of 'home'.  By positioning Canada as America, the dominant
ideology effectively appropriates the inherent qualities of whiteness (facilitated by
absence) in order to create its own image of the ideal 'homeland' for the new American
nation-state.
Returning now to the Canadian perspective, conventional wisdom has led us to
believe that English Canadian culture and national identity have been threatened,
weakened, or crippled in some way by the sheer omnipotence of American ideology and
cultural discourse.  The perspective that most Canadians have been encouraged to adopt
is that English Canadian cultural identity has been kept under the heel of American
media, cultural products and signifiers, and the values espoused by the image industry for
so long and to such a great extent that it has prevented us from developing or determining
who we really are, what our place in the world is, and what it is that we stand for. 
English Canadian culture could exist if only our films occupied a greater percentage of
screen time in Canadian theatres, if only English Canadians enjoyed watching English
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Canadian TV programs more than American ones, if only Canada was able to exercise
even some semblance of autonomy with regards to legislation to restrict the flow of
American cultural products in Canada, and so forth.  What I have set out to achieve in my
analysis is to illustrate the opposite; that, for better or worse, English Canada exists, and
has only ever existed, in a relationship of dependence to a dominant presence.  As Tony
Wilden explains:
Whatever our supposed intentions, most of us have been 
induced to believe that if only the others would stop doing 
whatever it is we have been persuaded to believe they are 
doing, then our own alienation would disappear.  We would 
at least be safe and secure in the selves that our social 
relations have induced us to construct.  But those very 
selves, our Imaginary selves, are dependent for many of their
characteristics on the paranoid relationship of opposition to 
the others ('I'm not like them'); and this is where Imaginary 
identifications come in to complement Imaginary projections.3
If we can assume for the sake of argument that Sartre is correct, and a people are only
able to define themselves through an act of refusing the definition constructed of them by
others, then the group must take the responsibility for this refusal into their own hands,
rather than leaving the onus of representation in the hands of their oppressors.  Only by
identifying and addressing the set of circumstances that perpetuate the means of
representation will English Canada achieve the autonomy necessary to develop a
discourse independent from that of the dominant ideology, and thus be able to define
itself on its own terms, rather than those laid out by, and therefore inevitably benefitting,
the dominant power.
However, it is crucial to remember that a refusal of the definition formed of
Canada and Canadian identity by the dominant ideology does not necessarily involve a
refusal of the entire system of relations that exist between the dominant and subordinant
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interests.  In fact, the attempt to achieve Canadian cultural autonomy is paradoxically
weakened by any attempt at self-definition that refuses to acknowledge the inherent
subordinance, absence, and dependency that constitute the reality of the Canadian
cultural consciousness.  To act as though these qualities and characteristics are externally
imposed and therefore assert that cultural autonomy can only be achieved through
internalizing cultural expression, represents not a refusal of the definition made of us but
rather a refusal to fully comprehend the nature of the relationship with the dominant
order that has formed the basis of our lived identities as Canadians.  Morley, in
discussing the nature of defining place in relation to identity, has stated that: 
Certainly, as Massey notes, in the face of these developments 
it has come to seem to many critics that any search for a 'sense 
of place' must of necessity be reactionary.  Massey's argument 
is that this is not necessarily the case and that it is in fact 
possible, if we approach the question differently, 'for a sense 
of place to be progressive; not self-enclosing and defensive, but 
outward-looking'.  This approach rejects the notion that a 'sense 
of place' must necessarily be constructed (a la Heritage Industry) 
out of 'an introverted, inward-looking history, based on delving 
into the past for internalized origins'.4  
This Heritage Industry approach to constructing a sense of place from internalized
origins has essentially been the approach taken by English Canadian cinema, endorsed
and determined by government agencies and policy makers who have tended to view
Canadian cultural dependency as the proverbial straight-jacket imposed upon us by
American dominance, something that we can struggle out of by continually reasserting
our 'Canadian culture' in the attempt to provide a counterbalance to the onslaught of
American cultural products and signifiers flooding our national reference points.  Such
internalization, however, does not attempt to refuse the conception made of English
Canadian identity by dominant interests, but rather tries to pretend that English Canadian
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identity can exist separate and independent from the ideological reference points of the
dominant culture.  The result of this denial of the actual framework within which English
Canadian identity exists is the production of an extremely fragmentary discourse that is
unable to connect with the group it claims to speak for because it fails to address the
entire framework that has helped to shape the lived identity of the group.
This approach also assumes that a particular end result can be achieved, that it is
possible to actually free ourselves from the straight-jacket and come to a clear, definitive
understanding of what Canada is, in and of itself.  However, such thinking fails to
recognize that Canada's identity as a nation is characterized by its inherent dependency,
absence, and amorphousness.  Such qualities do not permit a concrete definition, and
therefore any attempt to reach such a definitive conclusion is destined to fail due to the
fact that it ignores the actual substance (or intrinsic lack of substance) of that which it is
attempting to substantiate.  Indeed, the inability to come to a definitive understanding of
English Canadian identity is in and of itself an integral component of English Canadian
culture.  It is a paradox of an inherently dependent and subordinant nation such as
Canada that a solid conception of identity -- that is, a refusal of that which the Other has
made of us -- can only be achieved by first accepting, or at least addressing, the
definition made of us by the dominant order, for it is only through this process that we
will be able to appropriate the codes and signifiers of the dominant discourse, rather than
those that fail to express a relationship to the dominant discourse and therefore hold little
relevance for people whose lived identities are defined in relation to the dominant
ideology.  In keeping with this philosophy, Morley has further noted that:  
Against any inward-looking definition of place and identity, 
Massey argues for 'a sense of place which is extroverted, which 
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includes a consciousness to its links to the outside world', where 
what gives a place its identity is not its separate or 'pure' 
internalized history, but rather its uniqueness as a point of inter-
section in a wider network of relations.  This is then not simply 
a bounded, self-contained sense of place, constructed in 
antagonism to all that is outside (the threatening otherness of 
externality), but 'an understanding of its character which can be 
constructed by linking that place to places beyond' and where it 
is the 'particularity of linkage to that outside which is...part of 
what constitutes the place'.5  
I think one of the main reasons why many English Canadian films often come across as
seeming so placeless -- so lacking in a sense of where they are -- in spite of the use, in
some cases, of fairly distinctive locations (Hard Core Logo [Bruce Macdonald, 1996] and
Live Bait [Bruce Sweeney, 1995] are good examples of this) is because they fail to
recognize their "links to the wider world".  Placelessness, as I have illustrated throughout
my analysis, is not so much a matter of location and geography as it is a result of the kind
of consciousness people are operating under.  The fact of life in Canada is that a sense of
place can only be successfully achieved through a conceptualization that takes into
account the conceptions of Canadian space held within the dominant ideology, or in other
words, understands the 'particularity of linkage to that outside,' which is part of what
constitutes the character of the place.
This is primarily why it has been so helpful for me to conduct this study from
outside the physical and ideological boundaries of Canada.  Analysing issues of Canadian
cultural identity from within American society accentuates the relevance of the extent to
which Canada's identity and conceptualization is determined and perpetuated by forces
and interests within the United States, or at least within the structure of the dominant
American ideology.  An understanding of English Canada's intersection in the wider
network of relations is also essentially what The Tragically Hip accomplish, and is the
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main reason why they have figured so prominently in this study devoted primarily to the
image industry, and is also why a line from their song "Fireworks," which I discussed in
detail in Chapter III, introduces this section of my analysis.  In fact, my original intention
was to devote an entire chapter of this thesis to the English Canadian music industry in
an attempt to illustrate the manner in which it has succeeded to a much greater extent
than English Canadian cinema in developing a distinctly English Canadian discourse that
connects with the nation.6  Though I feel my current analysis succeeds in illuminating
issues related to the inability of English Canadian interests to develop a discourse that
successfully expresses a sense of place, an analysis of equal length could very easily be
devoted to the manner in which English Canadian musical artists have been able to
substantiate English Canada's sense of place.
I would like to draw attention here to a film that has succeeded in communicating
through a discourse that substantiates an English Canadian sense of place, in order to
illustrate the manner in which this can be accomplished through an understanding of
English Canada's place within the wider network of relations that constitute the dominant
ideology.  Keeping in mind that issues of space and place are, in many respects, more a
matter of discourse and ideology than of actual physical geography, the film which I will
discuss is Wayne's World (Penelope Spheeris, 1992), whose discourse is very Canadian
in its origin, and is highly invested in the relationship between space and marginality.7
The Canadian-ness of Wayne's World extends far beyond the nationality of its
star and writer, Mike Myers, and its producer, Lorne Michaels (who, it is worth
reminding, is also the producer of Saturday Night Live and The Kids in the Hall). 
Wayne's World, which was a blockbuster hit in the U.S. and spawned a respectably
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successful sequel, was of course based on the "Wayne's World" sketches from Saturday
Night Live, which in their own way preceded and determined the success of the film by
working their way into the American pop culture landscape.  The original sketches, in
which Wayne (Mike Myers) and Garth (Dana Carvey) sit in their basement and, through
the guise of a public access TV show, riff on various trends and components of American
pop culture, were really nothing more than a remake, updated and Americanized for a
Generation-X audience, of the Bob and Doug Mackenzie skits which Dave Thomas and
Rick Moranis performed for years on SCTV.  In those sketches, Bob and Doug are two
unemployed losers who broadcast their own show on the pseudo SCTV network from a
minimalist set in which they drink beer, eat doughnuts, and basically riff on both
Canadian and American culture.  The Bob and Doug sketches (as well as SCTV in
general), were essentially an embodiment of the amorphousness and blankness of
Canadian culture, with Bob and Doug themselves presented as the products of a culture
and society lacking in reference points and signifiers worth celebrating.  The backdrop in
front of which Bob and Doug sat, consisting of a giant geographical outline of Canada
lacking any detail and emblazoned only with the words 'The Great White North', can be
seen as a kind of self-deprecating awareness and acknowledgement of the conception of
Canada held within the dominant culture.
Wayne's World, then, picking up from its Bob and Doug-inspired origins, is
intrinsically concerned with the relationship between marginal and dominant interests
and the manner in which discourse facilitates both the maintenance of the dominant order
and the opportunity for empowerment on the part of the marginalized.  The film
essentially transplants the sensibilities and priorities of an English Canadian discourse
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into the structure and reference points of the dominant American discourse.  In fact,
Wayne's World can, in many regards, be viewed as an attempt by the marginal to subvert
the dominant discourse by revealing the methods upon which its hegemonic order relies. 
The marginalized, then, appropriate the codes and signifiers of the powerful so that they
can be deconstructed and satirized, their operation and systems of representation laid
bare.  Of course, it must be noted that the simple fact that an expression such as this is
produced and disseminated through dominant channels demands that the dominant order
not be deconstructed to the point where its legitimacy is challenged.  Rather, such an
expression acts as an outlet through which the marginalized are empowered by the
appropriation of dominant codes, even though these same codes can never be fully
relinquished by the dominant order due to the structure of its hegemonic authority over
the marginalized interests.
The plot of the film concerns the appropriation of Wayne and Garth's public
access show by a large Chicago television network.  Even though Wayne and Garth are
presented as Americans, residing in suburban Chicago, they are constructed as marginal
characters in opposition to the corporate media interests who try and appropriate their
form of expression.  Wayne and Garth, despite the American setting, are also presented
as leading explicitly Canadian lifestyles:  playing street hockey, hanging out at Stan
Makita's Donut Shop (a Chicago-ized version of Tim Horton's Doughnuts, the favoured
brand of Bob and Doug Mackenzie), and of course, living vicariously through American
pop culture.  In short, Wayne and Garth represent the kind of empowerment that can be
obtained within the margins of the dominant discourse.
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In many ways, the film serves as an attempt to transplant an English Canadian
cultural discourse into an American setting, the success of which is aided by the innate
hyper-awareness of the operation and function of the dominant American discourse that
constitutes the English Canadian perspective.  As I mentioned above, the film is also
extremely aware of issues such as the marginalization of certain groups through the
appropriation of their ideological sense of space by dominant interests.  At one point in
the film, Wayne and Garth and the small crew come to the large corporate studio from
where their show will now be filmed.  As they stand in the control room looking down on
the studio space, which has been constructed to look identical to Wayne's basement, the
narrative quite literally comes to a halt as Garth steps forward and says:  "Does this seem
weird to anybody else?  I mean, we're looking down on Wayne's basement, only that's not
Wayne's basement.  Isn't that weird?"  In doing so, the film directly draws attention to the
process by which dominant interests appropriate the sense of place and space held by
marginal concerns to promote their own interests.  This scene is immediately followed by
a short sequence in which Wayne and Garth, standing in front of a blue screen that has
been lowered down in front of their stand-in basement, announce,   We've got a new
feature on Wayne's World this week, which allows us to travel through time and space
and come home again.    Various different regionally-oriented backdrops then appear on
the screen (New York, Hawaii, Texas) and Wayne and Garth begin to act out the
appropriate behaviour that is considered to be associated with that particular
environment:  strutting like street toughs, hula dancing, and talking in a cowboy twang. 
When the final backdrop is revealed to be Delaware, Wayne and Garth simply stand
there, perplexed, until Wayne mutters a pathetic, "Hi, I'm in Delaware."
170
The film succeeds, through this reconstruction of space and the portrayal of the
manner in which some identities can be substantiated while others remain amorphous, in
acknowledging the manner in which English Canadian identity intersects with the wider
network of relations posited by dominant interests.  The film also achieves this in a later
scene in which Wayne spoofs the practice of product placement and thereby the billboard
effect upon which the dominant discourse relies for the perpetuation of its hegemonic
authority.  The scene begins as though there were nothing out of the ordinary, but then
large glowing lights appear behind Wayne as he samples various products in a very
obvious fashion, calling attention to one of the ways in which hegemony is established
and maintained.  In the case of Wayne's World, then, the relationship of English
Canadian culture to the wider network of relations is examined by  utilizing the English
Canadian discourse that facilitates a kind of hyper-awareness of American culture and
the manner in which the hegemony of the dominant order is maintained.
It is through these kinds of attempts at cultural expression, which externalize
cultural conditions and thereby allow them to exist within the reference points of the
dominant ideology that determine the lived identity of English Canadians, that English
Canada is best able, and really only capable, of formulating a discourse or form of
national expression that can substantiate a sense of place, a sense of where we exist in the
wider network of relations.  Canada=s place within this network, as I have argued, is
becoming increasingly prescient in terms of the manner in which it serves as a model for
the evolution of the contemporary nation-state.  There is an opportunity, then, for modes
of English Canadian cultural expression to reconfigure the way they position themselves
within the dominant ideology.  They can remain subservient to the economic and
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1.  Abraham Rotstein, ABinding Prometheus,@ Close The 49th Parallel: The Americanization of
Canada, ed. Ian Lumsden (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1970)  219.
2.  George Elliott Clarke, "White Like Canada," Transition Issue 73 Vol. 7 No.1. 100.
3.  Wilden 67.
4.  David Morley, ABounded Realms: Household, Family, Community, and Nation,@ Home,
Exile, Homeland: Film, Media, and the Politics of Place, ed. Hamid Naficy (New York:
ideological imperatives of the dominant order by continuing to exist as nothing more than
a branch plant society; they can continue to internalize their forms of expression and
marginalize themselves even further within the wider network of relations of the
globalized world; or they can utilize the unique perspective allowed by the English
Canadian discourse to construct in relation to dominant reference points modes of
resistance that empower the English Canadian character within the structure of
dependency and subordinance that represents an intrinsic and undeniable condition of the
Canadian mentality.  Such a culture would remain a culture of absence, but would accept
absence as empowering within the fluid, increasingly homogenized hegemonic structure
of the New World Order.
Abut i=m helpless more with the people 
than the space
I mean I=m helpless less with the people 
than the space.
You see, I don=t know Neil 
  I don=t know Neil@
-- The Tragically Hip
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6.  It should be noted here that the Quebecois cinema and music industry are both far more
successful at expressing a sense of place and connecting with the French Canadian nation
through a very distinct discourse.  Again, this in itself could be examined in an analysis of its
own.
7.  Further study of this kind -- an examination of the expression of an English Canadian
discourse in films made by Canadians within the structure of the dominant ideology -- also
deserves attention.  The films of James Cameron, for example, are particularly interesting in
terms of the manner in which they comment on technology, both in their storylines and their
means of production.  Cameron, as a director and screenwriter who happens to be Canadian,
seems to embody the material realization of the desire on the part of the marginalized to
appropriate with a vengeance the technological superiority of the dominant order, utilizing it to
express anxieties that are very much in keeping with the inherent concerns of the Canadian
consciousness.  The plot of Terminator 2 (1991), for example, directly parallels the discourse of
left-nationalism -- the primary expression of Canadian nationalism in the Fordist period -- as
described by Ian Angus:  "a lament for the failure adequately to preserve the past and an
argument that such preservation requires a radical reorientation in the future."
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APPENDIX
Programs that Position Canadian Locations as   Anywhere 
Series: Location Shot:      Location Set:    Identifiable Markers:     Production Companies:1             Cdn. Financial Involvement:2
Earth: Final Toronto      America in the future,    American Flags, geographical Tribune Entertainment; in assoc Alliance/Atlantis; in assoc with  
Conflict           Washington D.C. as a    markers and monuments  with TMG & Polygram  CTV; Cdn. Film or Video 
(in 2nd season)       home base Television Production Tax Credit
The Outer Vancouver      New every week, often    American flags & societal Trilogy Entertainment Group; Alliance/At lantis; in assoc. w/
Limits (in           in the future or some    reference points MGM Domestic Television Global, a Canwest Company, 
4th season)      alternative reality; Distribution & Superchannel; Cdn Film or 
     sometimes outer space Video Production Tax Credit
     or another planet
Sliders Vancouver      New every week;    American flags & societal 20th Century Fox Television None
(March/95-      portal leads cast to    reference points; licence plates
May/97, then      altered reality of the       when applicable; same non-   
cancelled by Fox;            descript American urban area  
renewed by Sci-Fi       with alternate character depending
Channel,  shot in LA)    on episode
Stargate SG-1 Vancouver      New every week;    American flags, military & MGM Worldwide Television None
(in 2nd season,      portal leads cast to    societal reference points Productions Inc.
4 more seasons      another world or 
already pre-sold      dimension; home base
to networks)      in Cheyenne facility
The X-Files Vancouver      New virtually every    American flags, governmental 20th Century Fox Television None
(first 5 seasons,      week; often different      &societal reference points;
Sept./93    May/98)           locales in same episode;      other applicable flags, licence      
     Wash. DC home base          plates & markers when applicable
1Excluded from mention here are the production companies run by  the show s producers, as these companies only oversee that one series.
2This includes only direct Canadian financial involvement identified in the show s end credits.  It must be rememb ered that all these programs enjoy significant financial advantages in the form of tax
production credits, exclusions from paying Canadian income tax, and various other financial incentives offered by federal and provincial governments, not to mention the advantageous exchange rate on the
Canadian dollar.
Programs that Position Canadian Locations as   Nowhere 
Series: Location Shot:      Location Set:    Identifiable Markers: Production Companies:1 Cdn. Financial Involvement2
Viper (shot in Vancouver      Metro Ci ty           American flags, governmental Paramount None
Vancouver since    & societal reference points; 
2nd season, Sep/96;       CA licence plates
currently in 4th season
Nightman Vancouver/      Bay City, CA    American flags; CA licence Tribune Entertainment; Canadian Film or Video 
(currently in San Francisco    plates Alliance Atlantis; Cescent; Production Tax Credit
1st season) in assoc. with WIC Entertainment
The Sentinel Vancouver      Cascade, WA    American flags, governmental Paramount None
(currently in    & societal reference points;
4th season)    WA licence plates
The Crow, Vancouver      Port Columbia       American flags, governmental Alliance/Atlantis; Crescent; Film Incentive BC; Canadian 
Stairway to    & societal reference points Polygram Television Film or Video Production
Tax 
Heaven3       (BC licence plates are kept out Credit
(currently in                  of focus when in shot)
1st season)
1See first f ootnote on  previous  chart.
2See sec ond footn ote on pre vious ch art.
3The Crow can also be considered under the locations as   anywhere   scenario.  Using the premise that the lead character, Eric Draven, is reincarnated, the show will often feature episodes that
revolve arou nd his oth er past life e xperien ces in oth er places a nd tim es throug h history.
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